BX 8915 .W5 1815 v.7
Witherspoon, John, 1723-
1794.
The works of John
Witherspoon

LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
AUG 10 1966
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN WITHERSPOON, D. D.

SOMETIME MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL AT PAISLEY, AND LATE PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON COLLEGE, IN NEW JERSEY.

CONTAINING

ESSAYS, SERMONS, &c.

ON

IMPORTANT SUBJECTS;

INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE AND ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION BY GRACE, AND TO POINT OUT ITS INFLUENCE ON HOLINESS OF LIFE.

TOGETHER WITH HIS

LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY, ELOQUENCE AND DIVINITY;

HIS SPEECHES IN THE AMERICAN CONGRESS;

AND MANY OTHER VALUABLE PIECES, NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED IN THIS COUNTRY.

VOL. VII.

EDINBURGH:

PRINTED FOR J. OGLE, PARLIAMENT-SQUARE; M. OGLE, GLASGOW; OGLES, DUNCAN, & COCHRAN, LONDON; AND T. JOHNSTON, DUBLIN.

1815.

CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME II.

LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

		Pag.
Lecture I.		9
II.		16
III.		23
IV.		31
V.		38
VI.		44
VII.		51
VIII.		60
IX.		66
Lecture X.		75

ON POLITICS.

XI.		86
	Relation of Parents and Children,	91
	Relation of Master and Servant,	93
Lecture XII.	Of Civil Society,	94
	Of the Different Forms of Government,	97
Lecture XIII.	Of the Law of Nature and Nations,	107
	Of Making Peace,	115
Lecture XIV.	Of Jurisprudence,	118
	Of the Sanction of the Moral Laws,	125
Lecture XV.		129
	Contracts,	*ib.*

Pag.

Of the Marks and Signs of Contracts, - - 134
Lecture XVI. Of Oaths and Vows, - 139
Of the Use of Symbols in Contracts, 142
Of the Value of Property, *ib.*
Rights of Necessity, and Common Rights, - - 145
Recapitulation, - - 149

LECTURES ON ELOQUENCE.

Lecture I. - - - - 155
II. - - - 165
III. - - - 174
IV. - - - 185
V. - - - 194
VI. - - - 205
VII. - - - 213
Of Figurative Speech, - 219
Of Figures, - - 221
VIII. - - - - 233
IX. - - - 227
X. - - - 239
XI. - - - 245
XII. - - 257
XIII. - - 265
XIV. - - - 273
XV. - - 284
XVI. - - 301

LECTURES

ON

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

LECTURE I.

MORAL Philoſophy is that branch of ſcience which treats of the principles and laws of duty, or morals. It is called *Philoſophy*, becauſe it is an inquiry into the nature and grounds of moral obligation by reaſon, as diſtinct from revelation.

Hence ariſes a queſtion, Is it lawful, and is it ſafe or uſeful, to ſeparate moral philoſophy from religion? It will be ſaid, it is either the ſame, or different from, revealed truth; if the ſame, unneceſſary —if different, falſe and dangerous.

An author of New England ſays, 'Moral philoſophy is juſt reducing infidelity to a ſyſtem.' But however ſpecious the objections, they will be found at bottom not ſolid. If the ſcripture is true, the diſcoveries of reaſon cannot be contrary to it; and

therefore it has nothing to fear from that quarter. And as we are certain it can do no evil, ſo there is a probability that it may do much good. There may be an illuſtration and confirmation of the inſpired writings from reaſon and obſervation, which will greatly add to their beauty and force.

The noble and eminent improvements in natural philoſophy, which have been made ſince the end of the laſt century, have been far from hurting the intereſt of religion; on the contrary, they have greatly promoted it. Why ſhould it not be the ſame with moral philoſophy, which is indeed nothing elſe but the knowledge of human nature? It is true, that infidels do commonly proceed upon pretended principles of reaſon. But as it is impoſſible to hinder them from reaſoning on this ſubject, the beſt way is to meet them upon their own ground, and to ſhew from reaſon itſelf the fallacy of their principles. I do not know any thing that ſerves more for the ſupport of religion, than to ſee, from the different and oppoſite ſyſtems of philoſophers, that there is nothing certain in their ſchemes, but what is coincident with the word of God.

Some there are, and perhaps more in the preſent than any former age, who deny the law of nature, and ſay, that all ſuch ſentiments as have been uſually aſcribed to the law of nature, are from revelation and tradition.

We muſt diſtinguiſh here between the light of nature and the law of nature: by the firſt is to be underſtood what we can or do diſcover by our own powers, without revelation or tradition: by the ſe-

cond, that which, when discovered, can be made appear to be agreeable to reason and nature.

There have been some very shrewd and able writers of late, viz. Dr Wilson of Newcastle, and Mr Riccalton of Scotland, who have written against the light of nature, shewing that the first principles of knowledge are taken from information:—That nothing can be supposed more rude and ignorant, than man without instruction:—That when men have been brought up so, they have scarcely been superior to brutes. It is very difficult to be precise upon this subject, and to distinguish the discoveries of reason from the exercise of it. Yet I think, admitting all, or the greatest part, of what such contend for, we may, notwithstanding, consider how far any thing is consonant to reason, or may be proven by reason; though perhaps reason, if left to itself, would never have discovered it.

Dr Clark was one of the greatest champions for the law of nature; but it is only since his time that the shrewd opposers of it have appeared. The Hutchinsonians (so called from Hutchinson of England) insist, that not only all moral, but also all natural knowledge, comes from revelation, the true system of the world, true chronology, all human arts, &c. In this, as is usual with most other classes of men, they carry their nostrums to extravagance. I am of opinion, that the scripture is perfectly agreeable to sound philosophy; yet certainly it was never intended to teach us every thing. The political law of the Jews contains many noble principles of equity, and excellent examples to fu-

ture lawgivers; yet it was so local and peculiar, that certainly it was never intended to be immutable and universal.

It would be more just and useful to say, that all simple and original discoveries have been the production of Providence, and not the invention of man. On the whole, it seems reasonable to make moral philosophy, in the sense above explained, a subject of study. And, indeed, let men think what they will of it, they ought to acquaint themselves with it. They must know what it is, if they mean even to shew that it is false.

The Division of the Subject.

Moral philosophy is divided into two great branches, ethics and politics; to this some add jurisprudence, though this may be considered as a part of politics.

Ethics relate to personal duties; politics to the constitution, government, and rights of societies; and jurisprudence, to the administration of justice in constituted states.

It seems a point agreed upon, that the principles of duty and obligation must be drawn from the nature of man. That is to say, if we can discover how his Maker formed him, or for what he intended him, that certainly is what he ought to be.

The knowledge of human nature, however, is either perplexed and difficult of itself, or hath been made so by the manner in which writers in all ages have treated it. Perhaps this circumstance itself is a strong presumption of the truth of the scripture-

doctrine of the depravity and corruption of our nature. Supposing this depravity, it must be one great cause of difficulty and confusion in giving an account of human nature as the work of God.

This I take to be indeed the case with the greatest part of our moral and theological knowledge.

Those who deny this depravity, will be apt to plead for every thing, or for many things, as dictates of nature, which are in reality propensities of nature in its present state, but at the same time the fruit and evidence of its departure from its original purity. It is by the remaining power of natural conscience that we must endeavour to detect and oppose their errors.

1. We may consider man very generally in his species as distinct from and superior to the other creatures, and what it is, in which the difference truly consists. 2. As an individual, what are the parts which constitute his nature.

1. Philosophers have generally attempted to assign the precise distinction between men and the other animals; but when endeavouring to bring it to one peculiar incommunicable characteristic, they have generally contradicted one another, and sometimes disputed with violence, and rendered the thing more uncertain.

The difficulty of fixing upon a precise criterion, only serves to shew, that in man we have an example of what we see also every where else, viz. a beautiful and insensible gradation from one thing to another, so that the highest of the inferior is, as it were, connected and blended with the lowest of

the ſuperior claſs. Birds and beaſts are connected by ſome ſpecies, ſo that you will find it hard to ſay whether they belong to the one or the other. So indeed it is in the whole vegetable as well as animal kingdom. (1.) Some ſay *men* are diſtinguiſhed from brutes by reaſon, and certainly this either in kind or degree, is the moſt honourable of our diſtinctions. (2.) Others ſay, that many brutes give ſtrong ſigns of reaſon, as dogs, horſes, and elephants; but that man is diſtinguiſhed by memory and foreſight: but I apprehend that theſe are upon the ſame footing with reaſon, if there are ſome glimmerings of reaſon in the brute creation, there are alſo manifeſt proofs of memory, and ſome of foreſight. (3.) Some have thought it proper to diſtinguiſh man from the inferior creatures by the uſe of ſpeech, no other creatures having an articulate language. Here, again, we are obliged to acknowledge, that our diſtinction is chiefly the excellence and fulneſs of articulate diſcourſe; for brutes have certainly the art of making one another underſtand many things by ſound. (4.) Some have ſaid, that man is not completely diſtinguiſhed by any of theſe, but by a ſenſe of religion. And I think it muſt be admitted, that of piety, or a ſenſe of the Supreme Being, there is not any trace to be ſeen in the inferior creatures. The ſtories handed about by weak-minded perſons, or retailed by credulous authors, of reſpect in them to churches, or ſacred perſons, are to be diſdained as wholly fabulous and viſionary. (5.) There have been ſome who have ſaid, that man is diſtinguiſhed from the brutes by a ſenſe of *ridicule*.

The whole creation (ſays a certain author) is grave, except man, no one aughs but himſelf. There is ſomething whimſical in fixing upon this as the criterion, and it does not ſeem to place us in a very reſpectable light. Perhaps it is not improper to ſmile upon the occaſion, and to ſay, that if this ſentiment is embraced, we ſhall be obliged to confeſs kindred with the apes, who are certainly themſelves poſſeſſed of a riſible faculty, as well as qualified to excite laughter in us. On the whole, there ſeems no neceſſity of fixing upon ſome one criterion, to the excluſion of others.

There is a great and apparent diſtinction between man and the inferior animals, not only in the beauty of his form, which the poet takes notice of, *Os homini ſublime dedit*, &c. but alſo in reaſon, memory, reflection, and the knowledge of God and a future ſtate.

A general diſtinction, which deſerves particularly to be taken notice of in moral diſquiſitions, is, that man is evidently made to be guided, and protected from dangers, and ſupplied with what is uſeful more by reaſon, and brutes more by inſtinct.

It is not very eaſy, and perhaps not neceſſary, to explain inſtinct. It is ſomething previous to reaſon and thought. When we ſay the birds build their neſts by inſtinct, and man builds his habitation by reflection, experience, or inſtruction, we underſtand things well enough; but if we attempt to give a logical definition of either the one or the other, it will immediately be aſſaulted by a thouſand arguments.

Though man is evidently governed by something elſe than inſtinct, he alſo has ſeveral inſtinctive propenſities, ſome of them independent of, and ſome of them intermixed with his moral diſpoſitions. Of the firſt kind are hunger, thirſt, and ſome others; of the laſt is the *storge*, or parental tenderneſs towards offſpring.

On inſtinct we ſhall only ſay farther, that it leads more immediately to the appointment of the Creator, and whether, in man or in other creatures, operates more early and more uniformly than reaſon.

LECTURE II.

2d. CONSIDERING man as an individual, we diſcover the moſt obvious and remarkable circumſtances of his nature, that he is a compound of body and ſpirit. I take this for granted here, becauſe we are only explaining the nature of man. When we come to his ſentiments and principles of action, it will be more proper to take notice of the ſpirituality and immortality of the ſoul, and how they are proved.

The body and ſpirit have a great reciprocal influence one upon another; the body on the temper and diſpoſition of the ſoul, and the ſoul on the ſtate and habit of the body. The body is properly the miniſter of the ſoul, the means of conveying perception to it, but nothing without it.

It is needleſs to enlarge on the ſtructure of the body; this is ſufficiently known to all, except we

lescend to anatomical exactness, and then, like all he other parts of nature, it shews the infinite wisdom of the Creator. With regard to morals, the influence of the body in a certain view may be very great in enslaving men to appetite, and yet there does not seem any such connection with morals as to require a particular description. I think there is little reason to doubt that there are great and essential differences between man and man, as to the spirit and its proper powers; but it seems plain, that such are the laws of union between the body and spirit, that many faculties are weakened, and some rendered altogether incapable of exercise, merely by an alteration of the state of the body. Memory is frequently lost and judgement weakened by old age and disease. Sometimes, by a confusion of the brain in a fall, the judgement is wholly disordered. The instinctive appetites of hunger and thirst, seem to reside directly in the body, and the soul to have little more than a passive perception. Some passions, particularly fear and rage, seem also to have their seat in the body, immediately producing a certain modification of the blood and spirits. This indeed is perhaps the case in some degree with all passions whenever they are indulged; they give a modification to the blood and spirits, which make them easily rekindled; but there are none which do so instantaneously arise from the body, and prevent deliberation, will, and choice, as these now named. To consider the evil passions to which we are liable, we may say, those that depend most upon the body, are fear, anger, volup-

tuouſneſs; and thoſe that depend leaſt upon it, are ambition, envy, covetouſneſs.

The faculties of the mind are commonly divided into theſe three kinds, the underſtanding, the will, and the affections; though perhaps it is proper to obſerve, that theſe are not three qualities wholly diſtinct, as if they were three different beings, but different ways of exerting the ſame ſimple principle. It is the ſoul or mind that underſtands, wills, or is affected with pleaſure and pain. The underſtanding ſeems to have truth for its object, the diſcovering things as they really are in themſelves, and in their relations one to another. It has been diſputed, whether good may be in any degree the object of the underſtanding. On the one hand, it ſeems as if truth, and that only, belonged to the underſtanding; becauſe we can eaſily ſuppoſe perſons of equal intellectual powers and oppoſite moral characters. Nay, we can ſuppoſe malignity joined to a high degree of underſtanding, and virtue, or true goodneſs, to a much lower. On the other hand, the choice made by the will ſeems to have the judgment, or deliberation of the underſtanding, as its very foundation. How can this be, it will be ſaid, if the underſtanding has nothing to do with good or evil? A conſiderable oppoſition of ſentiments among philoſophers has ariſen from this queſtion. Dr Clark, and ſome others, make underſtanding or reaſon the immediate principle of virtue. Shaftſbury, Hutchinſon, and others, make affection the principle of it. Perhaps neither the one nor the other is wholly right. Probably both are neceſſary.

The connection between truth and goodneſs, be-
ween the underſtanding and the heart, is a ſubject
great moment, but alſo of great difficulty. I
ink we may ſay with certainty, that infinite per-
ction, intellectual and moral, are united and inſe-
rable in the Supreme Being. There is not, how-
er, in inferior natures, an exact proportion be-
ween the one and the other; yet I apprehend, that
uth naturally and neceſſarily promotes goodneſs,
d falſehood the contrary; but as the influence is
ciprocal, malignity of diſpoſition, even with the
reateſt natural powers, blinds the underſtanding,
d prevents the perception of truth itſelf.

Of the will it is uſual to enumerate four acts;
ſire, averſion, joy, and ſorrow. The two laſt,
utchinſon ſays, are ſuperfluous, in which he ſeems
be right. All the acts of the will may be re-
ced to the two great heads of deſire and averſion,
, in other words, chuſing and refuſing.

The affections are called alſo paſſions, becauſe
ten excited by external objects. In as far as
ey differ from a calm deliberate deciſion of the
dgement, or determination of the will, they may
called ſtrong propenſities implanted in our na-
re, which of themſelves contribute not a little to
as the judgement, or incline the will.

The affections cannot be better underſtood than
obſerving the difference between a calm, deli-
rate, general inclination, whether of the ſelfiſh or
nevolent kind, and particular violent inclinations.
very man deliberately wiſhes his own happineſs;
t this differs conſiderably from a paſſionate at-
chment to particular gratifications, as a love of

riches, honours, pleasures. A good man will have a deliberate fixed desire of the welfare of mankind; but this differs from the love of children, relations, friends, country.

The passions are very numerous, and may be greatly diversified, because every thing, however modified, that is the object of desire or aversion, may grow by accident or indulgence, to such a size, as to be called, and deserve to be called, a passion. Accordingly we express ourselves thus in the English language: A passion for horses, dogs, play, &c.

However, all the passions may be ranged under the two great heads of *love* and *hatred*. To the first belong esteem, admiration, good-will, and every species of approbation, delight, and desire; to the other, all kinds of aversion, and ways of expressing it, *envy*, *malice*, *rage*, *revenge*, to whatever objects they may be directed.

Hope and fear, joy and sorrow, though frequently ranked among the passions, seem rather to be states or modifications of the mind, attending the exercise of every passion, according as its object is probable or improbable, possessed or lost.

Jealousy seems to be a passion of a middle nature, which it is not easy to say whether it should be ranked under the head of love or hatred. It is often said of jealousy between the sexes, that it springs from love; yet, it seems plainly impossible that it can have place without forming an ill opinion of its object, at least in some degree. The same thing may be said of jealousy and suspicion in friendship.

The passions may be ranged in two classes in a different way, viz. as they are selfish or benevolent,

public or private. There will be great occaſion to conſider this diſtinction afterwards, in explaining the nature of virtue, and the motives that lead to it. What is obſerved now, is only to illuſtrate our nature as it really is. There is a great and real diſtinction between paſſions, ſelfiſh and benevolent. The firſt point directly, and immediately at our own intereſt in the gratification; the others point immediately at the happineſs of others. Of the firſt kind, is the love of fame, power, property, pleaſure. And of the ſecond, is family and domeſtic affection, friendſhip, and patriotiſm. It is to no purpoſe to ſay, that ultimately it is to pleaſe ourſelves, or becauſe we feel a ſatisfaction in ſeeking the good of others; for it is certain, that the direct object in view, in many caſes, is to promote the happineſs of others; and for this many have been willing to ſacrifice every thing, even life itſelf.

After this brief ſurvey of human nature, in one light, or in one point of view, which may be called its capacity, it will be neceſſary to return back, and take a ſurvey of the way in which we become acquainted with the objects about which we are to be converſant, or upon which the above faculties are to be exerciſed.

On this it is proper to obſerve in general, that there are but two ways in which we come to the knowledge of things, viz. 1ſt, Senſation, 2d, Reflection.

The firſt of theſe muſt be divided again into two parts, external and internal.

External ariſes from the immediate impreſſion of objects from without. The external ſenſes, in num-

ber, are five; feeing, hearing, feeling, tafting, and fmelling.

In thefe are obfervable the impreffion itfelf, or the fenfation we feel, and the fuppofition infeparable from it, that it is produced by an external object. That our fenfes are to be trufted in the information they give us, feems to me a firft principle, becaufe they are the foundation of all our after reafonings. The few exceptions of accidental irregularity in the fenfes, can found no juft objection to this, as there are fo many plain and obvious ways of difcovering and correcting it.

The reality of the material fyftem, I think, may be eafily eftablifhed, except upon fuch principles as are fubverfive of all certainty, and lead to univerfal fcepticifm; and perfons who would maintain fuch principles, do not deferve to be reafoned with, becaufe they do not pretend to communicate knowledge, but to take all knowledge from us.

The Immaterialifts fay, that we are conficious of nothing but the impreffion or feeling of our own mind; but they do not obferve, that the impreffion itfelf implies and fuppofes fomething external that communicates it, and cannot be feparated from that fuppofition. Sometimes fuch reafoners tell us, that we cannot fhew the fubftance feparate from its fenfible qualities; no more can any man fhew me a fenfible quality feparate from a particular fubject. If any man will fhew me whitenefs, without fhewing me any thing that is white, or roundnefs without any thing that is round, I will fhew him the fubftance without either colour or fhape.

Immaterialiſm takes away the diſtinction between truth and falſehood. I have an idea of a houſe or a tree in a certain place, and I call this true, that is, I am of opinion, there is really a houſe or a tree in that place. Again, I form an idea of a houſe or a tree, as what may be in that place; I aſk what is the difference, if after all, you tell me, there is neither tree, houſe, nor place, any where exiſting. An advocate for that ſyſtem ſays, that truth conſiſts in the livelineſs of the idea, than which nothing can be more manifeſtly falſe. I can form as diſtinct an idea of any thing that is not, as any thing that is, when it is abſent from my ſight. I have a much more lively idea of Jupiter and Juno, and many of their actions, from Homer and Virgil, though I do not believe that any of them ever exiſted, than I have of many things that I know happened within theſe few months.

The truth is, the immaterial ſyſtem is a wild and ridiculous attempt to unſettle the principles of common ſenſe by metaphyſical reaſoning, which can hardly produce any thing but contempt in the generality of perſons who hear it, and which, I verily believe, never produced conviction even on the perſons who pretend to eſpouſe it.

LECTURE III.

INTERNAL ſenſation is what Mr Hutchinſon calls the finer powers of perception. It takes its riſe from the external objects, but, by abſtraction, con-

ſiders ſomething farther than merely the ſenſible qualities.—

1. Thus, with reſpect to many objects, there is a ſenſe of beauty in the appearance, ſtructure, or compoſition, which is altogether diſtinct from mere colour, ſhape, and extenſion. How, then, is this beauty perceived? It enters by the eye, but it is perceived and reliſhed by what may be well enough called an internal ſenſe, quality, or capacity of the mind.

2. There is a ſenſe of pleaſure in imitation, whence the arts of painting, ſculpture, poetry, are often called the imitative arts. It is eaſy to ſee, that the imitation itſelf gives the pleaſure, for we receive much pleaſure from a lively deſcription of what would be painful to behold.

3. A ſenſe of harmony.

4. A ſenſe of order or proportion.

Perhaps, after all, the whole of theſe ſenſes may be conſidered as belonging to one claſs, and to be the particulars which either ſingly, or by the union of ſeveral of them, or of the whole, produce what is called the pleaſures of the imagination. If ſo, we may extend theſe ſenſes to every thing that enters into the principles of beauty and gracefulneſs. Order, proportion, ſimplicity, intricacy, uniformity, variety—eſpecially as theſe principles have any thing in common that is equally applicable to all the fine arts, painting, ſtatuary, architecture, muſic, poetry, oratory.

The various theories upon the principles of beauty, or what it is that properly conſtitutes it, are of much importance on the ſubject of taſte and cri-

ticiſm, but of very little in point of morals. Whether it be a ſimple perception that cannot be analyſed, or a Je ne ſcai quoi, as the French call it, that cannot be diſcovered, it is the ſame thing to our preſent purpoſe, ſince it cannot be denied, that there is a perception of beauty, and that this is very different from the mere colour or dimenſions of the object. This beauty extends to the form and ſhape of viſible, or to the grace and motion of living objects; indeed, to all works of art, and productions of genius.

Theſe are called the reflex ſenſes ſometimes, and it is of moment to obſerve, both that they really belong to our nature, and that they are very different from the groſſer perceptions of external ſenſe.

It muſt alſo be obſerved, that ſeveral diſtinguiſhed writers have added, as an internal ſenſe, that of morality, a ſenſe and perception of moral excellence, and our obligation to conform ourſelves to it in our conduct.

Though there is no occaſion to join Mr Hutchinſon, or any other, in their oppoſition to ſuch as make reaſon the principle of virtuous conduct, yet I think it muſt be admitted, that a ſenſe of moral good and evil, is as really a principle of our nature, as either the groſs external or reflex ſenſes, and as truly diſtinct from both, as they are from each other.

This moral ſenſe is preciſely the ſame thing with what, in ſcripture and common language, we call conſcience. It is the law which our Maker has written upon our hearts, and both intimates and enforces duty, previous to all reaſoning. The op-

pofers of innate ideas, and of the law of nature, are unwilling to admit the reality of a moral fenfe, yet their objections are wholly frivolous. The neceffity of education and information to the production and exercife of the reflex fenfes or powers of the imagination, is every whit as great as to the application of the moral fenfe. If, therefore, any one fhould fay, as is often done by Mr Locke, If there are any innate principles, what are they? enumerate them to me; if they are effential to man, they muft be in every man; let me take any artlefs clown, and examine him, and fee if he can tell me what they are. I would fay, if the principles of tafte are natural, they muft be univerfal. Let me try the clown, then, and fee whether he will agree with us, either in difcovering the beauty of a poem or picture, or being able to affign the reafons of his approbation.

There are two fenfes which are not eafily reducible to any of the two kinds of internal fenfes, and yet certainly belong to our nature. They are allied to one another—A fenfe of ridicule, and a fenfe of honour and fhame. A fenfe of the ridiculous is fomething peculiar; for though it be admitted, that every thing that is ridiculous is at the fame time unreafonable and abfurd; yet it is as certain the terms are not convertible, for any thing that is abfurd is not ridiculous. There are an hundred falfehoods in mathematics and other fciences, that do not tempt any body to laugh.

Shafteſbury has, through his whole writings, endeavoured to eſtabliſh this principle, that ridicule is the teſt of truth; but the falſehood of that opinion

appears from the above remark, for there is something really distinct from reasoning in ridicule. It seems to be putting imagination in the place of reason.—See Brown's Essays on the Characteristics.

A sense of honour and shame seems, in a certain view, to subject us to the opinions of others, as they depend upon the sentiments of our fellow-creatures. Yet, perhaps we may consider this sentiment as intended to be an assistant or guard to virtue, by making us apprehend reproach from others for what is in itself worthy of blame. This sense is very strong and powerful in its effects, whether it be guided by true or false principles.

After this survey of human nature, let us consider how we derive either the nature or obligation of duty from it.

One way is to consider what indications we have from our nature, of the way that leads to the truest happiness. This must be done by a careful attention to the several classes of perceptions and affections, to see which of them are most excellent, delightful, or desirable.

They will then soon appear to be of three great classes, as mentioned above, easily distinguishable from one another, and gradually rising above one another.

1. The gratification of the external senses. This affords some pleasure. We are led to desire what is pleasing, and to avoid what is disgustful to them.

2. The finer powers of perception give a delight which is evidently more excellent, and which we must necessarily pronounce more noble. Poetry,

painting, muſic, &c. the exertion of genius, and exerciſe of the mental powers in general, give a pleaſure, though not ſo tumultuous, much more refined, and which does not ſo ſoon ſatiate.

3. Superior to both theſe, is a ſenſe of moral excellence, and a pleaſure ariſing from doing what is dictated by the moral ſenſe.

It muſt doubtleſs be admitted, that this repreſentation is agreeable to truth, and that to thoſe who would calmly and fairly weigh the delight of moral actions, it muſt appear ſuperior to any other gratification, being moſt *noble*, *pure*, and *durable*. Therefore we might conclude, that it is to be preferred before all other ſources of pleaſure, that they are to give way to it when oppoſite, and to be no otherwiſe embraced than in ſubſerviency to it.

But though we cannot ſay there is any thing falſe in this theory, there are certainly very eſſential defects. As for example, it wholly confounds, or leaves entirely undiſtinguiſhed, acting virtuouſly from ſeeking happineſs: ſo that promoting our own happineſs will in that caſe be the eſſence or definition of virtue, and a view to our own intereſt will be the ſole and complete obligation to virtue. Now there is good ground to believe, not only that reaſon teaches us, but that the moral ſenſe dictates to us, ſomething more on both heads, viz. that there are diſintereſted affections that point directly at the good of others, and that theſe are ſo far from meriting to be excluded from the notion of virtue altogether, that they rather ſeem to claim a preference to the ſelfiſh affections. I know the friends of the ſcheme of ſelf-intereſt have a way of colouring or ſolving

this. They say, men only approve and delight in benevolent affections, as pleasing and delightful to themselves. But this is not satisfying, for it seems to weaken the force of public affection very much, to refer it all to self-interest, and when nature seems to be carrying you out of yourself, by strong instinctive propensities or implanted affections, to turn the current and direction of these into the stream of self-interest, in which experience tells us we are most apt to run to a vicious excess.

Besides it is affirmed, and I think with good reason, that the moral sense carries a good deal more in it than merely an approbation of a certain class of actions as beautiful, praise-worthy, or delightful, and therefore finding our interest in them as the most noble gratification. The moral sense implies also a sense of obligation, that such and such things are right, and others wrong; that we are bound in duty to do the one, and that our conduct is hateful, blameable, and deserving of punishment, if we do the contrary; and there is also in the moral sense or conscience, an apprehension or belief that reward and punishment will follow, according as we shall act in the one way, or in the other.

It is so far from being true, that there is no more in virtuous action than a superior degree of beauty, or a more noble pleasure, that indeed the beauty and sweetness of virtuous action arises from this very circumstance—that it is a compliance with duty or supposed obligation. Take away this, and the beauty vanishes, as well as the pleasure. Why is it more pleasant to do a just or charitable action, than to satisfy my palate with delightful

meat, or to walk in a beautiful garden, or read an exquisite poem? only because I feel myself under an obligation to do it, as a thing useful and important in itself. It is not duty because pleasing, but pleasing because duty. The same thing may be said of beauty and approbation. I do not approve of the conduct of a plain, honest, industrious, pious man, because it is more beautiful than that of an idle profligate, but I say it is more beautiful and amiable, because he keeps within the bounds of his duty. I see a higher species of beauty in moral action: but it arises from a sense of obligation. It may be said, that my interest and duty are the same, because they are inseparable, and the one arises from the other; but there is a real distinction and priority of order. A thing is not my duty, because it is my interest, but it is a wise appointment of nature, that I shall forfeit my interest, if I neglect my duty.

Several other remarks might be made to confirm this. When any person has by experience found, that in seeking pleasure he embraces a less pleasing enjoyment, in place of one more delightful, he may be sensible of mistake or misfortune, but he has nothing at all of the feeling of blame or self-condemnation; but when he hath done an immoral action, he has an inward remorse, and feels that he has broken a law, and that he ought to have done otherwise.

LECTURE IV.

THIS, therefore, lays us under the neceſſity of ſearching a little further for the principle of moral action. In order to do this with the greater accuracy, and give you a view of the chief controverſies on this ſubject, obſerve, that there are really three queſtions upon it, which muſt be inquired into, and diſtinguiſhed. I am ſenſible, they are ſo intimately connected, that they are ſometimes neceſſarily intermixed; but at others, not diſtinguiſhing leads into error. The queſtions relate to,

1. The nature of virtue.
2. The foundation of virtue.
3. The obligation of virtue.

When we inquire into the nature of virtue, we do enough when we point out what it is, or ſhew how we may come to the knowledge of every particular duty, and be able to diſtinguiſh it from the oppoſite vice. When we ſpeak of the foundation of virtue, we aſk or anſwer the queſtion, Why is it ſo? Why is this courſe of action preferable to the contrary? What is its excellence? When we ſpeak of the obligation of virtue, we aſk, By what law we are bound, or from what principles we ought to be obedient to the precepts which it contains or preſcribes?

After ſpeaking ſomething to each of theſe—to the controverſies that have been raiſed upon them—and the propriety or importance of entering far

into theſe controverſies, or a particular deciſion of them, I ſhall proceed to a detail of the moral laws, or the ſeveral branches of duty, according to the diviſion firſt laid down.

1. As to the nature of virtue, or what it is; or, in other words, what is the rule by which I muſt try every diſputed practice—that I may keep clear of the next queſtion, you may obſerve, that upon all the ſyſtems they muſt have recourſe to one or more of the following, viz. Conſcience, reaſon, experience. All who found virtue upon affection, particularly Hutchinſon, Shafteſbury, and their followers, make the moral ſenſe the rule of duty, and very often attempt to exclude the uſe of reaſon on this ſubject. Theſe authors ſeem alſo to make benevolence and public affection the ſtandard of virtue, in diſtinction from all private and ſelfiſh paſſions.

Dr Clark, and moſt Engliſh writers of the laſt age, make reaſon the ſtandard of virtue, particularly as oppoſed to inward ſentiment or affection. They have this to ſay particularly in ſupport of their opinion, that reaſon does in fact often controul and alter ſentiment; whereas ſentiment cannot alter the clear deciſions of reaſon. Suppoſe my heart dictates to me any thing to be my duty, as, for example, to have compaſſion on a perſon detected in the commiſſion of crimes; yet if, upon cool reflection, I perceive that ſuffering him to go unpuniſhed will be hurtful to the community, I counteract the ſentiment from the deductions of reaſon.

Again: Some take in the aid of experience, and chiefly act upon it. All particularly who are upon the ſelfiſh ſcheme, find it neceſſary to make expe-

rience the guide, to shew them what things are really conducive to happiness, and what not.

We shall proceed to consider the opinions upon the nature of virtue, the chief of which are as follow.

1. Some say that virtue consists in acting agreeably to the nature and reason of things; and that we are to abstract from all affection, public and private, in determining any question upon it.—*Clark.*

2. Some say that benevolence or public affection is virtue, and that a regard to the good of the whole is the standard of virtue. What is most remarkable in this scheme is, that it makes the sense of obligation in particular instances give way to a supposed greater good.—*Hutchinson.*

3. One author (Wollaston Rel. of Nat. delineated) makes truth the foundation of virtue; and he reduces the good or evil of any action to the truth or falsehood of a proposition. This opinion differs not in substance, but in words only, from Dr Clark's.

4. Others place virtue in self-love, and make a well regulated self-love the standard and foundation of it. This scheme is best defended by Dr Campbell, of St Andrew's.

5. Some of late have made sympathy the standard of virtue, particularly Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. He says we have a certain feeling, by which we sympathise, and, as he calls it, go along with what appears to be right. This is but a new phraseology for the moral sense.

6. David Hume has a ſcheme of morals that is peculiar to himſelf. He makes every thing that is *agreeable* and *useful* virtuous, and *vice versa*, by which he entirely annihilates the difference between natural and moral qualities, making health, ſtrength, cleanlineſs, as really virtues as integrity and truth.

7. We have an opinion publiſhed in this country, that virtue conſiſts in the love of being, as ſuch.

Several of theſe authors do eaſily and naturally incorporate piety with their ſyſtem, particularly Clark, Hutchinſon, Campbell, and Edwards.

And there are ſome who begin by eſtabliſhing natural religion, and then found virtue upon piety. This amounts to the ſame thing in ſubſtance; for reaſoners upon the nature of virtue only mean to ſhew what the Author of nature has pointed out as duty. And after natural religion is eſtabliſhed on general proofs, it will remain to point out what are its laws, which, not taking in revelation, muſt bring us back to conſider our own nature, and the rational deduction from it.

2. The opinions on the foundation of virtue may be ſummed up in the four following.

1. The will of God. 2. The reaſon and nature of things. 3. The public intereſt. 4. Private intereſt.

1. The will of God. By this is not meant what was mentioned above, that the intimations of the divine will point out what is our duty; but that the reaſon of the difference between virtue and vice is to be ſought no where elſe than in the good pleaſure of God; that there is no intrinſic excellence

in any thing but as he commands or forbids it. They pretend that, if it were otherwiſe, there would be ſomething above the Supreme Being, ſomething in the nature of things that would lay him under the law of neceſſity or fate. But notwithſtanding the difficulty of our forming clear conceptions on this ſubject, it ſeems very harſh and unreaſonable to ſay, that the difference between virtue and vice is no other than the divine will. This would be taking away the moral character even of God himſelf. It would not have any meaning, then, to ſay he is infinitely holy and infinitely perfect. But probably thoſe who have aſſerted this, did not mean any more, than that the divine will is ſo perfect and excellent, that all virtue is reduced to conformity to it; and that we ought not to judge of good and evil by any other rule. This is as true as that the divine conduct is the ſtandard of wiſdom.

2. Some found it in the reaſon and nature of things. This may be ſaid to be true, but not ſufficiently preciſe and explicit. Thoſe who embrace this principle ſucceed beſt in their reaſoning, when endeavouring to ſhew that there is an eſſential difference between virtue and vice. But when they attempt to ſhew wherein this difference doth or can conſiſt, other than public or private happineſs, they ſpeak with very little meaning.

3. Public happineſs. This opinion is, that the foundation of virtue, or that which makes the diſtinction between it and vice, is its tendency to promote the general good; ſo that utility at bottom is the principle of virtue, even with the great patrons of diſintereſted affection.

4. Private happineſs. Thoſe who chooſe to place the foundation of virtue here, would have us to conſider no other excellence in it than what immediately conduces to our own gratification.

Upon theſe opinions I would obſerve, that there is ſomething true in every one of them, but that they may be eaſily puſhed to an error by exceſs.

The nature and will of God is ſo perfect as to be the true ſtandard of all excellence, natural and moral: and if we are ſure of what he is or commands, it would be preſumption and folly to reaſon againſt it, or put our views of fitneſs in the room of his pleaſure; but to ſay, that God, by his will, might have made the ſame temper and conduct virtuous and excellent, which we now call vicious, ſeems to unhinge all our notions of the ſupreme excellence even of God himſelf.

Again, there ſeems to be in the nature of things an intrinſic excellence in moral worth, and an indelible impreſſion of it upon the conſcience, diſtinct from producing or receiving happineſs, and yet we cannot eaſily illuſtrate its excellence, but by comparing one kind of happineſs with another.

Again, promoting the public or general good ſeems to be ſo nearly connected with virtue, that we muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe that univerſal virtue could be of univerſal utility. Yet there are two exceſſes to which this has ſometimes led. One, the fataliſt and neceſſitarian ſchemes, to which there are ſo many objections; and the other, the making the general good the ultimate practical rule to every particular perſon, ſo that he may violate par-

ticular obligations with a view to a more general benefit.

Once more, it is certain, that virtue is as really connected with private as with public happiness, and yet to make the interest of the agent the only foundation of it, seems to narrow the mind, and to be so destructive to the public and generous affections, as to produce the most hurtful effects.

If I were to lay down a few propositions on the foundation of virtue, as a philosopher, they should be the following.

1. From reason, contemplation, sentiment, and tradition, the being, and infinite perfection and excellence of God, may be deduced; and therefore what he is, and commands, is virtue and duty. Whatever he has implanted in corrupted nature as a principle, is to be received as his will. Propensities resisted and contradicted by the inward principle of conscience, are to be considered as inherent or contracted vice.

2. True virtue certainly promotes the general good; and this may be made use of as an argument in doubtful cases, to determine whether a particular principle is right or wrong; but to make the good of the whole our immediate principle of action, is putting ourselves in God's place, and actually superseding the necessity and use of the particular principle of duty which he hath impressed upon the conscience. As to the whole, I believe the universe is faultless and perfect, but I am unwilling to say it is the *best* possible system, because I am not able to understand such an argument, and because it seems to me absurd that infinite perfec-

tion ſhould exhauſt or limit itſelf by a created production.

3. There is in the nature of things a difference between virtue and vice; and however much virtue and happineſs are connected by the divine law, and in the event of things, we are made ſo as to feel towards them, and conceive of them, as diſtinct. We have the ſimple perceptions of duty and intereſt.

4. Private and public intereſt may be promoted by the ſame means, but they are diſtinct views; they ſhould be made to aſſiſt, and not deſtroy each other.

The reſult of the whole is, that we ought to take the rule of duty from conſcience, enlightened by reaſon, experience, and every way by which we can be ſuppoſed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in creating us ſuch as we are. And we ought to believe, that it is as deeply founded as the nature of God himſelf, being a tranſcript of his moral excellence, and that it is productive of the greateſt good.

LECTURE V.

3. IT remains only that we ſpeak of the obligation of virtue, or what is the law that binds us to the performance, and from what motives or principles we ought to follow its dictates.

The ſentiments upon this ſubject differ, as men have different views of the nature and foundation

of virtue, yet they may be reduced within narrower bounds.

The obligation of virtue may be eaſily reduced to two general kinds, duty and intereſt. The firſt, if real, implies that we are under ſome law, or ſubject to ſome ſuperior, to whom we are accountable. The other only implies that nature points it out to us as our own greateſt happineſs, and that there is no other reaſon why we ought to obey.

Now, I think it is very plain, that there is more in the obligation of virtue, than merely our greateſt happineſs. The moral ſentiment itſelf implies that it is duty, independent of happineſs. This produces remorſe and diſapprobation, as having done what is blameable and of ill deſert. We have two ideas very diſtinct, when we ſee a man miſtaking his own intereſt, and not obtaining ſo much happineſs as he might, and when we ſee him breaking through every moral obligation. In the firſt caſe, we conſider him as only accountable to himſelf; in the ſecond, we conſider him as accountable to ſome ſuperior, and to the public. This ſenſe of duty is the primary notion of law and of rights, taken in their moſt extenſive ſignification, as including every thing we think we are entitled to expect from others, and the neglect or violation of which we conſider as wrong, unjuſt, vicious, and therefore blameable. It is alſo affirmed with great apparent reaſon by many, particularly Butler, in his Analogy and his Sermons, that we have a natural feeling of ill deſert, and merited puniſhment in vice. The patrons of the ſelfiſh ideas alone, are thoſe who confine the obligation of virtue to happineſs.

But of thoſe who are, or would be thought, of the oppoſite ſentiment, there are ſome who differ very conſiderably from others. Some who profeſs great oppoſition to the ſelfiſh ſcheme, declare alſo great averſion to founding the obligation of virtue in any degree on the will of a ſuperior, or looking for any ſanction of puniſhment, to corroborate the moral laws. This they eſpecially treat with contempt, when it is ſuppoſed to be from the Deity. Shaftſbury ſpeaks with great bitterneſs againſt taking into view a future ſtate of what he calls more extended ſelf-intereſt. He ſays men ſhould love virtue for its own ſake, without regard to reward and puniſhment. In this he has been followed by many reaſoners, as far as their regard to religion would permit them.

If, however, we attend to the dictates of conſcience, we ſhall find evidently a ſenſe of duty, of ſelf-approbation, and remorſe, which plainly ſhew us to be under a law, and that law to have a ſanction: what elſe is the meaning of the fear and terror, and apprehenſions of guilty perſons? *Quorum mentes si recludantur*, &c. ſays Cicero.

Nor is this all, but we have all certainly a natural ſenſe of dependence. The belief of a Divine Being is certainly either innate and neceſſary, or handed down from the firſt man, and can now be well ſupported by the cleareſt reaſon. And our relation to him not only lays the foundation of many moral ſentiments and duties, but completes the idea of morality and law, by ſubjecting us to him, and teaching us to conceive of him, not only as our Maker, Preſerver, and Benefactor, but as our righ-

eous Governor and supreme Judge. As the being and perfections of God are irrefragably established, the obligation of duty must ultimately rest here.

It ought not to be forgotten, that the belief or apprehension of a future state of rewards and punishments has been as universal as the belief of a Deity, and seems inseparable from it, and therefore must be considered as the sanction of the moral law. Shaftsbury inveighs severely against this, as making man virtuous from a mercenary view; but there are two ways in which we may consider this matter, and in either light his objections have little force. (1.) We may consider the primary obligations of virtue, as founded upon a sense of its own excellence, joined with a sense of duty and dependence on the Supreme Being, and rewards and punishments as a secondary motive, which is found in fact to be absolutely necessary to restrain or reclaim men from vice and impiety. Or, (2.) We may consider, that, by the light of nature, as well as by revelation, the future reward of virtue is considered as a state of perfect virtue, and the happiness is represented as arising from this circumstance. Here there is nothing at all of a mercenary principle, but only an expectation that true goodness, which is here in a state of imperfection, and liable to much opposition, shall then be improved to the highest degree, and put beyond all possibility of change.

We may add to these obligations, the manifest tendency of a virtuous conduct to promote even our present happiness: this, in ordinary cases, it does; and when joined with the steady hope of futurity,

does in all cafes produce a happineſs ſuperior to what can be enjoyed in the practice of vice. Yet, perhaps, the Stoics of old, who denied pain to be any evil, and made the wiſe man ſuperior to all the viciſſitudes of fortune, carried things to a romantic and extravagant height. And ſo do ſome perſons in modern times, who, ſetting aſide the conſideration of a future ſtate, teach that virtue is its own reward. There are many ſituations in which, if you deprive a good man of the hope of future happineſs, his ſtate ſeems very undeſirable. On the contrary, ſometimes the worſt of men enjoy proſperity and ſucceſs to a great degree; nor do they ſeem to have any ſuch remorſe, as to be an adequate puniſhment to their crimes. If any ſhould inſiſt, that a good man has always ſome comfort from within, and a bad man a ſelf-diſapprobation and inward diſquiet, ſuited to their characters, I would ſay, that this ariſes from the expectation of a future ſtate, and a hope on the one ſide, and fear on the other, of that condition there.

Thoſe who declaim ſo highly of virtue being its own reward in this life, take away one of the moſt conſiderable arguments which, from the dawn of philoſophy, has always been made uſe of as a proof of a future ſtate, viz. the unequal diſtribution of good and evil in this life. Beſides, they do not ſeem to view the ſtate of bad men properly. When they talk of remorſe of conſcience as a ſufficient puniſhment, they forget that this is ſeldom to a high degree, but in the caſe of ſome groſs crimes. Cruelty and murder, frequent acts of groſs injuſtice, are ſometimes followed with deep horror of con-

ſcience; and a courſe of intemperance or luſt is often attended with ſuch diſmal effects upon the body, fame, and fortune, that thoſe who ſurvive it a few years are a melancholy ſpectacle, and a burden to themſelves and others. But it would be very looſe morality, to ſuppoſe none to be bad men, but thoſe who were under the habitual condemnation of conſcience. On the contrary, the far greater part are blinded in their underſtandings, as well as corrupt in their practice. They deceive themſelves, and are at peace. Ignorance and inattention keep the multitude at peace. And falſe principles often produce ſelf-juſtification and ill-founded peace, even in atrocious crimes. Even common robbers are ſometimes found to juſtify themſelves, and ſay, I muſt live; I have a right to my ſhare of proviſion, as well as that proud fellow that rolls in his chariot.

The reſult of the whole is, that the obligation to virtue ought to take in all the following particulars: A ſenſe of its own intrinſic excellence—of its happy conſequences in the preſent life—a ſenſe of duty and ſubjection to the Supreme Being—and a hope of future happineſs, and fear of future miſery, from his deciſion.

Having conſidered the reaſonings on the nature, foundation, and obligation of virtue, I now proceed to a more particular detail of the moral laws, and ſhall take them under the three heads formerly mentioned, Ethics, Politics, and Juriſprudence.

LECTURE VI.

AS to the firſt, we muſt begin with what is uſually called the ſtates of man, or the ſeveral lights or relations in which he may be conſidered, as laying a foundation for duty. Theſe ſtates may be divided into two kinds. 1. Natural. 2. Adventitious.

The natural ſtate may be enumerated thus: 1. His ſtate with regard to God, or natural relation to him. 2. To his fellow-creatures. 3. Solitude or ſociety. 4. Peace or war. Perhaps we may add to theſe, 5. His outward proviſion, plenty or want.

Theſe are called natural ſtates, becauſe they are neceſſary and univerſal. All men, and at all times, are related to God. They were made by him, and live by his providence. We muſt alſo neceſſarily know our fellow-creatures, and their ſtate, to be ſimilar to ours in this reſpect, and many others. A man muſt at all times be independent, or connected with ſociety—at peace with others, or at war well—provided, or in want.

The other ſtates are called adventitious, becauſe they are the effect of choice and the fruit of induſtry, as marriage—family—maſter and ſervant—particular voluntary ſocieties—callings or profeſſions—characters or abilities, natural and acquired—offices in a conſtituted ſociety—property—and many particular modifications of each of theſe.

In proſecuting the ſubject further, and giving an analyſis of the moral duties founded upon theſe

ſtates, I ſhall firſt take notice of our relation to God, with the proofs of his being and perfections, and then conſider the moral laws under three heads; our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourſelves.

1. Our duty to God. To this place I have reſerved what was to be ſaid upon the proof of the being of God, the great foundation of all natural religion; without which the moral ſenſe would be weak and inſufficient.

The proofs of the being of God are generally divided into two kinds. 1. *A priori.* 2. *A posteriori.* The firſt is, properly ſpeaking, metaphyſical reaſoning downward from the firſt principles of ſcience or truth, and inferring by juſt conſequence the being and perfections of God. Clark's Demonſtrations, &c. (if there be any thing that ſhould be called *a priori,* and if this is a concluſive method of reaſoning), is as complete as any thing ever publiſhed; perhaps he has carried the principle as far as it will go.

This way of arguing begins by eſtabliſhing our own exiſtence from conſciouſneſs. That we are not neceſſarily exiſtent, therefore muſt have a cauſe; that ſomething muſt have exiſted from all eternity, or nothing ever could have exiſted; that this Being muſt exiſt by an internal neceſſity of nature; that what exiſts neceſſarily muſt exiſt alike every where; muſt be perfect; act every where; be independent, omnipotent, omniſcient, infinitely good, juſt, true: Becauſe, as all theſe are evidently perfections or excellencies, that which exiſts by a neceſſity of nature muſt be poſſeſſed of every perfection. And

the contrary of these virtues, implying weakness or insufficiency, cannot be found in the Infinite Being.

The other medium of proof, commonly called *a posteriori*, begins with contemplating the universe in all its parts; observing that it contains many irresistible proofs that it could not be eternal, could not be without a cause; that this cause must be intelligent; and from the astonishing greatness, the wonderful adjustment and complication of things, concludes that we can set no bounds to the perfection of the Maker, because we can never exhaust the power, intelligence, and benignity that we see in his works. In this way of arguing we deduce the moral perfections of the Deity from the faint resemblances of them that we see in ourselves. As we necessarily conceive justice, goodness, truth, &c. to be perfections or excellencies, we are warranted by the plainest reason to ascribe them to the Divine Being in an infinite degree.

There is, perhaps, at bottom, no difference between these ways of reasoning, because they must in some degree rest upon a common principle, viz. That every thing that exists must have a cause. This is equally necessary to both the chains of reasoning, and must itself be taken for an original sentiment of nature, or an impression necessarily made upon us from all that we see and are conversant with. About this and some other ideas great stir has been made by some infidel writers, particularly David Hume, who seems to have industriously endeavoured to shake the certainty of our belief upon cause and effect, upon personal

identity, and the idea of power. It is eaſy to raiſe metaphyſical ſubtleties, and confound the underſtanding on ſuch ſubjects. In oppoſition to this, ſome late writers have advanced, with great apparent reaſon, that there are certain firſt principles, or dictates of common ſenſe, which are either ſimple perceptions, or ſeen with intuitive evidence. Theſe are the foundation of all reaſoning, and without them, to reaſon is a word without a meaning. They can no more be proved than you can prove an axiom in mathematical ſcience. Theſe authors of Scotland have lately produced and ſupported this opinion, to reſolve at once all the refinements and metaphyſical objections of ſome infidel writers.

There is a different ſort of argument often made uſe of, or brought in aid of the others, for the being of God, viz. the conſent of all nations, and the univerſal prevalence of that belief. I know not whether we muſt ſay that this argument reſts alſo upon the principle, that nothing can exiſt without a cauſe, or upon the plan juſt now mentioned. If it is an univerſal dictate of our nature, we muſt take it as true immediately, without further examination.

An author I formerly mentioned has ſet this argument in a peculiar light, (Dr Wilſon of Newcaſtle). He ſays that we receive all our knowledge, as philoſophers admit, by ſenſation and reflection. Now, from all that we ſee, and all the reflection and abſtraction upon it we are capaple of, he affirms it is impoſſible we could ever form the idea of a ſpirit or a future ſtate. They have, however, been early and univerſal, and therefore

muſt have been communicated at firſt, and handed down by information and inſtruction from age to age. So that, unleſs upon the ſuppoſition of the exiſtence of God, and his imparting the knowledge of himſelf to men, it is impoſſible that any idea of him could ever have entered into the human mind. There is ſomething ingenious, and a good deal of probability, in this way of reaſoning.

As to the nature of God, the firſt thing to be obſerved is, the unity of God. This is ſufficiently eſtabliſhed upon the reaſonings both *a priori* and *posteriori*. If theſe reaſonings are juſt for the being of God, they are ſtrictly concluſive for the unity of God. There is a neceſſity for the exiſtence of one Supreme Being, the firſt cauſe, but no neceſſity for more; nay, one ſupreme independent Being does not admit any more. And when we view the harmony, order, and unity of deſign, in the created ſyſtem, we muſt be led to the belief of the unity of God.

Perhaps it may be thought an objection to this, (eſpecially if we lay any ſtreſs on the univerſal ſentiments of mankind), that all nations have been ſo prone to the belief and worſhip of a plurality of gods. But this argument is rather ſpecious than ſolid; as, however prone men were to worſhip local inferior deities, they ſeem to have conſidered them only as intermediate divinities and interceſſors between them and the Supreme God.

The perfections of God may be divided into two kinds, *Natural* and *Moral*.

1. The natural perfections of God are ſpirituality, immenſity, wiſdom, and power.

We call these natural perfections, because they can be easily distinguished, and in idea at least separated, from goodness of disposition. It is highly probable, indeed, that supreme excellence, natural and moral, must always reside in the same subject, and are truly inseparable; yet we distinguish them, not only because the ideas are distinct, but because they are by no means in proportion to one another in inferior natures. Great powers of mind and perfection of body are often joined to malignity of disposition. It is not so, however, in God; for as his natural perfections are founded on reason, so his moral excellence is evidently founded in the moral sense, or conscience, which he hath implanted in us.

Spirituality is what we may call the *very nature* of God. It must be admitted that we cannot at present form any complete or adequate idea of a spirit. And some, as you have heard formerly, insist that without revelation we could never have acquired the idea of it that we have. Yet there are many who have reasoned in a very strong and seemingly conclusive manner, to shew that mind or intelligence must be a substance altogether distinct from matter. That all the known properties of matter are incapable of producing thought, as being wholly of a different kind—that matter as such, and universally, is inert and divisible; thought or intelligence, active and uncompounded. See the best reasoning on this subject in Baxter's Immateriality of the Soul.

Immensity in the Divine Being is that by which he is every where, and equally present. Meta-

phyſicians, however, differ greatly upon this ſubject. The Carteſians will not admit that place is at all applicable to ſpirits. They ſay it is an idea wholly ariſing from extenſion, which is one of the peculiar and eſſential qualities of matter. The Newtonians, however, who make ſo much uſe of the idea of infinite ſpace, conſider place as eſſential to all ſubſtance, ſpirit as well as matter. The difficulties are great on both ſides. It is hard to conceive of ſpirit at all, ſeparating from it the qualities of matter; and after we have attempted to do ſo, it ſeems to be bringing them back to talk of place. And yet it ſeems not only hard, but impoſſible, to conceive of any real being without ſuppoſing it in ſome place, and particularly upon the immenſity of the Deity. It ſeems to be putting created ſpirits too much on a level with the infinite Spirit to deny his immenſity. It is, I think, certain, they are either confined to a place, or ſo limited in their operations, as is no way ſo well expreſſed as by ſaying, We are here, and no where elſe. And in this ſenſe both parties muſt admit the divine immenſity—that his agency is equal, univerſal, and irreſiſtible.

Wiſdom is another natural attribute of God, implying infinite knowledge—that all things, in all their relations, all things exiſting, and all things poſſible, are the objects of the divine knowledge. Wiſdom is uſually conſidered as reſpecting ſome end to be attained; and it implies the clear diſcovery of the beſt and moſt effectual means of attaining it.

Power is the being able to do all things, without limit or reſtraint. The omnipotence of God is always conſidered as an eſſential perfection, and ſeems to ariſe immediately from creation and providence. It is common to ſay that God can do all things except ſuch as imply a contradiction, ſuch as to make a thing to be and not to be at the ſame time; but this is unneceſſary and fooliſh in the way of an exception, for ſuch things are not the objects of power at all. They are mere abſurdities in our conception, and indeed we may ſay, of our own creation. All things are poſſible with God, nothing can withſtand his power.

LECTURE VII.

2. THE moral perfections of God are, holineſs, juſtice, truth, goodneſs, and mercy.

Holineſs is ſometimes taken in a general and comprehenſive ſenſe, as being the aggregate, implying the preſence of all moral excellence; yet it is ſometimes uſed, and that both in the ſcripture-revelation and by heathen writers, as a peculiar attribute. In this limited ſenſe it is extremely difficult to define or explain. Holineſs is that character of God to which veneration, or the moſt profound reverence in us, is the correſpondent affection. It is ſometimes alſo expreſſed by purity; and when we go to form an idea of it, perhaps we can ſcarce ſay any thing better, than that it is his being removed at an infinite diſtance from the groſſeſt of material indulgence.

Juſtice is an invariable determination to render to all their due. Juſtice ſeems to be founded on the ſtrong and unalterable perception we have of right and wrong, good and evil, and particularly that the one deſerves reward, and the other puniſhment. The internal ſanction, or the external and providential ſanction of natural laws, point out the juſtice of God. The chief thing that merits attention upon this ſubject is, the controverſy about what is called the vindictive juſtice of God: That is to ſay, is there in God, or have we a natural ſenſe of the propriety of, a diſpoſition to inflict puniſhment, independently of the conſequences, viz. the reformation of the offender, or the example of others. This looſe moraliſts often declaim againſt. Yet it ſeems plain, that the ſenſe in our minds of good and ill deſert, makes guilt the proper object of puniſhment ſimply in itſelf. This may have a relation to general order and the good of the whole, which however is out of our reach.

The truth of God is one of his perfections, greatly inſiſted upon in ſcripture, and an eſſential part of natural religion. It is inſeparable from infinite perfection; for any departure from truth muſt be conſidered as ariſing from weakneſs or neceſſity. What end could be ſerved to a ſelf-ſufficient and all-ſufficient Being by falſehood or deception?

Goodneſs in God is a diſpoſition to communicate happineſs to others. This is eaſily underſtood. The creation is a proof of it. Natural and moral

evil is no juſt objection to it, becauſe of the preponderancy of happineſs.

Mercy, as diſtinguiſhed from goodneſs or benignity, is his being of a placable nature; ready to forgive the guilty, or to remit deſerved puniſhment. It has been diſputed, how far mercy or placability is diſcoverable by reaſon. It is not mercy or forgiveneſs, unleſs it would have been juſt at the ſame time to have puniſhed. There are but two ways by which men from reaſon may infer the attribute of mercy to belong to the Deity. 1. Becauſe we ourſelves are ſenſible of this diſpoſition, and ſee in it a peculiar beauty. 2. From the forbearance of Providence, that ſinners are not immediately overtaken with puniſhment, but have ſpace given them to repent. Yet as all the concluſions drawn from theſe principles muſt be vague and general, the expectations of the guilty founded upon them muſt be very uncertain. We muſt conclude, therefore, that however ſtable a foundation there is for the other attributes of God in nature and reaſon, the way in which, and the terms on which, he will ſhew mercy, can be learned from revelation only.

Having conſidered the being and perfections of God, we proceed to our duty to him.

This may be conſidered in two views, as general and ſpecial. 1. By the firſt I underſtand our duty to obey him, and ſubmit to him in all things. This you ſee includes every branch of moral duty to our neighbour and ourſelves, as well as to God, and ſo the particular parts of it will be conſidered afterwards. But in this place, conſidering every

good action as an act of obedience to God, we will a little attend to the divine sovereignty, and the foundation of it.

In speaking of the foundation of virtue, I took in a sense of dependance and subjection to God. But as men are not to be deterred from bold inquiries, a further question is raised by some, What is properly the foundation of the divine dominion? 1. Some found it directly upon Omnipotence. It is impossible to resist his power. This seems to lay us under a necessity, rather than to convince us of duty. We ought, however, to think and speak of this subject with reverence, and certainly Omnipotence seems to oblige us to actual, if it should not bring us to willing obedience. It is somewhat remarkable, that in the book of Job, composed on purpose to resolve some difficulties in providence, where God himself is brought in as speaking out of the whirlwind, he makes use of no other argument than his tremendous majesty and irresistible power. Yet to rest the matter wholly upon this, seems much the same as founding virtue on mere will. Therefore, 2. Some found the divine dominion on his infinite excellence; they say it is the law of reason that the wisest should rule, and therefore that infinite perfection is entitled to universal sway. Even this, taken separate and alone, does not seem wholly to satisfy the mind. If one person is wiser than another, it seems reasonable that the other should learn of him, and imitate him; but it scarcely seems a sufficient reason that the first should have absolute authority. But perhaps the weakness of the argument, taken in this

view, may arise from the inconsiderable difference between man and man, when compared to the superiority of universal and unchangeable perfection. 3. Some found it upon creation. They say that God has an absolute property in all his creatures; he may therefore do what he will with his own. This, no doubt, goes a good way, and carries considerable force with it to the mind, the rather that, as you will afterwards see, it is something similar to this in us that lays the foundation of our most perfect rights, viz. that the product of our own industry is properly at our own disposal.

As upon the foundation of virtue I thought it necessary to unite the principles of different writers, so upon this subject I think that all the three particulars mentioned ought to be admitted, as the grounds of the divine dominion. Omnipotence, infinite excellence, and the original production and continual preservation of all creatures.

2. Our duty to God may be considered more specially, as it points out the duties we owe immediately to himself.

These may be divided into internal and external. 1. The internal are all included under the three following, love, fear, and trust.

The love of God, which is the first and great duty both of natural and revealed religion, may be explained in a larger and more popular, or in a more precise and stricter way.

In the first, love may be resolved into the four following acts, (1.) Esteem, (2.) Gratitude, (3.) Benevolence, (4.) Desire.

Theſe four will be found inſeparable from true love; and it is pretty much in the ſame order that the acts ſucceed one another. Love is founded on eſteem, on the real or ſuppoſed good qualities of the object. You can no more love that which you deſpiſe, than that which you hate. Gratitude is alſo inſeparable from it, to have a lively ſenſe of favours received, and to eſteem them for the ſake of the perſon from whom they came. Benevolence, or rejoicing in the happineſs and wiſhing well to the object. And, laſtly, a deſire of a place in his eſteem. Whatever we love we deſire to poſſeſs, as far as it is ſuited to our faculties.

The ſtricter and more preciſe method of conſidering the love of God, is to divide it into two branches, benevolence, and deſire. And indeed our affections to God ſeem to be capable of the ſame diviſion as our affections to our fellow-creatures, benevolent and ſelfiſh. I think it undeniable that there is a diſintereſted love of God, which terminates directly upon himſelf, without any immediate view to our own happineſs, as well as a diſcovery of our great intereſt in his favour.

The ſecond great duty to God, is fear; but here we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh this affection from one which bears the name, and is different from it, at leaſt in a moral view it is altogether oppoſite. Dutiful fear is what may be otherwiſe called veneration, and hath for its object the infinity of the divine perfection in general, but particularly his majeſty and greatneſs. The other is merely a fear of evil or puniſhment from him: theſe are called ſometimes a filial and ſervile fear. The firſt in-

creaſes, as men improve in moral excellence, and the other is deſtroyed. Perfect love caſteth out fear. Perhaps, however oppoſite, as they have the ſame name, they may be ſaid to be the ſame natural affection, only as it takes place in innocent or holy, and in guilty creatures. The ſame majeſty of God, which produces veneration in the upright, produces horror and apprehenſion of puniſhment in the guilty.

The third great duty is truſt. This is a continual dependence on God for every thing we need, together with an approbation of and abſolute reſignation to his providence.

2. The external duties to God, I ſhall briefly paſs over, being only, all proper and natural expreſſions of the internal ſentiments.

It may be proper, however, to take notice in general of the worſhip due to God, that whether we conſider the nature of things, or the univerſal practice of mankind, in all ages, worſhip, and that not only private, but public and ſocial worſhip, is a duty of natural religion.

Some of the enemies of revealed religion, have ſpoken with great virulence againſt this, as unreaſonable, and even diſhonourable to the Divine Being. The ſubſtance of what they ſay is this, that as it would be no part of the character of an eminent and good man, to deſire and take pleaſure in others praiſing him and recounting his good qualities, ſo it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the Supreme Being is pleaſed with incenſe, ſacrifices, and praiſes. But it ought to be obſerved, that he does not require theſe acts and exerciſes as any gratification to him-

ſelf, but as in themſelves juſt and neceſſary, and ſuited to the relation we ſtand in to him, and uſeful for forming our temper and univerſal practice. We ought alſo to remember, that we muſt not immediately and without diſcrimination, reaſon from what would be praiſe and blame-worthy among men, to what would be juſt or unjuſt in God, becauſe the circumſtances are very different. Beſides, though for any man to deſire the applauſe of his fellow-creatures, or be pleaſed with adulation, would be a mean and contemptible character, becauſe indeed there is ſuch unſpeakable imperfection in the beſt of men; yet when any duty or ſentiment is fully and manifeſtly due from man to man, there is nothing improper or diſhonourable in requiring or expecting it. Thus a parent requires reſpect and ſubmiſſion from his children, a maſter from his ſervants; and though the injury is merely perſonal, he thinks himſelf entitled to puniſh every expreſſion of contempt or diſregard. Again, every man who has beſtowed ſignal favours upon another, expects to ſee evidence of a grateful and ſenſible mind, and ſeverely condemns every ſentiment or action that indicates a contrary diſpoſition.

On the whole, then, we ſee, that if the worſhip of God be what is due from us to him, in conſequence of the relation we ſtand in to him, it is proper and neceſſary that he ſhould require it. To honour God, is to honour ſupreme excellence; for him not to expect and demand it, would be to deny himſelf.

One other difficulty I ſhall touch upon a little. It reſpects the duty of prayer; and the objections lie equally againſt it on the footing of natural re-

ligion and revealed. The objections are two. 1. Why does God, who perfectly knows all our wants, require and expect prayer before he will supply them? To this I would answer, that he supplies great multitudes of our wants without our asking it; and as to his requiring the duty of prayer, I say the same thing as of worship in general; it is reasonable and necessary to express, and to increase upon our minds, a sense of dependence, and thereby lay us under an obligation of properly improving what we receive. 2. The other obligation is with regard to the force or efficacy of prayer. Why, it is said, should we pray, when the whole system of divine providence is fixed and unalterable? Can we possibly suppose that God will change his purposes, from a regard to our cries or tears? To this some answer no otherwise than as before, that without having any effect upon the event, it has only an effect upon our minds, in bringing us to a right temper. Dr Leechman of Glasgow, in his discourse on prayer, makes no other answer to this difficulty. But I think to rest it here, and admit that it has no influence in the way of casualty upon the event, would in a great measure break the force and fervency of prayer. I would therefore say further, that prayer has a real efficacy on the event, and just as much as any other second cause. The objection arises from going beyond our depth, and reasoning from the unchangeable purpose of God to human actions, which is always unjust and fallacious. However unable we may be to explain it, notwithstanding the fixed plan of providence,

there is a real influence of second causes, both natural and moral, and I apprehend the connection between cause and effect is similar in both cases. If it is fixed from eternity that there shall be a plentiful crop upon a certain field, I know that nothing whatsoever can prevent it, if otherwise, the efforts of the whole creation cannot produce it; yet I know as certainly that, hypothetically, if it is not ploughed and sown, there will be no grain upon it, and that if it be properly manured and dressed, it will probably be fruitful. Thus, in moral matters, prayer has as real an influence in procuring the blessing, as ploughing and sowing has in procuring the crop; and it is as consistent with the established order of nature and the certainty of events in the one case, as in the other: for this reason the Stoical fate of old was called the *ignava ratio* of the Stoics, as they sometimes made use of the above fallacious reasoning.

LECTURE VIII.

2. WE come now to our duty to man. This may be reduced to a short sum, by ascending to its principle. Love to others, sincere and active, is the sum of our duty.

Benevolence, I formerly observed, ought not to be considered as the whole of virtue, but it certainly the principle and sum of that branch of duty which regards others.

We may distinguish between, (1.) particular kind

affections, and, (2.) a calm and deliberate good-will to all. The particular kind affections, as to family, friends, country, ſeem to be implanted by nature, to ſtrengthen the general principle, for it is only or chiefly by doing good to thoſe we are particularly related to, that we can promote the general happineſs.

Particular kind affections ſhould be reſtrained and directed by a calm good-will to all. Whereever our attachments to private perſons prevent a greater good, they become irregular and exceſſive.

Some think that a calm and ſettled good-will to others, is an improvement of the particular affections, and ariſes from the more narrow to the more extenſive; from family, friends, country, to all our fellow-creatures. But it ſeems more reaſonable to ſay, that the general affection is a dictate of our conſcience of a ſuperior kind. If it were only an increaſe and extenſion of private affection, it would grow more weak, as the diſtance from ourſelves increaſed, whereas in fact the more enlarged affections are intended to be more powerful than the confined.

When we are ſpeaking of kind affections, it will not be improper to obſerve that ſome unbelievers have objected againſt the goſpel, that it does not recommend private friendſhip and the love of our country. But if fairly conſidered, as the ſcripture, both by example and precept, recommends all particular affections, ſo it is to its honour, that it ſets the love of mankind above them every one, and by ſo much inſiſting on the forgiveneſs of injuries and

the love of enemies, it has carried benevolence to the greateſt perfection. The parable of the Samaritan, in anſwer to the queſtion, Who is my neighbour? is one of the greateſt beauties in moral painting any where to be ſeen.

The love of our country, to be ſure, is a noble and enlarged affection; and thoſe who have ſacrificed private eaſe and family-relations to it, have become illuſtrious; yet the love of mankind is ſtill greatly ſupérior. Sometimes attachment to country appears in a littleneſs of mind, thinking all other nations inferior, and fooliſhly believing that knowledge, virtue, and valour are all confined to themſelves. As the Romans long ago made the *Punica fides* to mean deceit, ſo there are not wanting among us thoſe who think that all the French are intereſted, treacherous, and cowardly.

On the great law of love to others, I ſhall only ſay further, that it ought to have for its object their greateſt and beſt intereſt, and therefore implies wiſhing and doing them good in ſoul and body.

It is neceſſary now to deſcend to the application of this principle to particular duties, and to examine what are the rights or claims that one man has upon another. Rights and obligations are correlative terms. Whatever others have a juſt right or title to claim from me, that is my duty, or what I am obliged to do to them.

Right in general may be reduced, as to its ſource, to the ſupreme law of moral duty; for whatever men are in duty obliged to do, that they have a claim to, and other men are conſidered as under an obligation to permit them. Again, as

our own happineſs is a lawful object or end, we are ſuppoſed to have each a right to proſecute this; but as our proſecution may interfere, we limit each others rights, and a man is ſaid to have a right or power to promote his own happineſs only by thoſe means which are not in themſelves criminal or injurious to others.

Rights may be divided or claſſed in ſeveral different ways; an attention to all of which is of uſe on this ſubject. Rights may be,

(1.) Natural or acquired. Natural rights are ſuch as are eſſential to man, and univerſal;—acquired are thoſe that are the fruits of induſtry, the effects of accident or conqueſt. A man has a natural right to act for his own preſervation, and to defend himſelf from injury, but not a natural right to domineer, to riches, (comparatively ſpeaking) or to any particular office in a conſtituted ſtate.

(2.) Rights are conſidered as perfect and imperfect. Thoſe are called perfect rights which can be clearly aſcertained in their circumſtances, and which we may make uſe of force to obtain when they are denied us. Imperfect rights are ſuch as we may demand, and others ought to give us, yet we have no title to compel them. Self-preſervation is a perfect right, but to have a grateful return for a favour is not a perfect right.

All the duties of juſtice are founded on the perfect rights; thoſe of mercy generally on the imperfect rights.

The violation of an imperfect right is often as great an act of immorality as that of a perfect right. It is often as immoral, or more ſo, to refuſe

to ſupply the neceſſitous, or to do it too ſparingly, as to commit a ſmall injury againſt a man's perſon or fortune. Yet the laſt is the breach of a perfect right, and the other of an imperfect.

Human laws reach only, in ordinary caſes, to the perfect rights. Sometimes imperfect rights, by being carried far, become perfect, as humanity and gentleneſs in a parent to a child may be ſo groſsly violated as to warrant the interpoſition of human authority.

(3.) Rights are alienable and unalienable. The firſt we may, according to juſtice and prudence, ſurrender or give up by our own act; the others we may not. A man may give away his own goods, lands, money. There are ſeveral things which he cannot give away, as a right over his own knowledge, thoughts, &c. Others, which he ought not, as a right to judge for himſelf in all matters of religion, his right of ſelf-preſervation, proviſion, &c. Some ſay that liberty is unalienable, and that thoſe who have even given it away may lawfully reſume it.

The diſtinction between rights as alienable and unalienable is very different from that of natural and acquired. Many of the rights which are ſtrictly natural and univerſal, may be alienated in a ſtate of ſociety for the good of the whole, as well as of private perſons; as for example, the right of ſelf-defence; this is in a great meaſure given up in a ſtate of civil government into the hands of the public, and the right of doing juſtice to ourſelves or to others in matter of property, is wholly given up.

(4.) Rights may be considered as they differ with regard to their object. 1. Rights we have over our own persons and actions. This class is called liberty. 2. Rights over things or goods which belong to us. This is called property. 3. Rights over the persons and actions of other men. This is called authority. 4. Rights in the things which are the property of others, which are of several sorts.

When we come to the second great division of moral philosophy, politics, the above distinctions will be more fully explained; at present it is sufficient to point at them in order, to shew what are the great lines of duty from man to man.

Our duty to others, therefore, may be all comprehended in these two particulars, justice and mercy.

Justice consists in giving or permitting others to enjoy whatever they have a perfect right to, and making such an use of our own rights as not to encroach upon the rights of others. There is one writer, David Hume, who has derided the duty of justice, resolving it wholly into power and conveniency; and has affirmed that property is common, than which nothing can be more contrary to reason; for if there is any thing clear as a dictate of reason, it is, that there are many rights which men severally possess, which others ought not to violate. The foundation of property in goods, I will afterwards shew you, is plainly laid in the social state.

Another virtue which this author ridicules is chastity. This, however, will be found to be in-

cluded in juſtice, and to be found in the ſentiments of all nations, and to have the cleareſt foundation hath in nature and public utility.

Mercy is the other great branch of our duty to man, and is the exerciſe of the benevolent principle in general, and of the ſeveral particular kind affections. Its acts, generally ſpeaking, belong to the claſs of imperfect rights, which are ſtrongly binding upon the conſcience, and abſolutely neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of human ſociety; yet ſuch as cannot be enforced with rigour and preciſion by human laws.

Mercy may be generally explained by a readineſs to do all the good offices to others that they ſtand in need of, and are in our power, unleſs they are oppoſed to ſome perfect right, or an imperfect one of greater moment.

LECTURE IX.

3. THE third claſs of moral duties is what contains our duty to ourſelves.

This branch of duty is as real and as much founded in the moral principle, as any of the former. Conſcience as clearly teſtifies the evil of neglecting it, and vicious conduct in this reſpect does generally lead us directly not only to miſery, but to ſhame.

We may, I think, divide our duties to ourſelves into two heads, which will be both diſtinct and

comprehenſive, 1. Self-government. 2. Self-intereſt.

The firſt of theſe is to keep our thoughts, deſires, and affections, in due moderation. If it be aſked, What is due moderation? I anſwer, it may be diſcovered three ways. (1.) When the indulgence interferes with our duty to God, (2.) To ourſelves, and, (3.) To our neighbour.

When our thoughts or deſires are ſuch as to be contrary to the love, fear, or truſt we owe to God, then they are to be reſtrained and brought into ſubjection.—Thus are generated the virtues of *humility*, *contentment*, *patience*, and ſuch as are allied to them.

When our thoughts and inward temper are ſuch as to be any way injurious to others, they muſt be governed and reſtrained; hence ariſes the obligation to guard againſt all the immoral paſſions, which will produce meekneſs and compoſure of ſpirit.

And when we have got but a little experience, we ſhall ſpeedily find that an exceſſive indulgence of any paſſion, *love*, *hatred*, *anger*, *fear*, diſcompoſes us exceedingly, and is an evil inſtead of a bleſſing. We ſhall therefore perceive the neceſſity of continence, ſelf-denial, fortitude, reſtraint, and moderation in every thing how good ſoever.

2. The other general branch of duty to ourſelves may be called ſelf-intereſt. This, taking in natural religion, includes our relation to the Divine Being, and attending particularly to that of procuring his favour. Therefore it is a prime part of our duty to ourſelves, to guard againſt any thing

that may be hurtful to our moral character, or religious hopes.

2. We ought to be active and diligent in acquiring every thing neceſſary for life and comfort. Moſt of our duties to ourſelves, reſemble the duties of juſtice and mercy to others. If there are certain offices due them, and if they have rights and claims in conſequence of their ſtate and relations, the ſame is the caſe with ourſelves. We are therefore to take all proper methods to preſerve and acquire the goods both of mind and body. To acquire knowledge, to preſerve health, reputation, poſſeſſions.

The whole muſt be kept within ſome limits; chiefly we muſt guard againſt interfering with the rights of others.

It will be proper, before concluding this part of the ſubject, to take notice of the opinions of the ancients, particularly their enumeration of what are called the cardinal virtues.

Their cardinal virtues were *juſtice*, *temperance*, *prudence*, and *fortitude*. Juſtice included the whole of our duty to our neighbour. Humanity or benevolence, you ſee, is kept out of view, though a virtue of the firſt claſs; but all its exerciſes are with them ranked under the heads of juſtice; temperance was by them conſidered as much more extenſive than being moderate in the uſe of meats and drink, to which the Engliſh word is chiefly confined. The *Egkrateia* of the Greeks, ſignified not only abſtinence in meats and drink, but continence or purity, and a moderation of all our deſires of whatever kind, of fame and riches, as well as plea-

ſures. Prudence, even in the way they generally explain it, ſeems ſcarcely to be a moral, or ſo much as a natural quality. Prudence, they ſay, is taking the wiſeſt courſe to obtain ſome good end. The placing this among the cardinal virtues will ſhow how matters ſtood among them. Great parts or talents were in high eſteem. They did not very fully diſtinguiſh between a good man and a great man. Prudence ſeems rather an embelliſhment of an illuſtrious character, than a moral virtue. Another reaſon why prudence ſeems to have held ſuch a place among the ancients was, that their chief foundation for virtue was intereſt, or what will produce happineſs. The inquiry upon this ſubject was, what is the *ſummum bonum*. Now, to this prudence is very neceſſary. Agreeably to all this, they commonly called the virtuous man, the *wiſe man*, and he was always an hero.

Fortitude is eaſily underſtood, and may be conſidered in two lights, as active and paſſive, which gives the two great virtues of patience and valour.

One of the moſt remarkable qualities in morals among the ancients, was the debate upon the Stoical poſition, That pain is no evil, nor pleaſure any good. This ariſes from comparing external things with the temper of the mind, when it appears without doubt, that the latter is of much more conſequence to happineſs than the former. They uſed to reaſon thus: Outward poſſeſſions, when beſtowed upon a bad man, make him no better, but worſe, and finally more miſerable. How, then, can theſe be goods in themſelves, which become good

or evil, according to the ſtate of him that uſes them. They were therefore called the things indifferent. There was ſomething ſtrained and extravagant in ſome of their writings, and perhaps oſtentatious, yet a great deal of true and juſt reaſoning. The moſt beautiful piece of antiquity in the moral way, is the Tablature of Cebes.

Let us now recapitulate what we have gone through, and then add ſome obſervations, or corrollaries, on the morality of actions. We have conſidered,

1. The nature of man.

2. The nature, foundation, and obligation of virtue.

3. Have given a ſort of general analyſis of the moral laws, as pointing out our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourſelves.

We muſt now conſider all morality in general as conformity to a law. We have ſeen above whence this law is collected, and derives its authority. Men may differ, not only as to the foundation, but as to the import or meaning of the law in ſome particulars; but it is always ſuppoſed that the law exiſts.

The morality of actions may be conſidered in two different lights, but theſe very nearly related to each other. (1.) As they are ranked and diſpoſed of by the law itſelf; (2.) In the conformity or oppoſition of the actions to the law.

Under the firſt view, an action is either commanded, forbidden, or permitted.

Commanded duties oblige abſolutely, and, as caſuiſts uſed to ſay, *ſemper non vero ad ſemper;* that is to ſay, they are obligatory upon all perſons, at the

ſeaſons that are proper for them, but not upon every perſon at every time; becauſe then there could be but one moral duty. All men are obliged to worſhip God, but this only at certain times; other duties have alſo their place and ſeaſon.

Prohibitions oblige *semper et ad semper*, all perſons at all times. We muſt not lie—this obliges every man at every moment, becauſe no time or circumſtances can make it lawful.

On permiſſion we may obſerve ſeveral things.

1. There is, as ſome ſay, a two-fold permiſſion, the one full and abſolute, which not only gives us a right to certain things with impunity, but implies a poſitive approbation of the legiſlator, and the other implies only that the action is left at large, being neither commanded nor forbidden.

2. Permiſſion in natural laws always implies the approbation of the legiſlator; and whatever is done in conſequence of it, is innocently done, for God and conſcience do not permit, or paſs uncondemned, any bad actions.

3. It is otherwiſe in human laws; if they leave any action open, it may be done with impunity, and yet by no means with approbation. I may have a right by human law to ſay things in a covered and couched manner, which yet may carry in them the higheſt degree of malignity.

4. The truth is, when we conſider the morality of action in a ſtrict or proper manner, the whole claſs of permitted actions vaniſhes. They become by their intention and application either good or bad.

Conſidering actions in their conformity to the laws, a diſtinction ariſes ſimilar to the former, into *good* or juſt, *bad* and *indifferent*.

A good action muſt be wholly conformable to the law in its ſubſtance, and in all its circumſtances. It is not enough that it be materially good, the time muſt be proper, and the intention laudable.

A bad action is that which, either in ſubſtance or in any circumſtance, is contrary to the law.

In conſequence of this, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, all truly good or juſt actions are equally ſo, ariſing from a perfect conformity to the law, as all ſtraight lines are equally ſtraight; but all bad actions are not equally bad, as lines may be bent in a different degree from the ſtraight direction.

Indifferent actions (if there are any truly ſuch) are thoſe that are permitted, and neither commanded nor forbidden by the law; but when we conſider the ſpirit and principles of true morality, we ſhall find no actions wholly indifferent, becauſe we are under an obligation to promote the happineſs of ourſelves and others, to which every action may be applied immediately or remotely; and ſubjection to the divine will may make a part of our deſign, in doing or forbearing any thing whatever.

In eſtimating the morality of actions, ſeveral circumſtances muſt be conſidered. (1.) The good done. (2.) The principle from which it flows,—ſelf-intereſt of the contracted kind, benevolence, or hope of reward. (3.) The hindrances or oppoſition that muſt be ſurmounted, as intereſt, inclination, difficulty. An objection ſeems to ariſe from this, not eaſily ſolved. If an action is the more

virtuous, the more oppoſition, internal and external, that is overcome, then the longer a man has had the habit of virtue; and the more completely it is formed, the leſs merit in his actions. It ſeems alſo to take away all moral excellence from the Deity, who cannot be ſuppoſed to have the leaſt oppoſition to encounter, either from within or without. This objection cannot be eaſily removed, but by ſaying, that the oppoſition is in no other reſpect an evidence of the good moral temper, but as it ſhews the ſtrength of that inclination that overcomes it; and therefore, when a moral habit is ſo ſtrong as to overcome and annihilate all oppoſition, it is ſo much the more excellent.

An action good in itſelf, may be made criminal by an evil intention.

But no action, in itſelf evil, can be made lawful or laudable by a good intention.

A man is obliged to follow the dictates of conſcience; yet a miſtaken conſcience does not wholly abſolve from guilt, becauſe he ought to have been at more pains to obtain information.

An action is not virtuous in proportion to its oppoſite being vicious. It is no high degree of virtue to love our offspring, or provide for a family; but to neglect either is exceedingly vicious.

One phenomenon in human nature, nearly connected with the moral feelings, has been particularly conſidered by ſome writers, viz. That there is ſuch a diſpoſition in the generality of men to crowd to ſee objects of diſtreſs, as an extraordinary public execution. What is the deſire that prompts to it? Is the ſight of miſery a pleaſant feeling? Some

resolve it merely into curiosity, which they consider as a natural and original impression. But there seems to be something in it different from novelty. Others say its arises from benevolence, and is an exercise of compassion, and that we have a strong natural impulse to the affection of pity, and really feel a pleasure in indulging it. But though every well-disposed mind is highly susceptible of pity, at least of all the benevolence and help that pity suggests when the object presents itself, we can scarcely say that the feeling is pleasant, or that we have a desire after such objects, in order to the gratification.

They who reason on the selfish scheme, as usual, resolve all into private interest; they say we delight to see objects of distress, because it gives us a secret satisfaction in reflecting upon our own different situation. I believe there is such a satisfaction in narrow and contracted minds; but to those tolerably disposed it has an opposite effect; it makes them rather consider the calamities which they themselves are subject to, than those from which they are free.

Perhaps it would be best to take more than one principle to account for this effect. Curiosity must make a part, and probably humanity and compassion also contribute to it. It seems to be thought some little alleviation to the sufferer's misery when others pity him. Yet prudent persons, knowing how unavailing this pity is, often choose to be absent.

Sympathy is a particular affection in aid of benevolence. Yet, like all other private affections,

when it is not moderated, it prevents its own effect. One deeply affected with the view of an object of diſtreſs, is often thereby incapacitated to aſſiſt him.

Another queſtion is ſometimes ſubjoined to the above, Why men have pleaſure in ſeeing tragedy, which is a ſtriking repreſentation of a melancholy cataſtrophe? As far as the ſubject differs from comedy, it may be accounted for on the ſame principles with the deſire to ſee objects of diſtreſs. But one powerful principle leads both to comedy and tragedy,—a pleaſure in the imitative arts; an exact portrait of any object whatever, gives the higheſt pleaſure, even though the object itſelf were originally terrible or diſguſting.

We ſee plainly, that an indulgence of the pleaſure given by a fine performance, is what crowds the theatre. Unhappily, to give greater pleaſure to a corrupt mind, they often invent ſuch ſcenes, and conduct the matter ſo, as to make the ſtage the greateſt enemy to virtue and good morals.

LECTURE X.

OF POLITICS.

POLITICS contain the principles of ſocial union, and the rules of duty in a ſtate of ſociety. This is but another and more complete view of the ſame things, drawn out more fully,

and applied to particular cafes. Political law is the authority of any fociety ftamped upon moral duty.

The firft thing to be confidered, in order to fee upon what principles fociety is formed, is the ftate immediately previous to the focial ftate. This is called the ftate of nature. Violent and unneceffary controverfies have been made on that fubject. Some have denied that any fuch thing ever exifted; that fince there were men, they have always been in a focial ftate. And to be fure this is fo far true, that in no example or fact could it ever laft long. Yet it is impoffible to confider fociety as a voluntary union of particular perfons, without fuppofing thofe perfons in a ftate fomewhat different before this union took place. There are rights, therefore, belonging to a ftate of nature, different from thofe of a focial ftate.

And diftinct focieties, or ftates independent, are at this moment in a ftate of nature, or natural liberty, with regard to each other.

Another famous queftion has been, Is the ftate of nature a ftate of war or peace? Hobbes, an author of conſiderable note, but of very illiberal fentiments in politics, is a ftrenuous advocate for a ftate of nature being a ftate of war. Hutchinfon and Shaftfbury plead ftrongly, that a ftate of nature is a ftate of fociety. However oppofite and hoftile their opinions feem to be with regard to each other, it feems no hard matter to reconcile them. That the principles of our nature lead to fociety, that our happinefs and the improvement of our powers are only to be had in fociety, is of the moft un-

doubted certainty; and that in our nature, as it is the work of God, there is a real good-will and benevolence to others; but, on the other hand, that our nature as it is now, when free and independent, is prone to injury, and consequently to war, is equally manifest; and that in a state of natural liberty, there is no other way but force, for preserving security and repelling injury. The inconveniences of the natural state are very many.

One class of the above-mentioned writers say, that nature prompts to society; and the other, that necessity and interest obliges to it; both are equally true.

Supposing, then, the state of natural liberty antecedent to society to be a reality, let us consider the perfect and imperfect rights belonging to that state, that we may see more distinctly how, and why they differ in a social state.

The perfect rights in a state of natural liberty, are, (1.) A right to life. (2.) A right to employ his faculties and industry for his own use. (3.) A right to the things that are common and necessary, as air, water, earth. (4.) A right to personal liberty. (5.) A power over his own life, not to throw it away unnecessarily, but for a good reason. (6.) A right of private judgement in matters of opinion. (7.) A right to associate, if he so incline, with any person or persons whom he can persuade, (not force); under this is contained the right to marriage. (8.) A right to character, that is to say, innocence, (not fame). It is easy to perceive that all these rights belong to a state of natural liberty, and that it would be unjust and unequal for any individual to hinder

or abridge another in any one of them, without consent, or unless it be in just retaliation for injury received.

The imperfect natural rights are very numerous, but they are nearly the same in a state of nature as in a state of society, as gratitude, compassion, mutual good offices, if they will be no injury to the person performing them. Indeed they must be the same in a natural and in a social state, because the very definition of an imperfect right is such as you cannot use force to obtain. Now, what you ought not to use force to obtain in a state of natural liberty, human laws in a well constituted state will not give you.

Society I would define to be an association or compact of any number of persons, to deliver up or abridge some part of their natural rights, in order to have the strength of the united body, to protect the remaining, and to bestow others.

Hobbes, and some other writers of the former age, treat with great contempt this which is generally called the social compact. He insists that monarchy is the law of nature. Few are of his sentiments now, at least in Britain, yet it is proper to trace them to the foundation.

It is to be admitted, that society began first insensibly by families, and almost necessarily. Hence parental authority was the first law, and perhaps it extended for two or three generations in the early ages. Though the patrons of monarchy use this as an argument, it does not favour their scheme. This which they call the patriarchal government, could not extend far; or supposing it could, there

would be but one rightful king in all the earth, the lineal defcendent of Adam's eldeft fon, not to mention that the very order of fucceffion in hereditary right has never been uniform, and is but of late fettled in the European nations.

The truth is, though man, for wife reafons, afterwards to be noticed, continues longer in a family-dependence than other animals, yet in time he becomes *sui juris ;* and when their numbers are increafed, when they either continue together, or remove and form diftinct focieties, it is plain that there muft be fuppofed an expreffed or implied contract.

Some fay there is no trace or record of any fuch contract in the beginning of any fociety. But this is no argument at all ; for things infeparable from, and effential to any ftate, commonly take place fo infenfibly, that their beginning is not obferved.

When perfons believe themfelves, upon the whole, rather oppreffed than protected in any fociety, they think they are at liberty, either to rebel againft it, or to fly from it ; which plainly implies, that their being fubject to it arofe from a tacit confent.

Befides, in migrations and planting of colonies, in all ages, we fee evident traces of an original contract and confent taken to the principles of union.

From this view of fociety as a voluntary compact, refults this principle, that men are originally and by nature equal, and confequently free.

Liberty either cannot, or ought not to be given

up in the ſocial ſtate. The end of the union ſhould be the protection of liberty, as far as it is a bleſſing. The definition of liberty in a conſtituted government, will be afterwards explained.

Some obſerve, that few nations or ſocieties in the world have had their conſtitutions formed on the principles of liberty: perhaps not one twentieth of the ſtates that have been eſtabliſhed ſince the beginning of the world, have been ſettled upon principles altogether favourable to liberty. This is no juſt argument againſt natural liberty and the rights of mankind; for it is certain, that the public good has always been the real aim of the people in general, in forming and entering into any ſociety. It has alſo conſtantly been at leaſt the profeſſed aim of legiſlators. Therefore the principle ſeems to have been admitted, only they have failed or been diſappointed in practice by miſtake or deceit. Though perhaps not one twentieth part of mankind have any tolerable ſkill in the fine arts, it does not follow that there are no ſuch arts, or that the principles of them are not founded in nature.

Reaſon teaches natural liberty, and common utility recommends it. Some nations have ſeen this more clearly than others, or have more happily found the means of eſtabliſhing it.

Here, perhaps, we ſhould conſider a little the queſtion, Whether it is lawful to make men or to keep them ſlaves, without their conſent? This will fall afterwards to be conſidered more fully: in the mean time, obſerve, that in every ſtate there muſt be ſome ſuperior and others inferior; and it

is hard to fix the degree of subjection that may fall to the lot of particular persons. Men may become slaves, or their persons and labour be put wholly in the power of others by consent. They may also sometimes, in a constituted state, be made slaves by force, as a punishment for the commission of crimes. But it is certainly unlawful to make inroads upon others, unproved, and take away their liberty, by no better right than superior power.

It has sometimes been doubted, whether it is lawful to take away the liberty of others for life, even on account of crimes committed. There can be no strong reason given against this, except that which is supposed to operate in Great Britain against making malefactors slaves, that it would be unfavourable to rational liberty to see any rank of men in chains. But, setting this aside, it seems plain, that if men may forfeit their lives to society, they may also forfeit their liberty, which is a less precious blessing. It seems also more agreeable, both to equity and public utility, to punish some sort of crimes with hard labour, than death. Imprisonment for life has been admitted and practised by all nations. Some have pleaded for making slaves of the barbarous nations, that they are actually brought into a more eligible state, and have more of the comforts of life, than they would have had in their own country. This argument may alleviate, but does not justify, the practice. It cannot be called a more eligible state, if less agreeable to themselves.

Upon the whole, there are not only many unlawful ways of making slaves, but also some that are lawful.

And the practice seems to be countenanced in the law of Moses, where rules are laid down for their treatment, and an estimation of injuries done to them, different from that of free men. I do not think there lies any necessity on those who found men in a state of slavery, to make them free, to their own ruin. But it is very doubtful whether any original cause of servitude can be defended, but legal punishment for the commission of crimes. Humanity in the manner of treating them is manifestly a dictate of reason and nature, and I think also of private and public utility, as much as of either.

The next step in opening the principles of the social state, is to consider the foundation, establishment, and extent of *property*. Some begin this by considering the property of man in general, in the inferior creatures. Has he any right to use the lower irrational animals for labour, or food, or both?

It is needless to refine too much upon this subject. To use them for labour seems evidently lawful, as they are inferior, with strength fitted for it, and strength which they could not employ for the improvement and cultivation of the earth without the direction of man. They seem to be to man, some how as the body to the mind. They help to produce food to themselves, and so increase their number, and receive much more sensual pleasure, sharing in all respects with their masters the fruit of their toil.

To use them for food is thus argued to be lawful. If suffered all to live, they would become too numerous, and could not be sustained, so that

death to many of them in a much worse way must be the certain consequence. Further, nature seems to dictate the use of them for food in the plainest manner, for they are food for one another in a regular gradation, the insect to the birds and fishes, many of them to the beasts, and the smaller to the greater, or the tamer to the more rapacious of every order.

If we take tradition or revelation for our guide, the matter is plain, that God made man lord of the works of his hands, and put under him all the other creatures. Only it appears that the grant of animal food was made no earlier than to Noah after the flood.

Let us next consider the establishment of private property. Private property is every particular person's having a confessed and exclusive right to a certain portion of the goods which serve for the support and conveniency of life.

In a very imperfect state of society, community of goods may subsist in a great degree; and indeed its subsisting is one of the surest signs of an imperfect state of society. Some attempts have been made in civilized states to introduce it, but without any considerable effect, except in Sparta, the constitution of which was very singular. In small voluntary societies, especially of the religious kind, it may be established, and will continue so long as the morals of the society are pure. But in civil society fully formed, especially if the state is at all extensive, or intended to be so, private property is essentially necessary, and founded upon the reason of things and public utility. The reasons of it are,

1. Without private property no laws would be sufficient to compel universal industry. There never was such a purity of manners and zeal for the public, in the individuals of a great body, but that many would be idle and slothful, and maintain themselves upon the labour of others.

2. There is no reason to expect, in the present state of human nature, that there would be a just and equal distribution to every one according to his necessity, nor any room for distinction according to merit.

3. There would be no place for the exercise of some of the noblest affections of the human mind, as charity, compassion, beneficence, &c.

4. Little or no incitement to the active virtues, labour, ingenuity, bravery, patience, &c.

Some have laid down schemes for making property common, as Sir Thomas Moore, in his Utopia; but in general they are chimerical and impracticable. There is no instance in fact, where any state that made a figure in the social life had their goods wholly in common. Sparta had the most of it, but it was a very small state, and limited in its views; besides, there was something so singular in the whole constitution of the Spartan government, that its subsisting so long remains a phenomenon for politicians and reasoners yet to account for.

Supposing private property to be essential, or at least useful in the social state, the next question is, How does this property take its rise, or by what ways is it acquired?

The original ways of acquiring property may be reduced to these two, (1.) Prior occupation, (2.) Our own industry.

As to the firſt of theſe, it may be analyſed thus: Of the things that lay in common for the uſe of man, I have a right to take what is convenient for me; and after I have taken it, no body can have a better right, nor conſequently any title, to take it from me.

But many queſtions difficult to be reſolved ariſe from the application of this principle. How far does this right extend? Muſt I take only what is ſufficient for the preſent moments? or may I provide for future neceſſities and enjoyments? In vacant lands, muſt I take only what I and my preſent followers can ſufficiently occupy? or may I touch a continent, and call it mine, though I ſhall not be able to fill it in many ages? I anſwer, common utility muſt be the rule in all theſe caſes; and any thing more particular muſt be reſerved till we come to the law of nations.

Some ſay, that the water in large bays and rivers ought to be common to all, becauſe it is inexhauſtible, and one's uſing it cannot waſte or ſpoil it for the uſe of others. But the ſecurity of ſocieties will point out the meaſure of property that muſt be in all thoſe things.

The extent or object of property contains three particulars.

1. A right to the fulleſt uſe. Whatever is a perſon's property, he has a right to do with it as he pleaſes, with this ſingle exception, if it may be called ſo, that he may not uſe it to the injury of others. Full property has no other exception, unleſs you call this an exception, that if any man would wantonly deſtroy the fruits of the earth, or

his habitation; in that case, though they were his own, people would hinder him, as supposing him to be mad, and deprive him not only of that liberty, but of all others.

2. Property implies a right of exclusion. We may hinder others from any way intermeddling with what is our property. This seems essential to the idea. Giving a full right to one, implies that others have none.

3. It implies a power to alienate: That is to say, a right of alteration, commutation, donation during life, and disposal at death. Thus property is said to be perpetual.

There are certain things called by Civilians *Res nullius;* such as, temples, public edifices, gates and walls of cities, &c. Temples used to be said to be given to God, and in the laws of civilized states attention is paid to this circumstance. But as to the property or use, the case of them, and of all the other things mentioned, is very clear. They are under the inspection of the magistrate, or such persons as represent the community, and are by them kept for common use.

LECTURE XI.

IN the social life, in general, we may consider, (1.) Domestic, (2.) Civil society.

The first of these we must consider as implying and made up of several relations, the chief of

which are, (1.) The relation of marriage, (2.) That of parents and children, (3.) That of masters and servants.

In marriage we ought to observe, that though all creatures may be said to be propagated in a way in a great degree similar, yet there is something peculiarly distinguished, dignified, and solemn, in marriage among men. This distinction is necessary, and founded in reason and nature.

Human creatures at their birth are in a state weaker and more helpless than any other animals. They also arrive much more slowly at maturity, and need by far most assistance and cultivation. Therefore a particular union of the parents is absolutely necessary, and that upon such powerful principles as will secure their common care. Marriage is a relation expressly founded upon this necessity, and must be so conducted as to ascertain the property of the offspring, and to promise the most assiduous, prudent, and extensive care.

This is the foundation of marriage drawn from the public good. But we ought also to observe, that man is manifestly superior in dignity to the other animals; and it was intended that all his enjoyments, and even his indulgence of instinctive propensities, should be of a more exalted and rational kind than theirs. Therefore the propensity of the sexes to one another, is not only reined in by modesty, but is so ordered as to require that reason and friendship, and some of the noblest affections, should have place. And it is certain that they have, if not a more violent, at least a more lasting

and uniform influence, in the married ſtate, than ſenſual deſire.

It is further obſerved by moral writers, that though beauty and perſonal attraction may be conſidered as the firſt motives, yet theſe are always ſuppoſed to be indications of ſomething excellent in the temper within. So that even love of beauty, in man, is an attachment to moral excellence. Let a perſon attend with ſerioufneſs, and he will find, that the utmoſt perfection of form in an idiot, or one thoroughly known to be of a very bad temper, is really no object of deſire; though in thoſe who are little known, it is apt to prejudice the ignorant and unwary to judge favourably of the perſon.

The particulars which reaſon and nature point out, relating to the marriage-contract, are as follow:

1. That it be between one man and one woman. Polygamy is condemned by nature; for it is found, that the males born are to the females as 13 to 12, or as ſome ſay as 20 to 19, the overplus being to ſupply the greater waſte of the male part of the ſpecies by war and dangerous occupations, hard labour, and travelling by land and ſea.

2. The fundamental and eſſential part of the contract is fidelity and chaſtity. This muſt immediately appear to be eſſential to the purpoſe of the union. Some writers ſay that this is eſpecially binding upon the woman, in order to aſcertain the offspring; but every body muſt ſee the abſurdity of any diſtinction, becauſe the contract would neither be equal, nor likely to be ſteadily obſerved, if

it were not mutual. Beſides, as a late author has well obſerved, if chaſtity be a female virtue, how can men be unchaſte without infringing upon it?

3. The contract ſhould be for life, otherwiſe it would be ſhort, uncertain, and mutual love and induſtry greatly weakened.

4. If ſuperiority and authority be given to the man, it ſhould be uſed with ſo much gentleneſs and love, as to make it a ſtate of as great equality as poſſible. Hutchinſon and ſome other writers ſay there ſhould be no ſuperiority, and that their property, being common, ſhould not be alienated by the one without the other. Others think that perfect equality of power in two perſons is not conſiſtent with order, and the common intereſt, and therefore give authority to the man; and the laws of moſt nations give the man the diſpoſal of property, with the reſervation of particular rights to the woman.

Some Heathen writers gave the man power of life and death over the woman; a thing evidently barbarous and unjuſt.

5. Marriages are ſometimes diſſolved by divorces, which our law permits only on three accounts—adultery, wilful and obſtinate deſertion, and incapacity. The firſt two of theſe are founded on the New Teſtament, and the laſt on reaſon, being not ſo properly a diſſolution of a marriage, as a declaration that it was void from the beginning, and never took place.

Some writers of moral philoſophy add as cauſes of divorce, contrariety of temper, incurable diſeaſes, and ſuch as would infect the offspring. But none of them ſeem of ſufficient moment. The firſt would

be an evident temptation to cauſeleſs and wanton ſeparations; and all the three may be guarded againſt by previous caution.

Hutchinſon obſerves, that in all nations, marrying in near degrees of conſanguinity or affinity has been avoided and abhorred; and he adds, that the natural and general abhorrence of it has been greater than reaſon ſeems to dictate. Hence it has been conjectured to have been early tradition or revelation; and men have exerciſed their invention in finding out the true reaſon or ground of the prohibition.

One reaſon aſſigned is, becauſe if marriage were lawful to near relations, their frequent intercourſe would be a ſtrong temptation to uncleanneſs.

Another, that if permitted, it would frequently confound or invert the duties of relations, by ſetting ſome above others whom they formerly uſed to obey.

A third reaſon, and perhaps the beſt, is, that abſtaining from blood relations in this voluntary contract extends the ſocial ties, and produces a greater number of family-relations.

Whatever be the moral reaſons, it ſeems to have a ſtrong ſanction in nature; for it is obſerved, that marriage between near relations, eſpecially if repeated, greatly weakens the human race.

As to the extent of this prohibition, it has been various in different nations, but the moſt prevailing has been to forbid all within three degrees. The degrees are reckoned by the ſteps of deſcent between the parties and the common parent. Parent and child is the firſt; child and child, the ſecond;

child and grand-child, the third; and two grand-children, or firſt couſins, the fourth, when it becomes lawful.

Relation of Parents and Children.

THE firſt thing to be obſerved is, that this relation is diſtinguiſhed by the ſtrongeſt inſtinct of parental affection. This ſeems neceſſary, as the education of children is a duty requiring ſo much time, care, and expence, which nothing but the moſt rooted affection would ſubmit to.

The rights of the parent may be ſummed up in theſe two: 1. Authority, which requires ſubjection in the children. 2. A right to a grateful return in due time from the children. The firſt is a perfect right, as far as it extends, but muſt be limited.

Some nations have given parents the power of life and death over their children; and Hobbes inſiſts, that children are the goods and abſolute property of their parents, and that they may alienate them and ſell them, either for a time or for life. But both theſe ſeem ill founded, becauſe they are contrary to the end of this right, viz. inſtruction and protection. Parental right ſeems in moſt caſes to be limited by the advantage of the children.

Children are no doubt to judge for themſelves in matters of religion, when they come to years; though the parents are under the ſtrongeſt obligation to inſtruct them carefully to the beſt of their judgement. Thoſe who inſiſt, that, to leave them their judgement free, they ought not to be taught

any principles, ought to consider that their scheme is impracticable and absurd. If the parents do not instruct them, they will imbibe prejudices, and contract habits, perhaps of the worst kind, from others.

Children in most nations are considered as having a right, exclusive of their parents, to property given them by others.

Many nations have given the parents a right to dispose of their children in marriage; but this seems to be carrying parental authority too far, if it be made absolute, because it puts in the power of the parent to dispose of what is most essential to their happiness through the whole of their future life. Yet it seems very contrary to reason and nature, that children in early life should dispose of themselves in marriage without consulting their parents.

Since we have denied the power of life and death to parents, it will be asked, What is the sanction of their authority? I answer, Moderate correction in early life, and, as the very highest punishment, expulsion from their family, or a forfeiture of the privileges which they despise.

As to the right to a grateful return, it is an imperfect right, but of the strongest kind; sometimes the civil authority interposes, and obliges children to maintain their aged parents.

To the disgrace of human nature, it is often observed, that parental affection is much stronger than filial duty. We must indeed acknowledge the wisdom of Providence in making the instinctive impulse stronger in parents towards their children,

than in children towards their parents; becauſe the firſt is more neceſſary than the other to the public good; yet when we conſider both as improved into a virtuous diſpoſition, by reaſon and a ſenſe of duty, there ſeems to be every whit as much baſeneſs in filial ingratitude, as in want of natural affection.

Relation of Master and Servant.

THIS relation is firſt generated by the difference which God hath permitted to take place between man and man. Some are ſuperior to others in mental powers and intellectual improvement; ſome by the great increaſe of their property, through their own or their predeceſſors induſtry; and ſome make it their choice, finding they cannot live otherwiſe better, to let out their labour to others for hire.

Let us ſhortly conſider, (1.) How far this ſubjection extends. (2.) The duties on each ſide.

As to the firſt, it ſeems to be only that the maſter has a right to the labours and ingenuity of the ſervant for a limited time, or at moſt for life. He can have no right either to take away life, or to make it inſupportable by exceſſive labour. The ſervant therefore retains all other natural rights.

The practice of ancient nations, of making their priſoners of war ſlaves, was altogether unjuſt and barbarous; for though we could ſuppoſe that thoſe who were the cauſes of an unjuſt war deſerved to be made ſlaves; yet this could not be the caſe of all who fought on their ſide; beſides, the doing ſo

in one inſtance would authoriſe the doing it in any other; and thoſe who fought in defence of his country, when unjuſtly invaded, might be taken as well as others. The practice was alſo impolitic, as ſlaves never are ſo good or faithful ſervants, as thoſe who become ſo for a limited time by conſent.

LECTURE XII.

OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

CIVIL Society is diſtinguiſhed from domeſtic, in the union of a number of families in one ſtate, for their mutual benefit.

We have before affirmed, that ſociety always ſuppoſes an expreſſed or implied contract or agreement. Let us now ſee what this agreement neceſſarily implies.

(1.) The conſent of every individual to live in, and be a member of that ſociety. (2.) A conſent to ſome particular plan of government. (3.) A mutual agreement between the ſubjects and rulers; of ſubjection on the one hand, of protection on the other. Theſe are all implied in the union of every ſociety, and they complete the whole.

Any objections that may be raiſed againſt this are eaſily ſolved. *Ex. gr.* Though every individual has not given an actual conſent, yet his determination to live with any ſociety implies it. Again, if it be aſked, how children come to be members of

a ſociety? it is anſwered, they receive the benefits and partake of the rights of the ſociety during the whole time of their education; and as they come to the uſe of reaſon, they both claim the privilege and acquieſce in the duty of citizens. And if they find any thing inſupportable in their condition, they may alter it at their pleaſure.

Have, then, all ſubjects a right, when they ſee fit, to remove from the ſociety in which they are? I anſwer, that in all ordinary caſes they ought to have, at leaſt in time of peace. Perhaps it may be affirmed with juſtice, that they who have enjoyed the privileges of any ſociety in time of peace, if war or danger to the public ſhould ariſe, they may be hindered from emigrating at that time, and compelled to contribute their ſhare in what is neceſſary to the common defence.

Whatever is the form of government in any ſociety, the members may be divided into two claſſes, the *rulers* and the *ruled*, the magiſtrates and ſubjects.

The rights of rulers may be divided into eſſential and accidental: the eſſential, ſuch as in general muſt be veſted in rulers of every ſociety; the accidental, ſuch as may be given to the rulers in ſome ſocieties, but not in others.

The eſſential rights of rulers, are what require moſt to be enumerated; and theſe again by ſome good writers are divided into greater and leſſer eſſentials.

Of the firſt kind are, (1.) Legiſlation. (2.) Taxation for the public expence. (3.) Juriſdiction, or the adminiſtration of juſtice. (4.) Repreſen-

tation, or appearing and acting in name of the whole, in all tranſactions, with adjacent independent ſtates, chiefly for the purpoſes of making war or peace.

The leſs eſſential rights of rulers are many, and they are called leſs eſſential, becauſe they may be more varied than the others; ſuch as, coining of money, poſſeſſing or managing public edifices, conferring honours on officers, &c.

The rights of ſubjects in a ſocial ſtate cannot be enumerated, but they may be all ſummed up in *protection;* that is to ſay, thoſe who have ſurrendered part of their natural rights, expect the ſtrength of the public arm to defend and improve what remains.

It has been often ſaid, that government is carried on by rewards and puniſhments; but it ought to be obſerved, that the only reward that a ſtate can be ſuppoſed to beſtow upon good ſubjects in general, is protection and defence. Some few who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the public ſervice, may be diſtinguiſhed by particular rewards; but to reward the whole is impoſſible, becauſe the reward muſt be levied from thoſe very perſons to whom it is to be given.

After what has been ſaid on the foundation of ſociety, viz. conſent, perhaps it may be neceſſary to mention two exceptions.

1. It is ſaid by ſome, with apparent reaſon, that a few perſons, if accidentally armed with power, may conſtrain a large ignorant rabble to ſubmit to laws which will be for their good. This I would admit in ſome caſes, when there is an evident mad-

ness and disorder in the multitude, and when there is a moral certainty that they will afterwards be pleased with the violence done them. But in general it is but a bad maxim, that we may force people for their good. All lovers of power will be disposed to think, that even a violent use of it is for the public good.

2. Though people have actually consented to any form of government, if they have been essentially deceived in the nature and operation of the laws, if they are found to be pernicious and destructive of the ends of the union, they may certainly break up the society, recal the obligation, and resettle the whole upon a better footing.

Of the different Forms of Government.

As soon as men began to consider and compare forms of government, they divided them into three general and simple kinds, (1.) Monarchy, (2.) Aristocracy, (3.) Democracy. These are called simple, because they are clearly distinguishable from each other in their nature and effects. The ancients generally divided the forms of government in this manner, because most of their governments were of one or other of these kinds, with very little mixture.

Monarchy is when the supreme power is vested in a single person. Mr Hutchinson says, Monarchy may be either absolute or limited; but this is an inaccuracy, for limited monarchy is one of the mixed kinds of government.

But monarchy may be either temporary or for

life. The Roman dictators were abſolute for a time, and ſo long as they continued, the government was purely monarchical, all other powers being dormant.

Monarchy may alſo be either hereditary or elective.

Ariſtocracy is that form of government in which the ſupreme power is lodged with a ſmall number of nobles. This is capable of the ſame variations as monarchy; and it may be either temporary or perpetual, hereditary or elective, with this difference, that a temporary or elective ariſtocracy always puts ſome power in the hands of the people. The moſt complete ariſtocracy is when the ruling party have the power of co-optation within themſelves, and can fill up as they pleaſe the vacancies made by deaths or reſignation.

Democracy is when the ſupreme power is left in the multitude. But as in large governments the people in a collective body cannot well meet together, nor could they tranſact buſineſs with any convenience if they did, they may meet by repreſentatives, choſen either by the whole or by particular diſtricts.

From thoſe ſimple forms are generated many complex forms; two of them may be compounded together, either in equal or in different proportions, or all theſe may be united, as in the Britiſh government.

After pointing out the ſimple forms of government, it will be proper to make ſome general obſervations upon government, and apply them to the

various forms, to shew whether any of them is preferable to the other, and the advantages and defects of each in particular.

I. There are four things that seem to be requisite in a system of government, and every form is good in proportion as it possesses or attains them. (1.) Wisdom to plan proper measures for the public good. (2.) Fidelity to have nothing but the public interest in view. (3.) Secrecy, expedition, and dispatch in carrying measures into execution. And, (4.) Unity and concord, or that one branch of the government may not impede, or be a hindrance to another.

Monarchy has plainly the advantage in unity, secrecy, and expedition. Many cannot so easily nor so speedily agree upon proper measures, nor can they expect to keep their designs secret; therefore, say some, if a man could be found wise enough, and just enough for the charge, monarchy would be the best form of government. Accordingly we find, that in the command of a ship, fleet, or army, one person is commonly intrusted with supreme power; but this does not apply to states, for many reasons. No man can be found who has either skill sufficient, or, if he had, could give attention to the whole departments of a great empire. Besides, in hereditary monarchies there is no security at all for either wisdom or goodness; and an elective monarchy, though it may seem to promise ability, has been always found in experience worse than the other, because there is no reason to expect that an elected monarch will have the public good at

heart; he will probably mind only private or family intereſt.

Ariſtocracy has the advantage of all the others for *wiſdom* in deliberations; that is to ſay, a number of perſons of the firſt rank muſt be ſuppoſed by their conſultations to be able to diſcover the public intereſt. But it has very little or no proſpect of fidelity or union. The moſt ambitious projects, and the moſt violent and implacable factions, often prevail in ſuch ſtates.

Democracy has the advantage of both the others for fidelity; the multitude collectively always are true in intention to the intereſt of the public, becauſe it is their own. They are the public. But at the ſame time, it has very little advantage for wiſdom or union, and none at all for ſecrecy and expedition. Beſides, the multitude are exceeding apt to be deceived by demagogues and ambitious perſons. They are very apt to truſt a man who ſerves them well, with ſuch power as that he is able to make them ſerve him.

If the true notion of liberty is the prevalence of law and order, and the ſecurity of individuals, none of the ſimple forms are favourable to it.

Monarchy, every one knows, is but another name for tyranny, where the arbitrary will of one capricious man diſpoſes of the lives and properties of all ranks.

Ariſtocracy always makes vaſſals of the inferior ranks, who have no hand in government, and the great commonly rule with greater ſeverity than abſolute monarchs. A monarch is at ſuch a diſtance from moſt of his ſubjects, that he does them little

injury; but the lord of a petty seignory is a rigorous task-master to his unhappy dependents. The jealousy with which the members of an aristocratical state defend their own privileges, is no security at all for humanity and easy treatment to their inferiors. Example—the Spartans; their treatment of the Helots—and the barons in all the feudal governments, in their treatment of their vassals.

Pure democracy cannot subsist long, nor be carried far into the departments of state—it is very subject to caprice and the madness of popular rage. They are also very apt to chuse a favourite, and vest him with such power as overthrows their own liberty,—examples, Athens and Rome.

Hence it appears, that every good form of government must be complex, so that the one principle may check the other. It is of consequence to have as much virtue among the particular members of a community as possible; but it is folly to expect that a state should be upheld by integrity in all who have a share in managing it. They must be so balanced, that when every one draws to his own interest or inclination, there may be an over-poise upon the whole.

II. The second observation upon the forms of government is, that where there is a balance of different bodies, as in all mixed forms, there must be always some *nexus imperii*, something to make one of them necessary to the other. If this is not the case, they will not only draw different ways, but will often separate altogether from each other. In order to produce this *nexus*, some of the great essential rights of rulers must be divided, and distributed

among the different branches of the legiſlature.—Example in the Britiſh government—the King has the power of making war and peace, but the Parliament have the levying and diſtribution of money, which is a ſufficient reſtraint.

III. The third obſervation is, that the ruling part of any ſtate muſt always have conſiderable property, chiefly of lands. The reaſon is, property has ſuch an invariable influence, that whoever poſſeſſes property muſt have power. Property in a ſtate is alſo ſome ſecurity for fidelity, becauſe intereſt then is concerned in the public welfare.

For this reaſon, did men in every ſtate live entirely by agriculture, an agrarian law would be neceſſary to liberty, becauſe if a vaſt proportion of property came into a few hands, they would ſoon take all power to themſelves. But trade and commerce ſuperſede the neceſſity of this, becauſe the great and ſudden fortunes accumulated by trade cauſe a rotation of property.

IV. In a well-formed ſtate, the ſubjects ſhould not be too numerous, nor too few. If very numerous, the principles of government cannot exert their force over the whole. The Roman empire fell by its own weight. If the ſubjects are too few, they are not ſufficient to ſuppreſs internal inſurrections, or repel attacks from without.

V. It is frequently obſerved, that in every government there is a ſupreme irreſiſtible power lodged ſomewhere, in king, ſenate, or people. To this power is the final appeal in all queſtions. Beyond this we cannot go. How far does this authority extend? We anſwer, As far as authority in a

ſocial ſtate can extend, it is not accountable to any other tribunal; and it is ſuppoſed in the ſocial compact, that we have agreed to ſubmit to its deciſion. There is, however, an exception, if the ſupreme power, wherever lodged, come to be exerciſed in a manifeſtly tyrannical manner, the ſubjects may certainly, if in their power, reſiſt and overthrow it. But this is only when it becomes manifeſtly more advantageous to unſettle the government altogether, than to ſubmit to tyranny. This reſiſtance to the ſupreme power, however, is ſubverting the ſociety altogether, and is not to be attempted till the government is ſo corrupt, as that anarchy and the uncertainty of a new ſettlement is preferable to the continuance as it is.

This doctrine of reſiſtance even to the ſupreme power is eſſentially connected with what has been ſaid on the ſocial contract, and the conſent neceſſary to political union. If it be aſked, Who muſt judge when the government may be reſiſted? I anſwer, The ſubjects in general, every one for himſelf. This may ſeem to be making them both judge and party, but there is no remedy. It would be denying the privilege altogether, to make the oppreſſive ruler the judge.

It is eaſy to ſee, that the meaning of this is not, that any little miſtake of the rulers of any ſociety will juſtify reſiſtance. We muſt obey and ſubmit to them always, till the corruption becomes intolerable; for to ſay that we might reſiſt legal authority every time we judged it to be wrong, would be inconſiſtent with a ſtate of ſociety, and to the very firſt idea of ſubjection.

The once famous controverfy on paffive obedience and non-refiftance, feems now, in our country, to be pretty much over; what the advocates for fubmiffion ufed to fay was, that to teach the lawfulnefs of refifting a government in any inftance, and to make the rebel the judge, is fubverfive of all order, and muft fubject a ftate to perpetual fedition; to which I anfwer, To refufe this inherent right in every man, is to eftablifh injuftice and tyranny, and leave every good fubject without help, as a tame prey to the ambition and rapacity of others. No doubt men may abufe the privilege, yet this does not make it void. Befides, it is not till a whole people rife, that refiftance has any effect; and it is not eafy to fuppofe, that a whole people would rife againft their governors, unlefs when they have really received very great provocation. Whereas, on the other hand, nothing is more natural than for rulers to grafp at power, and their fituation enables them to do it fucceffully by flow and infenfible encroachments. In experience, there are many inftances of rulers becoming tyrants, but comparatively very few of caufelefs and premature rebellions. There are occafional and partial infurrections in every government. Thefe are eafily raifed by intereffted perfons, but the great majority continues to fupport order.

VI. Dominion, it is plain from all that has been faid, can be acquired juftly only one way, viz. by confent. There are two other ways commonly mentioned, both of which are defective, inheritance and conqueft. Hereditary power, which originally rofe from confent, and is fuppofed to be

founded upon the continuance of consent, (as that of the hereditary power in a limited monarchy), is as lawful as any; but when they pretend such a right from nature is independent of the people, it is absurd.

That which is called the right of conquest ought to be exploded altogether. We shall see by and by what is the right of a conqueror in a just war. It was his right before, and he obtains possession of it by conquest. But to found any claim merely on conquest, is not a right, but robbery.

Upon the whole, I will conclude with a few remarks upon the spirit and tendency of different forms of government.

1. Monarchical government has a tendency to politeness and elegance of manners, and generally to luxury. The submission and obsequiousness practised at the court of a monarch, diffuses itself through the whole state.

2. Aristocracy narrows the mind exceedingly, and indeed cannot long subsist in a large state. A small aristocracy, however, may subsist as a form of government, as long as any other method, or longer.

3. Democracy tends to plainness and freedom of speech, and sometimes to a savage and indecent ferocity. Democracy is the nurse of eloquence, because, when the multitude have the power, persuasion is the only way to govern them.

Let us now ask this short question, What is the value and advantage of civil liberty?

Is it necessary to virtue? This cannot be suppo-

ſed. A virtuous mind and virtuous conduct is poſſible, and perhaps equally poſſible, in every form of government.

Is it neceſſary to perſonal private happineſs? It may ſeem ſo. We ſee the ſubjects of arbitrary governments, however, not only happy, but very often they have a greater attachment to their form of government than thoſe of free ſtates have to theirs. And if contentment be neceſſary to happineſs, there is commonly more impatience and diſcontent in a free ſtate than in any other. The tyranny even of an abſolute monarch does not affect with perſonal injury any of his ſubjects but a few, and chiefly thoſe who make it their choice to be near him. Perhaps in free governments, the law and the mob do more miſchief to private property, than is done in any abſolute monarchy.

What, then, is the advantage of civil liberty? I ſuppoſe it chiefly conſiſts in its tendency to put in motion all the human powers. Therefore it promotes induſtry, and in this reſpect happineſs, produces every latent quality, and improves the human mind. Liberty is the nurſe of riches, literature, and heroiſm.

LECTURE XIII.

OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS.

THE next thing in order is, to treat of what is called the law of *nature* and *nations*. It has been before obſerved, that ſeparate and independent ſtates are, with regard to one another, in a ſtate of natural liberty, or as man to man before the commencement of civil ſociety. On this ſeveral queſtions ariſe. 1. Is there any ſuch law? 2. What is the law? 3. What is its ſanction, or how is it to be enforced?

That there is ſuch a law, is plain from the reaſons that ſhews the obligation which one man lies under to another. If there are natural rights of men, there are natural rights of nations. Bodies politic in this view, do not differ in the leaſt from individuals. Therefore, as before, reaſon, conſcience, and common utility, ſhow that there is a law of nature and nations.

The queſtion, What it is? muſt be conſidered in the ſame manner. I am not able to recollect any perfect or imperfect right that can belong to one man, as diſtinguiſhed from another, but what belongs to nations, ſave that there is uſually leſs occaſion for the imperfect rights. If we read over the perfect rights, in a ſtate of natural liberty, we ſhall ſee they all apply to nations.

It will alſo appear, that the imperfect rights apply; but the occaſions of exerting them are much

more rare. For example, it is more rare to see a nation in a state of general indigence, so as to require a supply. Yet this sometimes happens. It did so in the case of Portugal, at the time of the great earthquake at Lisbon; and the other nations of Europe lent them assistance. It is also from this principle that ships of different nations, meeting at sea, will do acts of humanity to one another. Sometimes also there are national favours that deserve national gratitude. But this is seldom merited, and, I believe, still seldomer paid.

As to the sanction of the law of nature and nations, it is no other than a general sense of duty, and such a sense of common utility, as makes men fear, that if they notoriously break these laws, reproach and infamy among all nations will be the effect, and probably resentment and indignation by common consent.

The violation of the natural rights of mankind being a transgression of the law of nature, and between nations as in a state of natural liberty, there being no method of redress but force, the law of nature and nations has as its chief or only object the manner of making *war* and *peace*.

In war it is proper to consider distinctly, 1. The causes for which a just war may be carried on. 2. The time of commencing. 3. The duration. 4. The means by which it may be carried on.

As to the first, the causes of commencing war are, according to the principles above laid down, the violation of any perfect right—as taking away the property of the other state, or the lives of its subjects, or restraining them in their industry, or hin-

dering them in the use of things common, &c. There is only one perfect right, the violation of which does not seem to be a cause of war; I mean that by which we have a right to character. National calumny is scarcely a cause of war, because it cannot be frequent or of great effect. The violation of imperfect rights cannot usually be a cause of war between nations; yet a case may be supposed, in which even these would be a just cause of war. Suppose a ship of any nation should go into a port of another, in the greatest distress, and not only the people in general, but the governing part of the society should deny them all assistance:—This would be an act of such notorious inhumanity, and of such evil example, that it may justify national resentment; and yet even here, I think there should first be a demand of justice upon the offending persons, before vengeance should be taken upon the state.

These are the just and legitimate causes of making war. Some add to them, that when a nation is seen to put itself in such a situation as to defence, or as to the means of annoying others, that it seems to threaten hostilities, then we are not obliged to wait till it hath committed actual injury, but may put it in a state of incapacity; but there is no other truth in this, but what is founded upon the other; for the preservation of our property implies, that if others take such measures as are not to be accounted for, but upon the supposition of an intention of wronging me, it is often easier and safer to prevent and disarm the robber, than to suffer him to com-

mit the violence, and then to ſtrip him and rob him of his prey.

One thing more is to be added, that every nation has a right to join which it pleaſes of two contending parties. This is eaſily reſolved into the general principles; for the injured party may be ſuppoſed to go to war in defence of ſome perfect right; and the cauſe being juſt, the imperfect right of humanity, as well as general and common utility, calls for aſſiſtance to the oppreſſed. So that, if we have a right to aſſociate with any nation, we may be entitled to protect their property and rights.

2. As to the time of commencing war, it ſeems to be no way contrary to natural law, to ſay it is at any time the injured party pleaſes, after having received an injury; but accident or utility, or a deſire in each party to manifeſt the equity of their cauſe, has introduced univerſally the cuſtom of declaring war. This begun very early, and, though not of abſolute right, having been generally introduced, muſt be continued, though there is often more of form than of ſubſtance in it; for nations do often begin both attack and defence before declaration, as well as make all the neceſſary preparations for ſtriking the moſt effectual blow. The meaning of a declaration of war ſeems to be, to call upon the injured party to prevent it by reparation; likewiſe, to manifeſt to all other ſtates the juſtice of the cauſe.

3. The duration of a war ſhould be, according to natural equity, till the injury be completely redreſſed, and reaſonable ſecurity given againſt fu-

ture attacks; therefore the practice, too common, of continuing a war for the acquisition of empire, is to be condemned. Because one state has done some injury to another, it seems quite unreasonable that they should not only repair the injury, but subvert and ruin the offending state altogether; this would be unreasonable between man and man, if one had wronged another, not only to repair the wrong, but to take all the rest that he had, and reduce his family to beggary. It is even more unreasonable in states, because the offenders in states are not to be supposed to be the whole people, but only the rulers, or perhaps only some individuals.

Perhaps it may be asked, What is *reasonable* security against future injury? I answer, Between equal independent nations, solemn treaties ought to be considered as security; but, if faith has been often broken, perhaps something more may be required. The mutual complaints of nations against each other for breach of faith, makes conquerors often demand such a degree of security, as puts the conquered altogether in their power.

4. As to the legitimate means of carrying on the war, in general, it may be said in one word, by force or open violence. It is admitted on all hands, that this force may be used against the person and goods, not only of the rulers, but of every member of the hostile state. This may seem hard, that innocent subjects of the state should suffer for the folly and indiscretion of the rulers, or of other members of the same state; but it is unavoidable. The whole individuals that compose a state are consi-

dered but as one body; it would be impoſſible for an enemy to diſtinguiſh the guilty from the innocent; and when men ſubmit to a government, they riſk their own poſſeſſions on the ſame bottom with the whole, in return for the benefits of ſociety.

Open violence may be ſaid to have no bounds, and therefore every method that can be invented, and the moſt deadly weapons of annoyance may ſeem to be permitted. But, from what has been ſaid above, and upon the principles of general equity, all acts of cruelty and inhumanity are to be blamed, and all ſeverity that has not an immediate effect in weakening the national ſtrength of the enemy, is certainly inhumanity; ſuch as, killing priſoners whom you can keep ſafely,—killing women and children,—burning and deſtroying every thing that could be of uſe in life.

The uſe of poiſoned weapons has been alſo generally condemned, and the poiſoning of ſprings or proviſions.

To the honour of modern times, and very probably, I think, to the honour of Chriſtianity, there is much more humanity in the way of carrying on war than formerly.

To aim particularly at the life of a leader, or perſon of chief note, ſeems to have in it nothing unjuſt or improper, becauſe the more important the life, it does more toward the finiſhing of the war; but what many ſeem to admit, the bribing of his own people to aſſaſſinate him privately, I cannot think honourable or fair.

A queſtion is often moved in morals, How far it is lawful to deceive an enemy, eſpecially if we

hold the general and univerſal obligation of truth. To this it may be anſwered, in the firſt place, that we may certainly with great juſtice conceal our own deſigns from an enemy, as, indeed, we may generally from friends, by ſilence, and guarding againſt every circumſtance that may betray them. Neither do I think there is any thing at all blameworthy in a general of an army uſing ambiguous ſigns, as feigned marches of a part or the whole, putting up lights or ſuch things, becauſe, after a declaration of war, he does not pretend to give information to his enemy of his motions; nay, it is expected on both ſides, that they will do the beſt they can to over-reach one another in point of prudence. Yet I can ſcarce think it right to employ people to go to the enemy, and, profeſſing to be ſincere, tell direct falſehoods, and deceive them by that falſe intelligence.

It is the cuſtom of all to ſend ſpies to diſcover the enemy's deſigns, and alſo to bribe ſome of the enemies themſelves, to diſcover the deſigns of their leaders; the laſt of which is, I think, at leaſt of a doubtful nature, or rather unjuſt. Though ſending ſpies is by all approved, yet (what may ſeem a little unaccountable) ſuch ſpies are always puniſhed with inſtant death by the oppoſite party, when detected. The reaſon probably is, that, pretending friendſhip, they have a right to conſider them as traitors; or, as they are in an act of hoſtility, they kill them, as they would do an enemy in battle, when in their power.

Theſe circumſtances apply to all war in general; but there is a diſtinction of wars by civilians into

two kinds, *solemn* and *civil*. The firſt includes all wars between ſtates formerly independent; the other, internal inſurrections of a part of one government againſt another.

There has generally been a great difference in the behaviour of the oppoſite parties in theſe different wars. In ſolemn wars there is a preſumption of integrity in the plurality on both ſides; each believes his own cauſe to be juſt. On this account they are to be treated with the more humanity. In civil wars, the inſurgents are conſidered as making unjuſt reſiſtance to the ruling part of the ſociety, and therefore guilty of the greateſt crimes againſt ſociety. Therefore they are often treated with great rigour, and, when taken in battle, reſerved to ſolemn trial and public execution. There is ſome reaſon for this in many caſes, when it is indeed an unreaſonable or unprovoked inſurrection of diſorderly citizens; but there are many caſes in which the pretences on both ſides are ſo plauſible, that the war ſhould be in all reſpects conſidered as ſolemn.

It ſhould be obſerved, notwithſtanding the hoſtile diſpoſition, there are occaſions, both in a treaty for peace and during the continuance of the war, when enemies are under the ſtrongeſt obligations to ſincerity in their behaviour to each other; when propoſals are made for accommodating the differences, for a ſuſpenſion of arms, for an exchange of priſoners, or any thing ſimilar.

It is worth while to inquire, whether the greateſt honour and candour in war, with a ſtrict adherence

to all the laws above laid down, would give any party a great advantage who ſhould take the liberty of tranſgreſſing them; as for example, who ſhould uſe poiſoned weapons, ſhould ſend people to tell falſe ſtories, ſhould bribe ſubjects to aſſaſſinate a hoſtile prince.—I anſwer, that they would have no advantage at all, but probably the contrary. There is ſomething powerful in magnanimity, which ſubdues the hearts of enemies; nay, ſometimes terrifies them, and particularly inſpires a general's army with invincible courage. Beſides theſe, ſiniſter arts are not ſo terrible as may be imagined;—telling falſe news is as eaſily diſcovered as any trick whatſoever.

Prudence and integrity have no need of any aſſiſtance from fraud; acts even of generoſity, from enemy to enemy, are often as uſeful as any acts of hoſtility. There was ſomething very handſome in the Roman general, who refuſed to avail himſelf of the treachery of a ſchool-maſter, as well as whimſical in the way in which he puniſhed the traitor.

Of Making Peace.

As already hinted, all propoſals tending to this purpoſe ought to be made with the utmoſt ſincerity. Of all deceits in war, the moſt infamous is that of making a treaty, or ſeeking a confidence, only to take advantage of the ſecurity of one party, to deſtroy him,—by aſſaſſination, or by breaking a truce to fight with advantage.

The terms of peace ought to be agreeable to the

end of making war. Damages ſhould be repaired, and ſecurity given againſt future injury.

We have often ſaid, that nation to nation is as man to man in a ſtate of natural liberty; therefore treaties of peace between nations ſhould in general proceed upon the ſame principles as private contracts between man and man. There is, however, an exception, that contracts between individuals are (at leaſt by law) always void when they are the effect of conſtraint upon one ſide. Now, this muſt not hold in treaties between nations, becauſe it would always furniſh a pretext for breaking them. On the ſide of the conquered, a treaty is always in a great degree the effect of neceſſity.

It is generally, however, laid down in moſt authors as a principle, that the terms impoſed and ſubmitted to may be ſometimes ſo rigorous and oppreſſive, as to juſtify the injured party in revolting when they are able. This ſeems to me to be very lax in point of morals. It would be better, I think, to ſay, that the people who made the treaty ſhould not recede from it. Their poſterity, however, at ſome diſtance, cannot be ſuppoſed bound to unjuſt ſervitude by the deeds of their fathers.

Let us conclude this ſubject by a few remarks on the ſituation of neutral ſtates.

1. Every ſtate has a right, when others are contending, to remain neuter, and aſſiſt neither party.

2. They have a right to all their former privileges with both the contending parties, may carry on their traffic with both, and may ſhew all the uſual marks of friendſhip to both; only, it has been generally agreed upon, that they are not to trade

with any of them in certain articles ſuppoſed to be of conſequence in carrying on war, particularly proviſions and arms.

3. Neutral powers ſhould keep their harbours alike open to both for common refreſhment, and as an aſylum to fly to. And it is held neceſſary, that the contending powers muſt not carry on their quarrel, nor exerciſe any hoſtilities, within the territories of a neutral ſtate.

4. Neutral ſtates may purchaſe moveable goods from any of the contending parties, which have been taken from the other. But not ſo with reſpect to lands or forts; becauſe, if the other party are able, they will re-take their poſſeſſions.

5. Deeds of a violent poſſeſſor are held to be valid; that is to ſay, if a conqueror prevails for a time, and levies tribute from any country, and afterwards the rightful poſſeſſor prevails, it would be unjuſt to demand the tribute again, becauſe the true owner was not able to give protection to the ſubjects, and what was paid was loſt through his weakneſs. The ſame thing may be ſaid of a dependent ſtate; if it owes any money and ſervice to a ſupreme ſtate, and an enemy exact it by force, the proper creditor cannot juſtly demand it again.

On the whole, thoſe things that have been generally received as the law of nature and nations, are founded on the principles of equity, and, when well obſerved, do greatly promote general utility.

LECTURE XIV.

JURISPRUDENCE.

JURISPRUDENCE is the method of enacting and adminiſtering civil laws in any conſtitution.

We cannot propoſe to go through a ſyſtem of civil laws; and therefore what I have in view, is to make ſome preliminary remarks, and then to point out the *object* of civil laws, and the manner of their operation.

1. The firſt preliminary remark is, that a conſtitution is excellent, when the ſpirit of the civil laws is ſuch, as to have a tendency to prevent offences, and make men good, as much as to puniſh them when they do evil.

This is neceſſary in ſome meaſure; for, when the general diſpoſition of a people is againſt the laws, they cannot long ſubſiſt, even by a ſtrict and rigorous execution on the part of the rulers. There is, however, more of this in ſome conſtitutions than in others. Solon and Xenophon, as well as Lycurgus, ſeem to have formed their plan very much with this view, to direct the manners of the people in the firſt place, which will always make the obſervance of particular laws eaſy.

But how ſhall the magiſtrate manage this matter? or what can be done by law, to make the people of any ſtate virtuous? If, as we have ſeen above, virtue and piety are inſeparably connected, then to promote true religion is the beſt and moſt effectual

way of making a virtuous and regular people. Love to God, and love to man, is the ſubſtance of religion; when theſe prevail, civil laws will have little to do.

But this leads to a very important diſquiſition, how far the magiſtrate ought to interfere in matters of religion. Religious ſentiments are very various, and we have given it as one of the perfect rights in natural liberty, and that which ought not to be alienated even in ſociety, that every one ſhould judge for himſelf in matters of religion.

What the magiſtrate may do on this ſubject, ſeems to be confined to the three following particulars.

(1.) The magiſtrate (or ruling part of any ſociety) ought to encourage piety by his own example, and by endeavouring to make it an object of public eſteem. Whenever the general opinion is in favour of any thing, it will have many followers. Magiſtrates may promote and encourage men of piety and virtue, and they may diſcountenance thoſe whom it would be improper to puniſh.

(2.) The magiſtrate ought to defend the rights of conſcience, and tolerate all in their religious ſentiments, that are not injurious to their neighbours. In the ancient heathen ſtates, there was leſs occaſion for this, becauſe, in the ſyſtem of polytheiſm, the different gods and rites were not ſuppoſed to be oppoſite, but co-ordinate and conſiſtent; but when there is believed to be but one God, the ſentiments about his nature and worſhip will often

be conſidered as eſſentially repugnant one to another.

The pretence of infidels, that perſecution only belongs to the Chriſtian religion, is abſurd; for the Chriſtian was the firſt religion that was perſecuted; and it was the neceſſary conſequence of ſaying, that the gods of the heathens were no gods.

At preſent, as things are ſituated, one of the moſt important duties of the magiſtracy is, to protect the rights of conſcience.

It is commonly ſaid, however, that in caſe any ſect holds tenets ſubverſive of ſociety, and inconſiſtent with the rights of others, that they ought not to be tolerated. On this footing Popery is not tolerated in Great Britain; becauſe they profeſs entire ſubjection to a foreign power, the ſee of Rome; and therefore muſt be in oppoſition to the proper intereſt of their own ſtate; and becauſe violence or perſecution for religion is a part of their religion, which makes their proſperity threaten ruin to others, as well as the principle imputed to them, which they deny, That faith is not to be kept with heretics. But, however juſt this may be in a way of reaſoning, we ought in general to guard againſt perſecution on a religious account as much as poſſible, becauſe ſuch as hold abſurd tenets are ſeldom dangerous. Perhaps they are never dangerous, but when they are oppreſſed. Papiſts are tolerated in Holland, without danger to liberty. And though not properly tolerated, they are now connived at in Britain.

In ancient times, in great ſtates, the cenſorial power was found neceſſary to their continuance,

which inſpected the manners of men. It ſeems probable, that ſupporting the religious ſects in modern times anſwers this end; for the particular diſcipline of each ſect is intended for the correction of manners.

(3.) The magiſtrate may enact laws for the puniſhment of acts of profanity and impiety. The different ſentiments of men in religion ought not by any means to encourage or give a ſanction to ſuch acts as any of them count profane.

Many are of opinion, that, beſides all this, the magiſtrate ought to make public proviſion for the worſhip of God, in ſuch manner as is agreeable to the great body of the ſociety; though, at the ſame time, all who diſſent from it are fully tolerated. And, indeed, there ſeems to be a good deal of reaſon for it, that ſo inſtruction may be provided for the bulk of common people, who would, many of them, neither ſupport nor employ teachers, unleſs they were obliged. The magiſtrate's right in this caſe ſeems to be ſomething like that of the parent; they have a right to inſtruct, but not to conſtrain.

2. The ſecond preliminary remark is, that laws ſhould be ſo framed as to promote ſuch principles in general as are favourable to good government, and particularly that principle, if there be one, that gave riſe to the conſtitution, and is congenial to it.

Such a principle as I have in view, is generally the point of honour in a country; and this lawgivers and adminiſtrators of law ſhould endeavour to

preſerve in its full vigour, for whenever it is undermined the conſtitution goes to ruin.

Of theſe principles, ſobriety, induſtry, and public ſpirit, are the chief. Some ſtates are formed to ſubſiſt by ſobriety and parſimony, as the Lacedemonians.

Induſtry is the prevailing principle in others, as in Holland. Public ſpirit in others, as in Greece, ancient Rome, and Britain. Only public ſpirit may be diverſified; ſometimes it is a paſſion for acquiring glory and dominion, as in Rome; and ſometimes for preſerving liberty, as in Greece and Britain.

When I ſay, that, in the management of a ſtate, the utmoſt attention ſhould be given to the principle of the conſtitution, to preſerve it in its vigour, I mean, that though all other crimes are bad, and in part tend to the ruin of a ſtate, yet this is much more the caſe with crimes againſt that principle, than any other. Any act of immorality was bad at Sparta; but to make poverty and parſimony reproachful, and to introduce fine houſes and furniture, and delicate entertainments, would have been inſtant ruin.

Any act of immorality would be hurtful in Holland; but to make fraudulent bankruptcy leſs infamous than it is, would immediately deſtroy them.

Sobriety, induſtry, and public ſpirit, are nearly allied, and have a reciprocal influence upon one another. Yet there may be a great degree of ſome of them, in the abſence of the others. In Sparta, there was much ſobriety and public ſpirit, but little

induſtry. In Athens, induſtry and public ſpirit, but very little parſimony.

In oppoſition to the whole of this, Mandeville wrote a book, called *The Fable of the Bees*, which ſeems to be levelled againſt ſobriety, induſtry, and public ſpirit, all at once; his poſition is, *That private vices are public benefits*, and that the waſte and luxury of one man ſupplies the wants of another. But it is eaſy to overthrow his reaſoning; for, though ſober and induſtrious perſons ſpend each leſs than a profuſe perſon, yet ſobriety and induſtry tend much more to population, and by that means they are mutually ſerviceable to each other. Luxury and vice only waſte and deſtroy, they add nothing to the common ſtock of property or of happineſs. Experience fully juſtifies this; for, though from the luxury of one man another may reap ſome gain, the luxury of a nation always tends to the ruin of that nation.

3. A third preliminary remark is, that laws may be of two kinds, either written, or in the breaſts of magiſtrates. In every conſtitution of note, there is ſomething of each of theſe kinds. It is uncertain, whether it is better to have many or few ſpecial laws. On the one hand, it ſeems to be the very ſpirit of a free conſtitution, to have every thing as ſtrictly defined as poſſible, and to leave little in the power of the judge. But, on the other hand, a multiplicity of laws is ſo apt to lead to litigation, and to end in ambiguity, that perhaps judges of equity, choſen by the diſtrict in which they live and are to act, and choſen but for a time, would be a more juſt and equitable method of ending dif-

ferences. But the difficulty of ſettling a conſtitution, ſo as always to ſecure the election of impartial judges, has made modern ſtates, where there is liberty, prefer a multiplicity of written laws.

4. The laſt preliminary remark is, that no human conſtitution can be ſo formed, but that there muſt be exceptions to every law. So that there may be in every nation oppreſſion under form of law, according to the old maxim, *Summum jus, ſumma injuria.* This further ſhews the neceſſity of forming the manners of a people.

After having laid down theſe preliminaries, we may obſerve, that the object of civil laws may be divided into the three following particulars.

1. To ratify the moral laws by the ſanction of the ſociety. The tranſgreſſion of ſuch laws are called *crimes*, as profanity, adultery, murder, calumny, &c. And they are proſecuted and puniſhed by order of the public, according to the ſpirit of every conſtitution.

2. To lay down a plan for all contracts in the commerce or intercourſe between man and man; to ſhow when a contract is valid, and how to be proved. The tranſgreſſions of ſuch laws are called *frauds*. They chiefly regard the acquiſition, tranſmiſſion, or alienation of property.

3. To limit and direct perſons in the exerciſe of their own rights, and oblige them to ſhew reſpect to the interfering rights of others. This contains the whole of what is called the police of a country. And the tranſgreſſion of ſuch laws is called *treſpasses*. A number of things in this view may become illegal, which before were not immoral.

Of the Sanction of the Moral Laws.

In all poliſhed nations, there are puniſhments annexed to the tranſgreſſion of the moral laws, whether againſt God, our neighbour, or ourſelves; in the doing of which, the three following things are chiefly neceſſary.

1. To determine what crimes, and what degree of the ſame crime, are to be inquired into by the civil magiſtrate. It is of neceſſity that, in a free ſtate, crimes ſhould be preciſely defined, that men may not be ignorantly or raſhly drawn into them. There are degrees of every crime, profanity, impurity, violence, ſlander, that are blameable in point of morals, nay, even ſuch as fall under the diſcipline of a religious ſociety, that, if they were made cognizable by the civil magiſtrate, would multiply laws and trials beyond meaſure.

2. To appoint the methods of aſcertaining the commiſſion of crimes. This is uſually by teſtimony, in which we are to conſider the number and character of the witneſſes. Generally through Chriſtendom, and indeed moſt other parts of the world, two witneſſes have been eſteemed neceſſary to fix crimes upon an accuſed perſon; not but that the poſitive evidence of one perſon of judgement and untainted character is, in many caſes, ſufficient to gain belief, and often ſtronger than two of unknown or doubtful credit; but it was neceſſary to lay down ſome rule, and two are required, to guard againſt the danger of hired evidence, and to

give an opportunity of trying how they agree together. To have required more would have made a proof difficult or impoſſible in many caſes.

It ſeems to be a maxim in law, and founded on reaſon, That in the caſe of what are called occult crimes, ſuch as murder, adultery, forgery, and ſome others, where the nature of the thing ſhows that there muſt be a penury of evidence, they ſometimes content themſelves with fewer witneſſes, if there are corroborating circumſtances to ſtrengthen their teſtimony.

It ſeems to be a matter not eaſily decided, whether it be agreeable to reaſon and juſtice, in the caſe of very atrocious crimes, that, on account of the atrocity, leſs evidence ſhould be ſufficient for conviction, or that more ſhould be required. On the one hand, the more atrocious the crime, the greater the hurt to ſociety, and the more need of public vengeance. On the other hand, the more atrocious the crime, and the heavier the puniſhment, it ſeems agreeable to juſtice, that the conviction ſhould be upon the more unqueſtioned evidence. Lawyers are ſeen to take their common places, ſometimes the one way, ſometimes the other. It is often thought, that in practice leſs evidence is ſufficient to convict a man of murder, forgery, rape, and other crimes of a deep dye. But I am perſuaded, that the appearance is owing to the greater and more general eagerneſs to diſcover the perpetrators of ſuch crimes. Others are ſuffered to eſcape more eaſily; not that more evidence is neceſſary, but that it is more difficult to get at the evidence.

Evidence may be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds, *direct* and *circumſtantial*. Direct evidence is when the witneſſes ſwear to their ſight or knowledge of the accuſed committing the crime. Circumſtantial, when they only ſwear to certain facts which cannot be ſuppoſed to have exiſted, unleſs the crime had been committed; as, a man found dead, another found near the place, with a weapon bloody, or clothes bloody, &c. Some have affirmed, that circumſtantial evidence is ſtronger than direct; but it muſt be taken with very great caution and judgement.

3. The law is to proportion and appoint the puniſhment due to every crime, when proven.

Puniſhment in all regular ſtates, is taken wholly out of the hands of the injured perſons, and committed to the magiſtrate, though in many or moſt caſes the injured party is ſuffered to join the magiſtrate in the proſecution, and to have a certain claim, by way of reparation, as far as that is practicable.

Therefore the puniſhment in general muſt conſiſt of two parts: (1.) The reparation to the ſufferer: (2.) The *vindicta publica*, which has ſometimes two ends in view, to be an example to others, and to reclaim and reform the offender, as in corporal puniſhment leſs than death; ſometimes but one, the good of others in the example, as in capital puniſhments, and baniſhment.

The kind of puniſhment, and the degree, is left wholly to different lawgivers, and the ſpirit of different conſtitutions. Public utility is the rule. Puniſhment is not always proportioned to the atro-

ciousness of the crime in point of morals, but to the frequency of it, and the danger of its prevailing.

Some nations require, and some will bear, greater severity in punishments than others.

The same, or similar conduct, often produces opposite effects. Severe laws, and severe punishments, sometimes banish crimes, but very often the contrary. When laws are very sanguinary, it often makes the subjects hate the law more than they fear it; and the transition is very easy, from hating the law, to hating those who are entrusted with the execution of it. Such a state of things threatens insurrections and convulsions, if not the dissolution of a government.

Another usual effect of excessive severity in laws is, that they are not put in execution. The public is not willing to lend its aid to the discovery and conviction of offenders; so that in time the law itself becomes a mere *brutum fulmen*, and loses its authority.

I may make one particular remark, that, though many things are copied from the law of Moses into the laws of the modern nations, yet, so far as I know, none of them have introduced the *lex talionis* in the case of injuries, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, &c.; and yet perhaps there are many instances in which it would be very proper. The equity of the punishment would be quite manifest, and probably it would be as effectual a restraint from the commission of injury, as any that could be chosen.

The concluding remark shall be, that it is but

ſeldom that very ſevere and ſanguinary laws are of ſervice to the good order of a ſtate; but, after laws have been fixed with as much equity and moderation as poſſible, the execution of them ſhould be ſtrict and rigorous. Let the laws be juſt, and the magiſtrate inflexible.

LECTURE XV.

THE ſecond object of civil laws being to regulate the making of contracts, and the whole intercourſe between man and man, relating to the acquiſition, poſſeſſion, and alienation of property, we muſt conſider carefully the nature of

Contracts.

A contract is a ſtipulation between two parties, before at liberty, to make ſome alteration of property, or to bind one or both parties to the performance of ſome ſervice.

Contracts are abſolutely neceſſary in ſocial life. Every tranſaction almoſt may be conſidered as a contract, either more or leſs explicit.

The principal thing which conſtitutes a contract is conſent. But, in ſome kinds of contracts, viz. the gratuitous, the conſent of the receiver is preſumed. In the tranſmiſſion of eſtates by donation or teſtament, this is preſumed; and thoſe who are

incapable of giving their consent through infancy, may, notwithstanding, acquire property and rights. When a man comes into a settled country, and purchases property, he is supposed, besides every other part of the bargain, to purchase it under such conditions, and subject himself to such laws as are in force in that country.

Contracts are said to be of three degrees, in point of fulness and precision. (1.) A simple affirmation of a design as to futurity; as when I say to any one, that I shall go to such a place to-morrow; this is not properly binding; and it is supposed, that many things may occur to make me alter my resolution. Yet a frequent alteration of professed purposes gives the character of levity; therefore a prudent man will be cautious of declaring his purposes, till he is well determined. (2.) A gratuitous promise of doing some favour to me. This is not made binding in law, nor does it usually convey a perfect right, because it supposes that the person who was the object of good-will, may, by altering his behaviour, forfeit his title to it, or that the person promising may find it much more inconvenient, costly, or hurtful to himself, than he supposed; or, lastly, that what was intended as a service, if performed, appears plainly to be an injury. In the last case, every one must see that it cannot be binding; but in the two former, I apprehend, that in all ordinary cases, a distant promise is binding in conscience, though it may not be necessary to make it binding in law. I say, all ordinary cases, because it is easy to figure a case in wh ch I may make a promise to another, and such circumstances

may afterwards occur, as I am quite confident, if the perſon knew, he would not hold me to my promiſe. (3.) The third degree is a complete contract, with conſent on both ſides, and obligation upon one or both.

The eſſentials of a contract which render it valid, and any of which being wanting it is void, are as follow.

That it be, 1. Free. 2. Mutual. 3. Poſſible. 4. Careful. 5. With a capable perſon. 6. Formal.

1. It muſt be free. Contracts made by unjuſt force are void always in law, and ſometimes in conſcience. It muſt, however, be unjuſt force, becauſe, in treaties of peace between nations, as we have ſeen before, force does not void the contract; and even in private life, ſometimes men are forced to enter into contracts by the order of a magiſtrate, ſometimes by the threatening of legal proſecution, which does not make them void.

2. They muſt be mutual, that is, the conſent of the one as well as that of the other muſt be had. Contracts in this view become void, either by fraud on one ſide, or by eſſential error. If any man contrives a contract, ſo as to bind the other party, and keep himſelf free, this fraud certainly nullifies the agreement; or if there is an eſſential error in the perſon or the thing, as if a perſon ſhould oblige himſelf to one man, ſuppoſing him to be another.

3. Contracts ſhould be of things evidently poſſible, and probably in our power. Contracts by

which men oblige themſelves to do things impoſſible, are, no doubt, void from the beginning; but if the impoſſibility was known to the contracting party, it muſt have been either abſurd or fraudulent. When things engaged for become impoſſible by the operation of providence, without a man's own fault, the contract is void, and he is guiltleſs; as if a man ſhould covenant to deliver, at a certain place and time, a number of cattle; and, when he is almoſt at the place of deſtination, they ſhould be killed by thunder, or any other accident out of his power.

4. Contracts muſt be of things lawful. All engagements to do things *unlawful*, are from the beginning void; but by unlawful muſt be underſtood the violation of perfect rights. If a man oblige himſelf, for a reward, to commit murder, or any kind of fraud, the engagement is void; but it was criminal in the tranſacting, and the reward ought to be returned, or given to public uſes. There are many contracts, however, which are very blameable in making, that muſt, notwithſtanding, be kept, and muſt not be made void in law; as raſh and fooliſh bargains, where there was no fraud on the other ſide. If ſuch were to be voided, great confuſion would be introduced. The caſes of this kind are numerous, and may be greatly diverſified.

5. Contracts muſt be made with a capable perſon, that is to ſay, of age, underſtanding, at liberty, &c. It is part of the civil law, or rather municipal law, of every country, to fix the time of life when perſons are ſuppoſed capable of tranſact-

ing their own affairs. Some time must be fixed, otherwise it would occasion numberless disputes, difficult to be decided. A man at the age of fourteen, and a woman at twelve, may chuse guardians, who can alienate their property; but, at the age of twenty-one, they have their estates wholly in their own hand.

6. Contracts must be formal.

The laws of every country limit a great many circumstances of the nature, obligation, extent, and duration, of contracts.

Having pointed out something of the essential characters of all lawful contracts, I observe, they may be divided two different ways. (1.) Contracts are either absolute or conditional. The absolute are such as are suspended upon no condition, but such as are essential to every contract which have been mentioned above. Such as, when a person makes a settlement upon another, without reserve, then, whether he behave well or ill, whether it be convenient or inconvenient, it must be fulfilled. Conditional contracts are those that are suspended on any uncertain future contingency, or some performance by the opposite party. Of this last sort are almost all transactions in the way of commerce; which leads to the (2.) way of dividing contracts, into beneficent and onerous. The first is, when one freely brings himself under an obligation to bestow any favour, or do any service, as donations or legacies, and undertaking the office of guardian of another person's estate.

The onerous contract is, when an equal value is

ſuppoſed to be given on both ſides, as is the caſe, for the moſt part, in the alienation of property, and the tranſactions between man and man, and between ſociety and ſociety.

To this place belongs the queſtion about the lawfulneſs of lending money upon intereſt. If we conſider money as an inſtrument of commerce, and giving an opportunity of making profit, there ſeems plainly to be nothing unjuſt that the lender ſhould ſhare in the advantage ariſing from his own property.

The chief thing neceſſary is, that the ſtate, or governing part of the ſociety, ſhould ſettle the rate of intereſt, and not ſuffer it to depend upon the neceſſity of the poor, or the covetouſneſs of the rich. If it is not ſettled by law, uſury will be the certain conſequence.

The law of Moſes does not ſeem to have admitted the taking of intereſt at all from an Iſraelite. It is thought, however, that the main reaſon of this muſt have been drawn from ſomething in their conſtitution, as a ſtate that rendered it improper; for, if it had been in itſelf immoral, they would not have been permitted to take it of ſtrangers.

Of the Marks or Signs of Contracts.

All known and intelligent marks of conſent are the ſigns and means of completing contracts. The chief of theſe, however, are words and writing, as being found the moſt eaſy and uſeful. Words are, of all others, the moſt natural and proper for giving immediate conſent, and writing to perpetuate

the memory of the tranſaction. There are, however, many other ſigns that may be made uſe of, and wherever there is a real purpoſe of ſignifying our intention, by which others are brought to depend upon it, the engagement is real, and we are bound in conſcience, though the law in every country muſt of neceſſity be more limited. The whole reſts ultimately on the obligation to ſincerity in the ſocial life.

This obligation ariſes from the teſtimony of conſcience, and from the manifeſt utility, and even neceſſity, of ſincerity to ſocial intercourſe.

Signs are divided into *natural*, *inſtituted*, and *customary*. Natural ſigns are thoſe which have either a real likeneſs to the thing ſignified, or ſuch a known and univerſal relation to it, that all men muſt naturally be led from the one to the other, as a picture is a natural ſign, becauſe a repreſentation of the thing painted. An inflamed ſullen countenance and fiery eyes, are natural ſigns of anger, becauſe they are the univerſal effects of that paſſion.

Inſtituted ſigns are thoſe that have no other connection with the thing ſignified, than what has been made by agreement; as, if two perſons ſhall agree between themſelves, that if the one wants to ſignify to the other at a diſtance, that he wiſhes him to come to his aſſiſtance, he will kindle a fire upon a certain hill, or hang out a flag upon a certain pinnacle of his houſe, or ſome part of his ſhip. Words and writing are properly inſtituted ſigns, for they have no relation to the thing ſignified, but

what original agreement and long cuſtom has given them.

Cuſtomary ſigns are no other than inſtituted ſigns which have long prevailed, and whoſe inſtitution has either been accidental, or has been forgotten. It is alſo uſual to apply the word *customary* to ſuch ſigns as depend upon the mode and faſhion of particular countries. There are ſome ſigns and poſtures, which, though they may ſeem perfectly arbitrary, have obtained very generally, perhaps univerſally; as, bending down the body, or proſtration, as a ſign of reſpect and reverence; kneeling, and lifting up the hands, as a ſign of ſubmiſſion and ſupplication. Perhaps both theſe are natural, as they put the perſon into the ſituation leaſt capable of reſiſtance.

Sometimes there is a mixture of natural and inſtituted ſigns; as, if a man ſends a pair of wings, or the figure of them, to a friend, to intimate his danger, and the neceſſity of fleeing.

In the uſe of ſigns, the great rule of ſincerity is, that wherever we are bound, and wherever we profeſs to communicate our intention, we ought to uſe the ſigns in the leaſt ambiguous manner poſſible. When we have no intention, and are under no obligation, to communicate any thing to others, it is of ſmall moment what appearances are; it is their buſineſs not to make any unneceſſary or uncertain inferences. A light in a houſe, in the middle of the night, will perhaps ſuggeſt moſt probably, to a traveller accidentally paſſing, that there is ſome body ſick in that houſe; yet perhaps it is ex-

traordinary ſtudy or buſineſs that keeps ſome perſons awake.

Nay, when there is no obligation to give, nor any reaſon for the party to expect, true information, it is held generally no crime at all to uſe ſuch ſigns as we have reaſon to ſuppoſe will be miſtaken; as, when one who does not deſire to be diſturbed, keeps his chamber cloſe ſhut, that people may conclude he is not there; when a general of an army puts a fire in the camp, to conceal his march or retreat. And probably none would think it faulty, when there was an apprehenſion of thieves, to keep a light burning in a chamber, to lead them to ſuppoſe the whole family is not at reſt.

There are ſome who place in the ſame rank, evaſive phraſes, when there is an apparent intention to ſpeak our mind, but no right in the other to obtain it. Such expreſſions may be ſtrictly true, and yet there is all probability that the hearer will miſunderſtand them; as, if one ſhould aſk if a perſon was in any houſe, and ſhould receive for anſwer, he went away yeſterday morning; when, perhaps, he returned the ſame evening. I look upon theſe evaſions, however, as very doubtful, and, indeed, rather not to be choſen, becauſe they ſeem to contain a profeſſion of telling our real mind.

Some mention ironical ſpeech as an exception to the obligation to ſincerity. But it is properly no objection at all, becauſe there is no deception. Truth lies not in the words themſelves, but in the uſe of them as ſigns. Therefore, if a man ſpeak his words in ſuch a tone and manner, as the hearer

immediately conceives they are to be taken in an oppoſite ſenſe, and does really take them in the ſenſe the ſpeaker means them, there is no falſehood at all.

Mr Hutchinſon, and ſome others, allow a voluntary intended departure from truth, on occaſion of ſome great neceſſity for a good end. This I apprehend is wrong, for we cannot but conſider deception as in itſelf baſe and unworthy, and therefore a good end cannot juſtify it. Beſides, to ſuppoſe it were in men's power, on a ſufficient occaſion, to violate truth, would greatly deſtroy its force in general, and its uſe in the ſocial life.

There are two ſorts of falſehood, which, becauſe no doubt they are leſs aggravated than malicious intereſted lies, many admit of, but I think without ſufficient reaſon.

1. Jocular lies, when there is a real deception intended, but not in any thing material, nor intended to continue long. However harmleſs theſe may ſeem, I reckon they are to be blamed, becauſe it is uſing too much freedom with ſo ſacred a thing as truth. And very often ſuch perſons, as a righteous puniſhment in Providence, are left to proceed further, and either to carry their folly to ſuch exceſs, as to become contemptible, or to go beyond folly into malice.

2. Officious lies, telling falſehoods to children or ſick perſons, for their good. Theſe very ſeldom anſwer the end that is propoſed. They leſſen the reverence for truth; and, particularly with regard to children, are exceedingly pernicious; for, as they muſt ſoon be diſcovered, they loſe their

force, and teach them to deceive. Truth and authority are methods infinitely preferable, in dealing with children, as well as with persons of riper years.

LECTURE XVI.

Of Oaths and Vows.

AMONG the signs and appendages of contracts, are oaths and vows.

An oath is an appeal to God, the Searcher of hearts, for the truth of what we say, and always expresses or supposes an imprecation of his judgement upon us, if we prevaricate.

An oath, therefore, implies a belief in God, and his providence, and indeed is an act of worship, and so accounted in scripture, as in that expression, *Thou shalt fear the Lord God, and shalt swear by his name.* Its use in human affairs is very great, when managed with judgement. It may be applied, and indeed has been commonly used, 1. In the contracts of independent states, who have no common earthly superior. In ancient times, it was usual always to close national treaties by mutual oaths. This form is not so common in modern times, yet the substance remains; for an appeal is always supposed to be made to God, against the breach of public faith.

2. It has been adopted by all nations, in their

adminiſtration of juſtice, in order to diſcover truth. The moſt common and univerſal application of it has been, to add greater ſolemnity to the teſtimony of witneſſes. It is alſo ſometimes made uſe of with the parties themſelves, for conviction or purgation. The laws of every country point out the caſes in which oaths are required or admitted in public judgement. It is, however, lawful, and in common practice, for private perſons, voluntarily, on ſolemn occaſions, to confirm what they ſay by oath. Perſons entering on public offices, are alſo often obliged to make oath, that they will faithfully execute their truſt.

Oaths are commonly divided into two kinds, *aſſertory* and *promiſſory*; thoſe called *purgatory* fall under the firſt of theſe diviſions. There is, perhaps, little neceſſity for a diviſion of oaths, for they do not properly ſtand by themſelves; they are confirmations and appendages of contracts, and intended as an additional ſecurity for ſincerity, in the commerce between man and man.

Therefore oaths are ſubject to all the ſame regulations as contracts, or rather oaths are only lawful when they are in aid or confirmation of a lawful contract. What, therefore, voids the one, will void the other, and nothing elſe. A contract, otherwiſe unlawful, cannot be made binding by an oath; but there muſt be a very great caution uſed not to make any unlawful contract, much leſs to confirm it by an oath.

It is eaſy to ſee the extreme abſurdity of our being obliged to fulfil a criminal engagement by oath; for it would imply, that out of reverence to

God we ought to break his commands; but nothing can be more abominable than the principle of thoſe who think they may ſafely take an unlawful oath, becauſe it is not binding; this is aggravating groſs injuſtice by deliberate profanity.

I have ſaid, that oaths are appendages to all lawful contracts; but in aſſertory oaths, which are only confirmations of our general obligation to ſincerity, it is neceſſary, not only that what we ſay be true, but that the occaſion be of ſufficient moment to require or juſtify a ſolemn appeal to God. Swearing on common occaſions is unneceſſary, raſh, profane, and deſtructive of the ſolemnity of an oath, and its real uſe.

From the general rule laid down, that oaths are lawful when applied to lawful contracts, it will follow, that they become unlawful only when the fulfilling of them would be violating a perfect right; but perhaps an additional obſervation is neceſſary here. Contracts muſt be fulfilled, when they violate an imperfect right; whereas ſome oaths may be found criminal and void, though they are only contrary to imperfect rights; as for example, ſome perſons bind themſelves raſhly by oath, that they will never ſpeak to, or forgive their children, who have offended them. This is ſo evidently criminal, that nobody will plead for its being obligatory, and yet it is but the violation of an imperfect right. The ſame perſons, however, might in many ways alienate their property, to the prejudice of their children, by contracts which the law would oblige them to fulfil.

In vows, there is no party but God, and the perſon himſelf who makes the vow. For this reaſon, Mr Hutchinſon relaxes their obligation very much; ſuppoſing any perſon had ſolemnly vowed to give a certain part of his ſubſtance to public or pious uſes, he ſays, if he finds it a great inconvenience to himſelf or family, he is not bound. This, I apprehend, is too lax. Men ought to be cautious in making ſuch engagements; but I apprehend, that when made, if not directly criminal, they ought to be kept.

Of the Uſe of Symbols in Contracts.

Besides promiſes and oaths, there is ſometimes, in contracts, a uſe of other viſible ſigns, called ſymbols; the moſt common among us are, ſigning and ſealing a written deed. There is alſo, in ſome places, the delivery of earth and ſtone in making over land, and ſundry others. In ancient times, it was uſual to have ſolemn ſymbols in all treaties, mutual gifts, ſacrifices, feaſts, ſetting up pillars. The intention of all ſuch things, whenever and wherever they have been practiſed, is the ſame. It is to aſcertain and keep up the memory of the tranſaction. They were more frequent and ſolemn in ancient times than now, becauſe before the invention of writing they were more neceſſary.

Of the Value of Property.

Before we finiſh the ſubject of contracts, it may be proper to ſay a little of the nature and value of

property, which is the ſubject of them. Nothing has any real value, unleſs it be of ſome uſe in human life, or, perhaps we may ſay, unleſs it be ſuppoſed to be of uſe, and ſo becomes the object of human deſire; becauſe, at particular times, and in particular places, things of very little real importance acquire a value, which is commonly temporary and changeable. Shells and baubles are of great value in ſome places; perhaps there are ſome more baubles highly valued in every place.

But, though it is their uſe in life that gives things their value in general, it does not follow, that thoſe things which are of moſt uſe and neceſſity, are therefore of greateſt value as property, or in commerce. Air and water, perhaps we may add fire, are of the greateſt uſe and neceſſity; but they are alſo in greateſt plenty, and therefore are of little value as a poſſeſſion or property. Value is in proportion to the plenty of any commodity, and the demand for it; the one taken in the inverſe, and the other in the direct proportion.

Hence it follows, that money is of no real value. It is not wealth properly, but the ſign of it, and, in a fixed ſtate of ſociety, the certain means of procuring it. In early times, traffic was carried on by exchange of goods; but, being large, not eaſily divided or tranſported, they became very troubleſome. Therefore, it ſoon became neceſſary to fix upon ſome ſign of wealth, to be a ſtandard by which to rate different commodities.

Any thing that is fit to anſwer the purpoſe of a common ſign of wealth, muſt have the following

properties: It muſt be, 1. Valuable; that is, have an intrinſic commercial value, and rare, otherwiſe it could have no comparative value at all. 2. Durable, otherwiſe it could not paſs from hand to hand. 3. Diviſible, ſo that it might be in larger or ſmaller quantities, as are required. 4. Portable, it muſt not be of great ſize, otherwiſe it would be extremely inconvenient.

Gold and ſilver were ſoon found to have all theſe properties, and therefore are fixed upon as the ſign of wealth. But, beſides being the ſign of the value of other commodities, they themſelves are alſo matters of commerce, and therefore increaſe or decreaſe in their value, by their plenty or ſcarceneſs.

It may ſeem to belong to the ruling part of any ſociety, to fix the value of gold and ſilver, as ſigns of the value of commodities; and, no doubt, they do fix it nominally in their dominions. But in this they are obliged to be ſtrictly attentive to the value of theſe metals as a commodity, from their plenty or ſcarceneſs, otherwiſe their regulations will be of little force; other nations will pay no regard to the nominal value of any particular country; and even in internal commerce, the ſubject would fix a value upon the ſigns, according to their plenty.

It is as prejudicial to commerce to make the nominal value of the coin of any country too ſmall, as too great.

We ſhall cloſe this part of the ſubject, by ſpeaking a little of the

Rights of Necessity, and Common Rights.

THESE are certain powers assumed both by private persons and communities, which are supposed to be authorised by the necessity of the case, and supported by the great law of reason.

There will remain a great number of cases, in which those rights of necessity are to be used, even in the best regulated civil society, and after the most mature deliberation and foresight of probable events, and provision for them by specific laws.

Were a man perishing with hunger, and denied food by a person who could easily afford it him, here the rights of necessity would justify him in taking it by violence. Were a city on fire, and the blowing up of an house would save the far greater part, though the owner was unwilling, men would think themselves justified in doing it whether he would or not. Much more would men, in cases of urgent necessity, make free with the property of others, without asking their consent, but presuming upon it.

In our own government, where, by the love of liberty general among the people, and the nature of the constitution, as many particulars have been determined by special laws, as in any government in the world; yet instances of the rights of necessity occur every day. If I see one man rob another upon the high-way, or am informed of it, if I have courage and ability, I pursue the robber,

and apprehend him without any warrant, and carry him before a magiſtrate, to get a warrant for what I have already done. Nothing is more common in Britain than to force people to ſell their inheritance, or a part of it, to make a road or ſtreet ſtraight or commodious. In this inſtance, it is not ſo much neceſſity as great utility.

The queſtion of the greateſt moment here is, Whether the eſtabliſhing theſe rights of neceſſity does not derogate from the perfection and immutability of the moral laws? If it be true, that we may break in upon the laws of juſtice for the ſake of utility, is not this admitting the exploded maxim, That we may do evil, that good may come? I anſwer, That theſe rights of neceſſity have in general property as their object, or at moſt the life of particular perſons; and it ſeems to be inſeparable from the eſtabliſhment of property in the ſocial ſtate, that our property is to be held only in ſuch manner, and to ſuch a degree, as to be both conſiſtent with, and ſubſervient to, the good of others. And therefore, theſe extraordinary caſes are agreeable to the tacit or implied conditions of the ſocial contract.

In rights of neceſſity, we are to conſider, not only the preſent good or evil, but for all time to come, and particularly the ſafety or danger of the example. Where the repetition of the thing in ſimilar circumſtances would have a fatal effect, it ought not to be done. If a city were under all the miſeries of famine, and a ſhip or two ſhould arrive with grain, the owner of which would not ſell it, but at a moſt exorbitant price, perhaps equity

might admit that they ſhould be compelled; but if any ſuch thing were done, it would prevent others from going near that place again.

It would be of no conſequence to determine theſe rights of neceſſity by law. If the law deſcribed circumſtantially what might be done, it would be no longer a right of neceſſity, but a legal right. To forbid them by law would be either ineffectual, or it would aboliſh them altogether, and deprive the ſociety of the benefit of them, when the caſes ſhould occur. Things done by the rights of neceſſity, are, by ſuppoſition, illegal; and if the neceſſity does not excuſe, the perſon who pretends them may be puniſhed. If I am aiding in pulling down a man's houſe, on pretence of ſtopping a fire, if he afterwards makes it appear, that there was not the leaſt occaſion for it, or that I, being his enemy, took the opportunity of this pretence to injure him, he will obtain reparation.

As property, or at moſt life, is concerned in the rights of neceſſity, ſtill the moral laws continue in force. Whatever expreſſes an evil diſpoſition of mind does not fall under the rule, becauſe it can never be neceſſary to the doing of any good. The pretence of its being neceſſary in ſome caſes is generally chimerical; and even were it real, the neceſſity could not juſtify the crime; as, ſuppoſe a robber, very profane, ſhould threaten a man with death, unleſs he would blaſpheme God, or curſe his parents, &c.

There are certain things, called common rights, which the public is ſuppoſed to have over every member; the chief of them are, 1. Diligence.

As a man must eat, the community have a right to compel him to be useful; and have a right to make laws against suicide. 2. They have a right to the discovery of useful inventions, provided an adequate price be paid to the discoverer. 3. They have a right to insist upon such things as belong to the dignity of human nature. Thus all nations pay respect to dead bodies, though there is no reason for it, but that we cannot help associating with the body, even dead, the ideas which arise from it, and belonged to the whole person when alive.

3. The third and last object of civil laws is, limiting citizens in the exercise of their rights, so that they may not be injurious to one another, but that the public good may be promoted.

This includes the giving directions in what way arts and commerce may be carried on, and in some states extends as far as the possessions of private persons.

It includes the whole of what is called the police of a community; the manner of travelling, building, marketing, time and manner of holding all sorts of assemblies; in arts and commerce, particularly, the police shows its power.

It will only be necessary here to make a few remarks on the nature and spirit of those laws.

1. Those things in themselves are arbitrary and mutable, for there is no morality in them, but what arises from common utility. We may sometimes do things in a way better than that appointed by law, and yet it is not allowed.

2. Men in general have but a very light sense of

the malignity of tranſgreſſing theſe laws, ſuch as, running of goods, breaking over a fence, &c.

3. In the beſt conſtitutions, ſome ſanctions are appointed for the breach of theſe laws. Wherever a ſtate is founded upon the principles of liberty, ſuch laws are made with ſeverity, and executed with ſtrictneſs.

Finally, a man of real probity and virtue adopts theſe laws as a part of his duty to God and the ſociety, and is ſubject, not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience ſake.

RECAPITULATION.

HAVING gone through the three general diviſions of this ſubject, Ethics, Politics, and Juriſprudence, I ſhall conclude with a few remarks upon the whole, and mention to you the chief writers who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in this branch of ſcience.

1. You may plainly perceive, both how extenſive, and how important moral philoſophy is. As to extent, each of the diviſions we have gone through might have been treated at far greater length. Nor would it be unprofitable to enter into a fuller diſquiſition of many points; but this muſt be left to every ſcholar's inclination and opportunities in future life. Its importance is manifeſt from this circumſtance, that it not only points out perſonal duty, but is related to the whole buſineſs of active life. The languages, and even mathematical

and natural knowledge, are but hard words to this ſuperior ſcience.

2. The evidence which attends moral diſquiſitions, is of a different kind from that which attends mathematics and natural philoſophy; but it remains as a point to be diſcuſſed, whether it is more uncertain or not. At firſt ſight, it appears that authors differ much more, and more eſſentially, on the principles of moral than natural philoſophy. Yet perhaps a time may come, when men, treating moral philoſophy as Newton and his ſucceſſors have done natural, may arrive at greater preciſion. It is always ſafer, in our reaſonings, to trace facts upwards, than to reaſon downwards upon metaphyſical principles. An attempt has been lately made by Beatty, in his Eſſay on Truth, to eſtabliſh certain impreſſions of common ſenſe, as axioms and firſt principles of all our reaſonings on moral ſubjects.

3. The differences about the nature of virtue are not, in fact, ſo great as they appear; they amount to nearly the ſame thing in the iſſue, when the particulars of a virtuous life come to be enumerated.

4. The different foundations of virtue are many of them not oppoſite or repugnant to each other, but parts of one great plan; as benevolence and ſelf-love, &c. They all conſpire to found real virtue; the authority of God, the dictates of conſcience, public happineſs, and private intereſt, all coincide.

5. There is nothing certain or valuable in moral philoſophy, but what is perfectly coincident with the ſcripture, where the glory of God is the firſt

principle of action, arising from the subjection of the creature; where the good of others is the great object of duty, and our own interest the necessary consequence.

In the first dawn of philosophy, men began to write and dispute about virtue. The great inquiry among the ancients was, what was the *summum bonum?* by which, it seems, they took it for granted, that virtue and happiness were the same thing. The chief combatants here, were the stoics and epicureans. The first insisted that virtue was the *summum bonum*, that pleasure was no good, and pain no evil; the other said, that the *summum bonum* consisted in pleasure, or rather that pleasure was virtue; the academics and Platonists went a middle way between these.

I am not sensible that there is any thing among the ancients, that wholly corresponds with the modern dispute upon the foundation of virtue.

Since the disputes arose in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some of the most considerable authors, chiefly British, are, Leibnitz, his Theodicee and his Letters;—Hutchinson's Inquiries into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, and his System;—Wollaston's Religion of Nature delineated;—Collins on Human Liberty;—Nettleton on Virtue and Happiness;—David Hume's Essays;—Lord Kames's Essays;—Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments;—Reid's Inquiry;—Balfour's Delineation of Morality;—Butler's Analogy and Sermons;—Balguy's Tracts;—Theory of Agreeable Sensations, from the French;—Beatty on Truth;—Essay on Virtue and Harmony.

To these may be added the whole deistical writers, and the answers written to each of them in particular, a brief account of which may be seen in Leland's View of the Deistical Writers.

Some of the chief writers upon government and politics are, Grotius, Puffendorf, Barberac, Cumberland, Selden, Burlamaqui, Hobbes, Machiavel, Harrington, Locke, Sydney—and some late books, Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws; Ferguson's History of Civil Society; Lord Kames's Political Essays; Grandeur and Decay of the Roman Empire; Montague's Rise and Fall of Ancient Republics; Goguet's Rise and Progress of Laws, Arts, and Sciences.

LECTURES

ON

ELOQUENCE.

LECTURES

ON

ELOQUENCE.

GENTLEMEN,

WE are now to enter on the ſtudy of eloquence, or, as perhaps it ought to be called, from the manner in which you will find it treated, Compoſition, Taſte, and Criticiſm.

Eloquence is undoubtedly a very noble art, and when poſſeſſed in a high degree, has been, I think, in all ages, one of the moſt admired and envied talents. It has not only been admired in all ages, but, if I am not miſtaken, among all ranks. Its power is univerſally felt, and therefore probably the talent more univerſally eſteemed than either genius or improvement in ſeveral other kinds of human excellence. Military ſkill and political wiſdom have their admirers, but far inferior in num-

ber to thoſe who admire, envy, or would wiſh to imitate, him that has the power of perſuaſion.

Plato, in his Republic, or, Idea of a well-regulated State, has baniſhed orators, under pretence that their power over the minds of men is dangerous, and liable to abuſe. Some moderns have adopted the ſame ſentiments.

Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, I believe, (though I am not certain), has embraced it. But this is a manner of thinking and reaſoning altogether ſuperficial. It would militate equally againſt all cultivation of the mind, and indeed againſt every human excellence, natural and acquired. They are, and have been, and may be, abuſed by men of vicious diſpoſitions. But how ſhall this be prevented? It is impoſſible. How ſhall it be counteracted? Only by aſſiſting the good in the cultivation of their powers, and then the ſame weapons will be uſed in defence of truth and virtue, with much greater advantage than they can be in ſupport of falſehood and vice. Learning in general, poſſeſſed by a bad man, is unſpeakably pernicious, and that very thing has ſometimes made weak people ſpeak againſt learning; but it is juſt as abſurd, as if, in the confines of a country expoſed to hoſtile inroads, the inhabitants ſhould ſay, We will build no forts for protection, becauſe, if the enemy get into poſſeſſion of them, they will become the means of annoyance: we will uſe no arms for defence; for, if the enemy take them from us, they will be turned againſt us.

Perhaps it may be proper to take notice of what the apoſtle Paul ſays, in his firſt epiſtle to the Co-

rinthians, in ſeveral places, particularly from the beginning of the 2d chapter, "And I, brethren," &c. and in the 4th chapter, 11th verſe, "And my ſpeech and my preaching was not," &c. I have mentioned this, to prevent any of you miſtaking, or being prejudiſed againſt, the ſubject, and ſhall obſerve upon it, that the meaning of the apoſtle in this and other ſimilar paſſages, is fully comprehended in one or more of the following particulars: 1. That he came not to the Corinthians with an artful deluſive eloquence, ſuch as the ſophiſts of thoſe days made uſe of to varniſh over their fooliſh ſentiments. 2. That he came not to ſhew his ſkill in ſpeaking for and againſt any thing, as many of them did, not to diſcover or communicate truth, but to diſplay their own talents. 3. That the truths he had to communicate needed no ornaments to ſet them off, and were not by any means adapted to the proud ſpirit of the world. And, 4. That he would uſe the greateſt ſelf-denial, and not by any means attempt to recommend himſelf as a man of ability and learning, but content himſelf with the humble and ſimple doctrine of the croſs. And the truth is, after the higheſt improvement in the art of ſpeaking, there muſt be the greateſt reſerve and ſelf-denial in the uſe of it, otherwiſe it will defeat its own purpoſe. Rhetoricians do uſually give it among the very precepts of the art, to appear to be in earneſt, and to have the ſubject or the intereſt of the audience at heart, and not their own fame; and this can never be attained to ſo great perfection, as when there is the humility of a true diſciple,

and the disinterested zeal of a faithful minister of Christ. That this is not contrary to the most diligent application for the improvement of our powers, is manifest in itself, and appears from the many exhortations of the same apostle to his young disciples, Timothy and Titus, 1 Tim. iv. 13. "Till I come, give attendance," &c. and ver. 15. "Meditate," &c.

I know not whether any apology is necessary for my undertaking to speak on this subject, or the manner of treating it. Some may expect, that discourses on eloquence should be distinguished examples of the art of which they treat. Such may just be pleased to observe, that a cool, plain, and simple manner of speaking, is necessary in teaching this, as well as every other art. No doubt, a justness and precision of expression, will be of great benefit in these discourses; but there will be no need of that high and complete polish that might be expected in what is prepared for publication. Nor would the same brevity and conciseness be any advantage to discourses once delivered, that would be reckoned a beauty in what is in every body's hands, and therefore may be often read.

Before entering on the strict and methodical discussion of the subject, I have commonly begun the course by two or three preliminary discourses, containing such general observations as may be most intelligible, and may serve to prepare the way for what shall be afterwards introduced.

The subject of the first preliminary discourse shall be the following question: Whether does art

or nature contribute moſt to the production of a complete orator?

This is a queſtion often aſked, and many things have been ſaid upon it; yet, to diſcuſs it as a matter of controverſy, and adduce the arguments on each ſide, in order to a deciſion in favour of the one, and prejudice of the other, I take to be of very little conſequence, or rather improper and abſurd. It ſeems to be juſt as if one ſhould propoſe an inquiry, whether the ſoil, the climate, or the culture, contributes moſt to the production of the crop? Therefore, inſtead of treating the queſtion as if one ſide of it were true, and the other falſe, I ſhall make a few obſervations on the influence of nature and art, in order to your forming juſt apprehenſions of the ſubject, and to direct you in your future conduct and ſtudies.

1. Some degree of natural capacity is evidently neceſſary to the inſtruction or ſtudy of this art, in order to produce any effect. A ſkilful labourer may ſubdue a very ſtubborn, or meliorate a very poor ſoil; but when there is no ſoil at all, as on a bare and ſolid rock, his labour would be impoſſible or fruitleſs. There muſt therefore, doubtleſs, be ſome capacity, in general, and even ſome turn for this very branch of knowledge. In this ſenſe, it is true of every other art, as well as oratory, that a man muſt be born to it.

There are ſome ſo deſtitute of oratorical powers, that nothing can poſſibly be made of them. It will be ſtrange, however, if this is not eaſily diſcovered by themſelves, and if it does not make the ſtudy as unpleaſant as it is difficult, ſo that they

will ſpeedily give it over. I have known ſome examples, but very few, of miniſters, whoſe principal defect was mere barrenneſs of invention. This is exceedingly rare, becauſe the far greateſt number of bad ſpeakers have enough to ſay, ſuch as it is; and generally the more abſurd and incoherent, the greater the abundance.

When ſpeaking on this obſervation, I muſt make one remark, that a total want of capacity for one branch of ſcience, is not inconſiſtent even with a great capacity for another. We ſometimes ſee great mathematicians who make miſerable orators. Nay, it is reckoned by ſome of the beſt judges, that this ſtudy is unfriendly to oratory. The definite preciſion of methematical ideas, which may all be ultimately referred to menſuration, ſeems to be contrary to the freedom and boldneſs of imagination, in which the ſtrength of oratory lies. There are, however, exceptions to this, in fact. Dr Clark, and Dr Barrow, two of the moſt eminent mathematicians of the laſt age, were alſo eminent orators; that is to ſay, the firſt was a very accurate writer, the other a very fervent preacher.

I have only further to obſerve, that many have thought academical teaching not to be favourable to oratory; that is to ſay, thoſe who are accuſtomed to the cool diſpaſſionate manner of ſpeaking, uſual and neceſſary in the inſtruction of youth, frequently loſe a good deal of that fire and impetuoſity which they might naturally poſſeſs, and which is of ſo much importance in ſpeaking to a large and promiſcuous aſſembly.

2. To make what is called a complete orator,

very great natural powers are neceſſary, and great cultivation too. The truth is, when we ſpeak of a complete orator, we generally form an idea of perfection ſuperior to any thing that ever exiſted, by aſſembling together all the excellencies of every kind that have been ſeen in different perſons, or that we are able from what we have ſeen to form an imagination of. We can eaſily enumerate many of theſe; for example, great penetration of mind,—great literature, and extenſive knowledge,—a ſtrong and lively imagination, reined in by a correctneſs of judgement, a rich invention, and retentive memory, tenderneſs and ſenſibility of affection, an acquaintance with the world, and a thorough knowledge of the human heart. To theſe we muſt add all external perfections, an open countenance, a graceful carriage, a clear, articulate, ſtrong melodious voice. There is not one of theſe but is capable of great improvement, by application and ſtudy, as well as by much practice. In all the great orators of whom we read, there appears to have been an union of natural talents, and acquired ſkill, as Pericles, Demoſthenes, Cicero, Hortentius. To theſe you may add all the ſpeakers mentioned by Cicero and Quintilian, taking their talents and performances to have been as related by theſe authors.

3. Perhaps the moſt extraordinary appearances in this, as well as in other branches, have been from nature wholly, or but with little ſtudy. Theſe ſpontaneous productions are as ſo many prodigies. It is commonly believed, that the orators and ſages at the firſt formation of ſociety, were more power-

ful in their elocution, than in more polished times. This, however, I am apt to think, is in some degree founded on a mistake. There might be more extraordinary effects of eloquence, because the ignorant or superstitious herd were then more easily moved; but this was as much owing to the state of the audience, as the power of the speakers. The same fire that would burn a heap of dry brush, would not make any impression upon a heap of green logs. It might also be owing to another circumstance, which I shall have occasion afterwards to explain more fully, the narrowness of language, and the use of figures, which have so great an effect upon the imagination.

But, allowing very great force to uncultivated prodigies of genius in every kind, I am apt to think it is less powerful, comparatively speaking, in oratory than in poetry. It has been an old saying, *Poeta nascitur et non fit*. There are two reasons why the poetry of nature, without art, seems to be much admired. 1. That in such a poet, a strong unbounded fancy must be the prevailing character; and this is what chiefly captivates the mind. It must be a very strong inward impulse that induces a man to become a poet without example, and without instruction. 2. It is found in fact, that the knowledge of the rules of art, somehow cramps and deters the mind, and restrains that boldness, or happy extravagance, that gives such general delight. It is an observation of an ingenious author, that in no polished nation, after the rules of criticism were fully settled, and generally understood, was there ever any great work of ge-

nius produced. This, however, muſt be underſtood chiefly of what are called the higher ſpecies of poetry, epic poety, and tragedy; and, for the reaſons juſt now given, it muſt be ſo in them. Homer is the great poet of nature; and it is generally thought, that there is greater fire in him than in Virgil, juſt becauſe he lived at a time when the rules of writing were unknown. The ſame thing is ſaid of Shakeſpeare, of our own country; and perhaps the late-diſcovered poems of Oſſian may be conſidered as another example. After all, perhaps the compariſon made between the effects of nature and art, is at bottom wrong, and that they produce beauties of different kinds. A wild uncultivated foreſt, a vaſt precipice, or ſteep cataract or water-fall, is ſuppoſed to be an object more auguſt and ſtriking, than any ornaments produced by human ſkill. The order and ſymmetry, however, of architecture and gardening, are highly pleaſing, and ought not properly to be compared with the other, as pleaſing the imagination in a different degree, ſo much as in a different kind.

The effects of the poetry of nature, therefore, in one view, are very great, and continue to be ſo in all ages, becauſe they touch the ſoul in one way, which continues to be univerſally felt: but I doubt much whether eloquence ever arrived at much excellence, without conſiderable ſtudy, or at leaſt previous patterns on which to form. The firſt great poets were before all criticiſm, and before even the poliſhing of human manners; but the firſt great orators appeared in improved, civilized ſtates,

and were the consequence of the knowledge of mankind, and the study of the human heart.

4. When persons are meanly qualified in point of natural capacity for any art, it is not very proper to attempt to instruct them in it. It is not only difficult to instruct those who have a radical incapacity for any study, but sometimes they are much the worse for application; just as fine clothes, and a courtly dress upon a clown, renders him unspeakably ridiculous. Some who are utterly void of taste for speaking, after long study, and sometimes even by great literature, become more obscure, more tedious, and more given to swelling and bombast, than the most uncultivated person in the world. The want of a fund of good sense and genuine taste, makes ignorant persons fools, and scholars pedants. A plain man will tell you of taking a purge, or a dose of physic, and you neither mistake him, nor laugh at him. A quack of a physician will tell you of a mucilaginous decoction, to smooth the acid particles, and carry off the acrimonious matter that corrodes and irritates the internal coats of the stomach.

5. In the middle regions of genius, there are often to be found those who reap the greatest benefit from education and study. They improve their power by exercise; and it is surprising to think what advances are to be made by the force of resolution and application. I might give you many examples of this in the annals of literature; but the one most suited to our purpose is, that Demosthenes himself is said at first to have laboured under almost insuperable difficulties: it is said he could not even

pronounce at firſt all the letters of the Greek alphabet, particularly the letter R, the firſt letter of his art, as the critics have called it.

Perſons of the middle degrees of capacity, do alſo, perhaps generally, fill the moſt uſeful and important ſtations in human life. A very great genius, is often like a very fine flower, to be wondered at, but of little ſervice either for food or medicine. A very great genius is alſo often accompanied with certain irregularities, ſo that we only conſider with regret, what he might have been, if the lively ſallies of his imagination had been reined in a little, and kept under the direction of ſober judgement.

On the whole, you may plainly perceive what great encouragement there is for diligence in your ſtudies, and be perſuaded to attend to the inſtructions to be given you, on this ſubject in particular, with aſſiduity and care.

LECTURE II.

IN this, which, as the former, I conſider as a preliminary diſcourſe, I will endeavour to give you ſome general rules, which, as they belong equally to all ſorts of writing, would not come in ſo properly under the diviſions of the ſubject.

1. Study and imitate the greateſt examples. Get the moſt approved authors for compoſition, read them often, and with care. Imitation is what

commonly give us our first ideas upon any subject. It is by example that ambition is kindled, and youth prompted to excel. It is by remarks upon actual productions, that criticism itself is formed. Men were not first taught by masters to speak, either in oratory or poesy; but they first felt the impulse, and did as they could, and their reflection and observation, by making the comparison, found out what was best. And after the existence of precepts, it is by examples that precepts are made plain and intelligible. An acquaintance with authors, will also be the best mean of determining what is your own turn and capacity, for you will probably most relish those writers, and that manner, that you are best able to imitate.

For this purpose, let the best authors be chosen, ancient and modern. A controversy has often risen among critics and men of letters, upon the preference being due to ancient or modern writers. This question was debated, *ex professo*, in the last age, and some very great men engaged in it. The famous M. Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray, has written a treatise upon it, called, The Wars of the Poets; and Dean Swift wrote his account of the Battle of the Books in St James's Library, on the same subject. I reckon it is wrong to be opinionative in such a controversy, and very easy to push it to excess on both sides. No doubt, the few remains of remote antiquity have survived the wrecks of time, in a great measure by their excellence itself, and therefore will always be considered as standards. And as they are chiefly works of imagination that have been so preserved, and true taste

is the ſame in all ages, they muſt deſerve real eſteem; and this will be ſomewhat augmented, by the veneration felt for their antiquity itſelf. Homer is the firſt and great pattern of writing, to whom the higheſt commendations have been given in every age. Horace ſays, *Vos exemplaria Greca* (meaning chiefly Homer) *nocturna verſate manu, verſate diurna;* and Mr Pope ſays,

"Be Homer's works your ſtudy and delight,
"Read him by day, and meditate by night."

Now, the beauties of Homer we are eaſily capable of perceiving, though, perhaps, not his faults. The beauty of a deſcription, the force of a ſimilitude, we can plainly ſee; but, whether he always adhered to truth and nature, we cannot tell, becauſe we have no other way of knowing the manners and cuſtoms of his times, but from what he has written.

The powers of mankind, however, are certainly the ſame in all ages, but change of circumſtances may create diverſity in the appearance and production of genius. Theſe circumſtances tend to produce excellence of different kinds. The boldneſs, and almoſt exceſſive flights of imagination in uncultivated times, give way to beauties of a different nature, to order, judgement, and preciſion. A maſterly judgement will endeavour to underſtand the reaſons on both ſides. It is certain, however, that there are great and excellent patterns to form upon, both ancient and modern. And it is very

proper for young perſons to read authors, after they have heard critciſms and remarks made upon them. Theſe criticiſms you may take at firſt either from books or converſation. Try if you can obſerve the genius, or peculiar and characteriſtic turn of an author, not only his excellencies, but wherein they are peculiar to him, and different from thoſe of others. Cicero is flowing, fervent, ornate—ſomewhat vain and oſtentatious, but maſterly in his way. Demoſthenes is ſimple, cloſe, nervous, rapid, and irreſiſtible. Livy has a bewitching knack of telling a ſtory; he is ſo expreſſive and deſcriptive, that one cannot help being pleaſed with it, even after ſeveral times reading.

Salluſt excels in giving characters, which he ſtrikes off in ſingle epithets, or very conciſe remarks. Tacitus is chiefly remarkable for judicious and ſagacious obſervations on human life; and Xenophon is ſuperior to almoſt every author, in dignity, elegance, and ſweetneſs in the narration.

Of modern authors in our own language, Mr Addiſon is a noble pattern of elegance, dignity, and ſimplicity. Swift, in his political pieces, writes with great ſtrength and force, and is perhaps a pattern of ſtyle, which has ſcarcely been exceeded ſince his time. Hervey, in his Meditations, has a great deal of very lively and animated deſcription; but it is ſo highly ornamented, that it is ſomewhat dangerous in the imitation. Dr Robertſon, in his Hiſtory, has as juſt a mixture of ſtrength and elegance, as any other author I know in the Engliſh language. I cannot help here cautioning you againſt one modern author of ſome eminence, John-

ſon, the author of the Rambler. He is ſo ſtiff and abſtracted in his manner, and ſuch a lover of hard words, that he is the worſt pattern for young perſons that can be named.

It has been given ſometimes as a rule, to form one's ſelf upon a particular author, who may be moſt agreeable to a ſtudent's taſte, and perhaps congenial (if I may ſpeak ſo) to his capacity. It is pretty common to fall into this without deſign, by a natural propenſity. It is ſaid, that Demoſthenes wrote over the hiſtory of Thucydides eight times, that he might the more effectually form himſelf to his ſtyle and manner. I cannot ſay I would recommend this, it ſeems to be too much honour to give to any one perſon. I would not be guilty of idolatry of any kind. A comprehenſive knowledge of many authors, or at leaſt a conſiderable number of the beſt, is certainly far preferable. If there be any advantage in particular imitation, it is, that it is the eaſieſt way of coming to a fixed or formed ſtyle. One will ſoon run into an imitation of an author with whom he is much converſant, and of whom he is a great admirer; and, in this view, to ſome perſons of moderate capacity, it may not be an improper method. But perſons of real and original genius, ſhould be rather above ſuch a practice, as it will certainly make them fall ſhort of what they would otherwiſe attain.

To this we may add, that particular imitation is liable to ſeveral very great dangers. (1.) It leads to ſervility of imitation. Such perſons often may be ſaid to borrow the piece, inſtead of imitating

the pattern. When a ſervile imitation is perceived, which it always will be, it is certain to be deſpiſed. Even a manner ever ſo excellent, if merely a copy, brings no credit to a ſpeaker. And if a writer retail the very ſentiments and language of another, it is conſidered as an abſurdity. (2.) Servile imitation leads to copying defects. There neither is, nor ever was, any ſpeaker or writer free from defects, or blemiſhes of ſome kind. Yet, ſervile imitators never fail to copy the defects as well as beauties. I ſhould ſuppoſe, that any one who made Cicero his particular model, would very probably transfuſe a proportion of his vanity and oſtentation, and probably more of that than of his fire.

But of all ſorts of imitation, the moſt dangerous is the imitation of living ſpeakers, and yet to this young ſcholars are moſt prone, ſometimes by deſign, and ſometimes quite inſenſibly. It is attended in the higheſt degree with the diſadvantage of copying defects. In living ſpeakers, there are not only peculiarities of ſtyle, and blemiſhes in compoſition, to copy, but in looks, tone, and geſture. It is a matter of conſtant experience, that imitators catch the blemiſhes eaſieſt, and retain them longeſt. And it is to be obſerved, that defects, when they are natural and undeſigned, appear very inconſiderable; but, when they are copied, and adopted voluntarily, we cannot help deſpiſing the folly and abſurdity of one that judges ſo ill. Further, when defects are occaſional and undeſigned, they are generally inconſiderable; but when they are copied, they are commonly aggravated and overcharged,

and so appear quite monstrous. This must be so; for even the very best manner looks silly in the imitator, although just and graceful in the original.

2. An excellent general rule is, to accustom yourselves early and much to composition, and exercise in pronunciation. Practice is necessary in order to learn any thing to perfection. There is something to be learned from practice, which no instruction can impart. It is so in every other art as well as this—mathematics, geometry, and in navigation; after you have learned the theory in the most perfect manner, there is still a nameless something, which nothing but experience can bestow. You must not wait till you are masters of the rules of art, before you begin to put them in practice. Exercise must go hand in hand with instruction, that the one may give meaning, force, and direction to the other. I do not mean that you should be fond of entering very soon upon real life, but that you should be assiduous in preparatory exercises. This is a rule given by Cicero, in his book *De Oratore*, which he reckons of great importance—*Scribendum quam plurimum*; and he declares it to have been his own practice.

Since we are upon private exercises of composition, it may perhaps give you a clearer view of the matter, to mention some of the various ways in which it may be separately tried. It may be tried in translation; perhaps it may be best to try it first here. Translation will accustom you to attend to the various idioms of language, and to understand the genius of your own language: for,

when tranſlating, you will ſpeedily find, that to render out of any one language into another *ad verbum*, would be very ſorry compoſition. It may be tried alſo in narration. This, I think, ſhould be the next ſtep to tranſlation, to learn to give a naked account of facts with ſimplicity and preciſion. This, alſo, though certainly in itſelf more obvious, and eaſier than ſome other kinds, yet it is by no means ſo eaſy as ſome imagine. Imitation of a particular paſſage, or compoſition of ſome author, by writing upon ſomething quite ſimilar, may perhaps be the next in order. To underſtand what this is, you need only look into an admirable example of it in poetry, Mr Pope's imitation of a ſatire in Horace, beginning, *Quæ virtus et quanta*, &c. After this comes deſcription, painting ſcenes, or drawing characters. Then argumentation: And, laſtly, perſuaſion. I believe it would be a great improvement of the laudable practice in this college of daily orations, if they were choſen with more judgement, and better ſuited to the performers. Almoſt all the pieces we have delivered to us, are of the laſt or higheſt kind, warm paſſionate declamations. It is no wonder that ſome ſhould perform theſe ill, who have never tried the plainer manner of ſimple narration. Suppoſing a ſtudent to have tried all theſe ways of compoſition for his own improvement, would he not be by that means ſenſible in what way he is moſt able to excel? as alſo having made trial of them ſeparately, he is more able to vary his diction, and give compaſs to his diſcourſe upon a general ſubject. Theſe are like an analy-

sis, or simple division of composition; and as persons read best, who have been first taught to resolve words into syllables, and syllables into letters, so the easiest and completest way of any to composition, is to begin it in this order.

In such exercises, let me by all means recommend to you, early to acquire, and always to preserve, a certain patience and resolution of mind, which will enable you to apply with vigour, not only for a time, but to review and correct your pieces, and bring them to some degree of perfection, and your taste to some degree of accuracy. To explain this a little, there are three things equally contrary to it, and perhaps equally prejudicial. (1.) Mere weakness, and want of courage, which finding one attempt unsuccessful, will hardly be brought to make another. When a young person first goes to exercise himself in composition, he finds the thing so uncouth and difficult, that he is apt to consider it as altogether impossible. (2.) There is a fault contrary to this, a vanity of mind, which is so pleased with any thing it does, as neither to see its own faults, nor be willing to hear them. There are some, who, from the beginning of life, think it a great pity that any of their productions should be blotted or erased. It is not to be supposed, that *they* will make great progress in knowledge or taste. (3.) There is another sort, perhaps distinct from both, who are of a loose, desultory disposition, so unstayed, that they cannot spend long enough time upon any thing to do it well, or sometimes even to bring it to a conclusion. They will begin an essay upon a subject,

but are presently out of conceit with it, and therefore will do it very carelessly, or before it is finished must away to another, which struck their fancy more lately.

That steady application which I have recommended, some of the ancients were very remarkable for. Some of them indeed seemed to carry it to an excess. They would sometimes spend as much time in polishing an epigram, or little trifling panegyric, as might have been sufficient for the production of a work of extensive utility. However, this is not the most common error; running over a great deal in a superficial way, is the bane of composition. Horace, with his usual elegance, ridicules this dispositon, when he says, *Detur nobis locus*, &c.; and somewhere else, he brings in a vainglorious poet, boasting how many verses he had made, or could make, while standing upon one foot.

LECTURE III.

IN this discourse, I intend to finish what I began in the last, viz. laying down some general rules to form the taste, and direct the conduct of a student.

3. Be careful to acquaint yourselves well, and to be as perfect as possible, in the branches that are subordinate to the study of eloquence. These, because they ought to be learned in the earliest stages, if they are then neglected, some are unwilling or

ashamed to go back to them. What I have here in view chiefly, are the grammar, orthograpy, and punctuation of the English language. It is not uncommon to find orators of considerable name, both in the pulpit and at the bar, far from being accurate in point of grammar. This is evidently a very great blemish. Perhaps it may be occasioned, in some measure, by the English seldom or never being taught grammatically to children. But those who have learned the principles of grammar, in the Greek and Latin languages, should be more ready to attend to it. I am sensible, that the grammar of every langage is ultimately fixed by custom; with regard to which, Horace says, *Quem penes arbitrium est*, &c. But even here, we must attend to the meaning of the sentiment. It is not the custom of the vulgar that establishes either the grammar or pronunciation of any language, but that which is received and established by the best writers. You will say, How do these writers determine themselves? Are not they also guided by practice? They are in a great measure; and it is generally said, that the practice of the capital of a nation, or of the court in that capital, settles the grammar. This must in substance be agreed to, yet judgement and analogy will frequently suggest improvements, and introduce a good, or abolish an ill custom. You must not suppose, that all the phrases of the vulgar in London, are therefore agreeable to the grammar of the English, or even that at court all the nobility, male and female, speak with perfect propriety. It is in the last resort, the men of literature,

particularly the authors, who, taking cuſtom as a general rule, give it all the direction they can, by their reaſoning and example.

To make you underſtand this by ſome inſtances, you ſee Mr Addiſon, Dean Swift, and Mr Pope, have endeavoured to attend to the genius of the Engliſh language, to ſhew where it was harſh and unpoliſhed, and where improprieties might be corrected; and they have ſucceeded in a great meaſure. It was obſerved by all thoſe great men, that the Engliſh, and all the northern languages, are harſh, by the numbers of conſonants meeting without intervening vowels; therefore, that it is a great barbariſm to ſtrike out the vowels that we have, as in theſe words, don't, can't, didn't, wouldn't, ſhouldn't, rebuk'd, drudg'd, fledg'd. Several of theſe words may yet be heard in ſome places, and I have even ſeen them in print in America; but no good ſpeaker or tolerable writer would uſe them in Great Britain. I give another example when the ſenſe and analogy of the words ſuggeſts the improvement. Averſe and averſion, were often formerly uſed with *to* or *at*; he is very averſe to it; he has a great averſion at it. But, as averſe properly ſignifies turned away, it ſeems an evident improvement to ſay, averſe from. What I mean by this obſervation, is to turn your attention to ſuch remarks, when you meet with them in reading or converſation.

I will make an obſervation or two more. It is of ſome importance to attend to the uſe of words nearly related, or in ſome degree ſynonymous. It is not uncommon to hear people ſay, a man is incident to

ſuch and ſuch a thing; the evil is incident to the perſon, the perſon liable to the evil, or ſubject to it; this may be ſeen by the original meaning of the word, of Latin derivation, and ſignifies, to fall upon. The word *notify* is often uſed wrong, particularly in America; they ſpeak of notifying the public, that is to ſay, making known the public; inſtead of this, we ſhould ſay, notify any thing (or make it known) to the public. You advertiſe a perſon, or inform him of a thing,—acquaint him with it. The verb *conſiſt*, in Engliſh, has two diſtinct meanings, and two conſtructions; when it ſignifies to agree or correſpond, it is joined to *with*. It conſiſts *with* my knowledge. When it ſignifies to compoſe or make up a total, it is conſtructed either with *in* or *of*; as, his eſtate conſiſts *of*, or *in* houſes, lands, &c. *This* and *that*, and *these* and *those*, when together in a ſentence, are uſed with diſtinction; *this* and *these* for the neareſt, and *that* and *those*, for the moſt remote antecedent; but otherwiſe, *these* and *those* are uſed indiſcriminately, but *those* more frequently; as, *those authors who are of different opinions*.

In all matters doubtful, you ought to obſerve how the current of good authors go. So far as I have been able to obſerve, collective words in Engliſh are indifferently conſtructed, either with a verb ſingular or plural, as number, multitude, part—a great number were preſent, or was preſent; though I ſhould prefer the laſt.—

As to orthography, it is of the utmoſt moment; not but that a man may be ſuppoſed to ſpeak, though he cannot ſpell; but becauſe a public ſpeaker

muſt be always in ſome degree converſant in public life, and then bad ſpelling is exceedingly reproachful. It is not only neceſſary to underſtand, in all ordinary caſes, the orthography of our own language, but a ſcholar and critic, I think, ſhould be able to obſerve the variations that have been made in ſpelling from time to time. Between thirty and forty years ago, an attempt was made to alter the ſpelling of the Engliſh language very conſiderably, by bringing it nearer to the way of pronouncing; but it did not ſucceed, being oppoſed by ſome of the greateſt eminence, as likely to deſtroy or hide the etymology of words. There have ſome ſmall alterations obtained a good deal in my remembrance, ſuch as taking away the final *k* in public, eccleſiaſtic, &c. There is alſo juſt now an attempt making to change the ſpelling of ſeveral words. I have ſeen an example of it in a very late edition of Middleton's Life of Cicero; ſuch as, revele, repete, explane—honor, favor, candor, &c. This ſeems upon the principle of bringing words nearer to their Latin derivation.

Punctuation is a thing that a ſcholar ſhould ſtrive to underſtand a little; though there are few gentlemen or ſcholars who uſe it much, either in letters or in their compoſition. The reaſon of this is, that it is looked upon as too formal, and unneceſſary to uſe it in writing letters, except a full ſtop. It is always the beſt language that has leaſt need of points to be underſtood. Points are, I believe, a modern invention, ſubſequent to the invention of printing; very uſeful, however, in teaching young perſons to read with proper pauſes. Another reaſon why points are little uſed in pri-

vate writing, is, that such papers as are sent to the press, (in Britain), do not need them, the printers themselves understanding that matter at least as well, if not better, than any writer.

4. It is a good rule, to observe early, and study to guard against some of the most remarkable blemishes in writing and speaking, which are fallen into by design or accident, and continued by habit. It is not difficult for any person, as soon as he begins to observe and reflect, to discover these in others; and as he will perceive the absurdity clearly in them, let him be very careful to find out whether there is not something of the same kind in himself. That you may understand what I mean, I will mention some particulars.

1. *Peculiar phrases.*—Such as have nothing in them but what is just, and decent, and proper, when used once, or now and then; but when a speaker falls so into any of them, that the practice is known for his own, and he is known by it, they become unspeakably ridiculous. It is very difficult to avoid something of this kind; there are few, if any, but in common discourse use some phrases more than others. A cautious person, as soon as he perceives a habit of using any one coming upon him, will endeavour to alter or avoid it. Even the greatest men are not wholly free from this defect. It is observed of Cicero, that *esse videatur* occurs in almost every three or four sentences, be the subject what it will. I knew a preacher that used the word *sedate*, so very frequently, that he was called generally where he was known, by the name of the

sedate preacher. I say the same thing of particular motions and gestures, which if they be in any degree out of the way, are a great blemish in a speaker: both the one and the other of these are commonly at first taken up as graces, and retained so long in that view, that they acquire an irresistible power from habit.

2. Another blemish of this kind, is using improper epithets. This is very common: some, especially young persons, are apt to think a discourse lean and poor, unless there be a great number of epithets; and as they will let no substantive go without an adjective, it is a great chance that some of them are improper: they cannot say the sky, without the azure sky, or the lofty sky, or the wide expanded sky; and though all these epithets may belong to the sky, they may not be equally proper in the place where they are introduced. A certain gentleman, of no mean rank in Great Britain, in drawing an address from a borough to his Majesty, on the peace, told him, that the terror of his arms had spread to the most distant parts of the *terraqueous* globe. Now, though it be certainly true that the globe is terraqueous, it was exceedingly ridiculous to tell the king so; it looked as if his Majesty were a boy, and the borough-magistrates were teaching him: or they themselves were boys, who had just learned the first lesson in geography, that the globe consists of land and water, and therefore were desirous of letting it be known that they were so far advanced.

3. Another visible blemish is, a multitude of unnecessary words of any kind, particularly the

vain repetition of ſynonymous phraſes. Some do not think their ſentences full and round enough, without a number of theſe phraſes. But though it be true, that there is a fulneſs of a ſentence, and the clauſes of a ſentence, which is neceſſary to pleaſe the ear, yet it is but an ill way to make up the ſhape with what is without ſenſe or force. The moſt common of this kind are the double epithets, which men are led into by the introduction of words derived from the Latin or Greek, into the Engliſh language. Theſe words differing in ſound, are often coupled together, as if different in meaning alſo—As happineſs, and felicity,—fruition and enjoyment,—greatneſs and magnificence,—eaſe and facility—way and manner,—end and concluſion,—ſmall and minute,—bountiful and liberal, &c. Sometimes, from your lofty ſpeakers, we hear a whole ſtring of words, of ſo little difference in meaning, that it is almoſt impoſſible to perceive it. Thus I have lately heard, "This grand, capital, important, and fundamental truth;"—all proper epithets; and though any one of them would have made the diſcourſe nervous, as well as juſt, by the addition of them all it becomes ſwelled and ſilly *.

---

* *List of Synonymous Terms frequently to be met with.*

Speakers and writers,	Worth and value,
Motives and arguments,	Laſting and abiding,
Benefit and advantage,	Command and order,
Small and minute,	Order and appoint,

4. Vulgariſms. I have been ſurpriſed to ſee ſome perſons of education and character, introduce the mere vulgariſms of diſcourſe in the pulpit, or at the bar; ſuch as, I an't, I can't, I ſhan't. An author, who entitles his book Lexiphanes, and has very ſucceſsfully expoſed Johnſon's long and hard words, let ſlip a vulgariſm into his own diſcourſe, for which he was ſeverely handled by the reviewers. *Between you and I.* *I* there is a governed caſe; and if it were to be uſed, it ſhould be, Be-

---

Bountiful and liberal,	Sin and guilt,
Right and title,	Chearfulneſs and alacrity,
Order and method,	Greatneſs and magnificence
Sharp and acute,	Joy and delight,
Pain and anguiſh,	Fruition and enjoyment,
Moment and importance,	Juſt and righteous,
Delight and ſatisfaction,	End and deſign,
Joy and pleaſure,	Open and explain,
Profit and advantage,	Laſting and durable,
Reſolution and purpoſe,	Clear and manifeſt,
Juſtice and equity,	Marks and ſigns,
Truth and ſincerity,	Plain and perſpicuous,
Wealth and riches,	Eaſe and facility,
Penury and want,	End and concluſion,
Odious and hateful,	A final iſſue,
Poor and indigent,	Motives and reaſons,
Order and regularity,	Diminiſhed and leſſened,
Rules and Regulations,	Excellence and perfection,
Cauſes and Reaſons,	Benevolence and good-will,
Uſeful and profitable,	Demonſtrate and prove,
Amiable and lovely,	Cover and conceal,
Wiſe and prudent,	Fooliſh and unwiſe,

tween you and me. But the truth is, the phrase is altogether a vulgarism, and therefore not to be used, except in particular circumstances, describing familiar chat. There are also certain cant phrases which come into repute and use in the course and the changes of fashion.

These have been sufficiently exposed by Swift and Addison, and therefore I shall say nothing at all further on them, at present, as an opportunity will afterwards occur of mentioning them to advantage.

5. The fifth and last general rule I shall just mention, is, to follow nature. This is a rule often given, and greatly insisted on by the ancients. Every body has heard of it, nay, sometimes those who have not heard of it will speak as if they had, and say, "This was quite natural—This was altogether unnatural." But it is somewhat difficult to understand. Nature seems in this rule to be opposed to art. Is following nature, then, to do as untaught persons generally do? Will the most ignorant persons make the most plain and the best connected discourse? Will they tell a story with

---

Terms and Phrases to be noted for remarks.

Happifying,—susceptive,—fellow-countryman,—felicitos,—to be found in the Monitor.

"Unsexed thy mind," in a Poem.

"Sensibilities," Aikin's Magazine, Oct. vol. 1. 468. 469.

"These commendations will not, I am persuaded, make you vain and *coxcomical*."

Knickknackically, simplify, domesticate, pultpitically.

the moſt genuine ſimplicity, and at the ſame time with perſpicuity? We find it is quite otherwiſe. Perhaps it would be beſt to ſay, it is following truth, or following that which is eaſieſt and plaineſt, and probably would be followed by all, but for affectation.

On this ſubject I can think of nothing ſo good as to ſay, Realize and ſuppoſe you ſaw the thing you would deſcribe, and put yourſelf in the very ſtate of him whoſe ſentiments you would ſpeak. Clear conceptions make diſtinct expreſſions, and reality is a great aſſiſtant to invention. If you were bid to ſtudy a ſubject abſtractly, it would be with great difficulty that things proper and ſuitable to it would come into your mind. But if you yourſelf were in the ſituation that is to be ſuppoſed, the ſentiments pertinent to it would crowd upon you immediately. Let me try to make this familiar by an example: Suppoſe I were to aſk any of you juſt now, what are the circumſtances that aggravate ſin, or make it more heinous, and deſerving of ſevere puniſhment? It is highly probable he would either be at a loſs altogether, or at leaſt would omit many of them. But if any of you had received an injury from another, in explaining of it, he would not fail to come over them every one. He would ſay it was unprovoked.—If he had done him ſervice, he would not fail to upbraid him with it, and nothing would be forgotten between the two that could aggravate the crime.

Suppoſing the reality of every thing, alſo, ſerves particularly to deliver a ſpeaker from affected ornaments, and every thing in language or carriage

that is improper: If you were pleading the cauſe of one accuſed of a capital crime, it would be beſt to ſuppoſe that you yourſelf were the accuſed perſon, and that you were ſpeaking for your own life. This would give an earneſtneſs of ſpirit, and a juſtneſs and correctneſs to the manner, infinitely diſtant from that theatrical pomp, which is ſo properly ſaid to be a departure from the ſimplicity of nature.

LECTURE IV.

HAVING given you ſome preliminary diſcourſes on ſuch points as I thought would ſerve to prepare you for what might be afterwards ſaid, I proceed to treat the ſubject more methodically, and more fully. There are various ways of dividing the ſubject, which yet may each of them be ſaid to take in the whole, in one way or other. Several of theſe muſt be combined together; as it is not ſufficient to view a building only from one ſtation. If you would underſtand it thoroughly, you muſt view it from different ſtations, and even take it in profile, and learn not only its outward appearance, but its inward ſtructure. The method I have reſolved to follow, and which ſeems to me as complete as any I could fall upon, is this—

I. To treat of language in general, its quali-

ties, and powers—eloquent ſpeech—and its hiſtory and practices as an art.

II. To conſider oratory as divided into its three great kinds, the ſublime—ſimple—and mixed,—their characters—their diſtinctions—their beauties—and their uſes.

III. To conſider it as divided into its conſtituent parts—invention—diſpoſition—ſtyle—pronunciation—and geſture.

IV. To conſider it as its object is different—information—demonſtration—perſuaſion—entertainment.

V. As its ſubject is different—the pulpit—the bar—and the ſenate, or any deliberate aſſembly.

VI. To conſider the ſtructure and parts of a particular diſcourſe,—their order,—connection—proportion—and ends.

VII. Recapitulation, and an inquiry into the principles of taſte, or of beauty and gracefulneſs, as applicable not only to oratory, but to all the other (commonly called) fine arts.

In the firſt place, then, I am to treat of language in general—its qualities and powers—eloquent ſpeech—and its hiſtory and practice as an art.

Language is what in a great meaſure diſtinguiſhes man from the inferior creatures. Not but that almoſt all animals have certain ſounds by which they can communicate ſomething to one another. But theſe ſounds are evidently only ſimple, and ſometimes ſingle exertions, differing in one creature from another, according to the different conformation of their organs. Articulate ſpeech has a

far greater compaſs, and is able to expreſs a vaſt multitude of complex, as well as ſimple ideas; perhaps we may even ſay, that articulate ſpeech is little leſs extenſive than thought itſelf, there being hardly any idea that can be formed but it may be expreſſed, and by that means communicated. In this there is a wide and manifeſt diſtinction between the rational and irrational creatures.

Articulate language is intended to communicate our ſentiments one to another. This may be conſidered as fully explained, by ſaying it includes information and perſuaſion. A conception in my mind, when ſpoken, its excellence conſiſts in making another perceive what I perceive, and feel towards it as I feel. They may be afterwards amplified and extended; but theſe two particulars ſhew the true original purpoſe of ſpeech. Eloquence is commonly called the art of perſuaſion, but the other muſt be taken in. We muſt inform, before we can perſuade; or if there be any ſuch thing as perſuaſion without information, it is only a blind impulſe.

Articulate ſpeech is repreſenting our ideas by arbitrary ſounds; that is to ſay, there is no real or natural connection between the ſound and ſignification, but what is the effect of compact and uſe. In this, articulate ſpeech is diſtinguiſhed from ſigns or natural ſounds, as alphabetical writing (of which more afterwards) is diſtinguiſhed from hieroglyphical. Natural ſounds may ſignify joy, fear, anger; but language, in general, has no ſuch natural connection with its meaning. The words *ſun* and *moon* might have had different meanings,

and ſerved the ſame purpoſe. The word *beith* in Hebrew, *oikos* in Greek, *domus* in Latin, *maiſon* in French, and *houſe* in Engliſh, though all of them different, are equally proper for ſignifying the ſame thing, when once they are fixed by the cuſtom of the ſeveral nations. Some have attempted to reduce the original words of a ſuppoſed original language, and even the letters of the alphabet, to a natural reſemblance of the things to be ſignified; but their attempts have been fruitleſs, and ridiculous. It was in ancient times a pretty general imagination, that there was a certain language that was original and natural to man; that this was the firſt language in uſe; and that if men were not taught another language by example, they would all ſpeak this language. But experience, after trial had been made by ſeveral curious perſons, ſhowed this imagination to be vain; for thoſe who were brought up without any communication with men, were always dumb, and ſpoke none at all, except ſometimes imitating the natural ſounds of ſome beaſts or birds, which they might occaſionally hear. Herodotus's ſtory is either a fable, or it proves nothing, of a king of Egypt having two children nouriſhed by goats, and pronouncing the word *Bec*, or *Beccos*, which, they ſaid, ſignified bread in the Phrygian language. This was a thing merely accidental, if true; yet, at any rate, of very doubtful authority.

The words in articulate ſpeech, therefore, are arbitrary; nor is there any poſſibility of their being otherwiſe, for words are only ſounds; and though it is poſſible in ſome few particulars to fix upon

words with a natural relation; as for example, perhaps the names of animals might ſometimes be given them, with ſome reſemblance of ſound to the natural ſounds which theſe animals utter; yet even this with diſadvantages, as any body may perceive, by trying to make a word that ſhall reſemble the neighing of a horſe, the lowing of a bull, &c. But as to all inanimate viſible objects, it is impoſſible to repreſent them by ſound; light and ſound, the eye and the ear, being totally different in kind. I can recollect nothing that makes any difficulty in this matter, unleſs that ſome may ſay, How then do you find place for that particular beauty of poetry, and other deſcriptions, in making the ſound an echo to the ſenſe? But this is eaſily reſolved. In ſome caſes, the paſſions give a modulation to ſound; and in the quantity of the ſyllables, and eaſe or difficulty of pronouncing them, there may be a reſemblance to ſlowneſs and labour, or their oppoſites, or both: As in the famous paſſage of Homer, *Ton men Tisiphon;* or, in Mr Pope, who exemplifies the rule in giving it.

"'Tis not enough, no harſhneſs gives offence," &c.

If words are arbitrary, it may be aſked, how language came firſt into uſe? in which the opinions are various, but the controverſy is not of any great moment. Some think it was in the ſame way as other creatures exert their natural powers, that man by practice gradually came to the uſe of ſpeech, and ſettled the meaning of words by cuſtom. Others think that this would either never have happened, or have taken a very long time,

and ſuppoſe that their Maker taught them at leaſt ſome degree of practice, which ſhould open the way to a more extenſive uſe of the faculty. And the conſideration, that ſounds in language are arbitrary, in ſome degree favours this ſuppoſition, becauſe it may be obſerved, that as mankind are capable by inſtruction of the greateſt and moſt multifarious improvement, ſo without inſtruction they are capable of doing leaſt. A human infant, when firſt brought forth, is more helpleſs, and longer helpleſs, than other animal that we know. It does not ſeem to be of much importance to form a determinate opinion of this queſtion. It occurs in the very ſame way again, and may be reaſoned upon the ſame principles, whether alphabetical writing was an invention and diſcovery of man, or revealed by God. Thoſe who hold the laſt opinion obſerve, that hieroglyphic writing, or writing by ſigns or pictures, was before alphabetical; and that the improvement of hieroglyphics does not lead to, but from alphabetical writing: That the one conſiſts of natural emblems, and viſible ſigns of ſentiments, and the other of arbitrary or artificial ſigns for ſimple ſounds; ſo that the more complex you make the hieroglyphic, you differ the more from the alphabet. It ſeems probable, that this, and indeed the radical principles of all great diſcoveries, were brought out by accident, that is to ſay, by Providence: therefore it is probable, that God gave to our firſt parents, who were found in a ſtate of full growth, all the inſtruction neceſſary for proceeding upon, and exerciſing the faculty of ſpeech, the length that was neceſſary for the purpoſes of hu-

man life. It is alſo probable, from the analogy of providence, that he left as much to the exerciſe of the human powers, as convenience and application could conveniently ſupply.

I will not enter much into the formation and conſtruction of language in general. It is formed by a certain number of ſimple ſounds, which, when variouſly combined, produce that variety of words, which, though certainly not ſtrictly infinite, yet have been hitherto inexhauſted by all the languages in the world. The letters are divided into vowels and conſonants, the firſt having a ſound of themſelves, and the other only giving a ſort of modification to that ſound. Some great philologiſts are of opinion, that in the Hebrew, and ſeveral other ancient languages, their whole letters are conſonauts, tending to mark the different configurations of the organs of ſound at the beginning of pronunciation, and the vowels are the ſounds themſelves, which they ſay men were taught to adopt by habit, firſt in ſpeaking, and then in writing, and afterwards were diſtinguiſhed by marks or ſigns, for the ſake of readers. Hence the controverſy about the Hebrew points, and indeed reading the dead languages in general, which is attended with great uncertainty, particularly from the following circumſtances. Vowels have in general been but five or ſix in number, which ſhould expreſs all the ſimple ſounds, and yet they do not; and perhaps there is not a language in which there is greater confuſion in this matter, than our own, which makes the Engliſh ſo exceedingly difficult for a foreigner to attain. Several

Engliſh vowels have three or four different ſounds; and, as Sheridan ſays, ſome of them the length of five; *I* has three in one word, viz. *infinite*. Theſe things not being neceſſary to my main purpoſe, I only point at them without enlarging.

It is plain, that in whatever manner languages were firſt formed, we can eaſily ſee that they came ſlowly and by degrees to perfection. An eminent French author, Father Lamy, ſays, the Hebrew language was perfect in its original; but he advances no proof of this, but ſhowing indeed by very juſt hiſtorical remarks and criticiſms, that the Hebrew was anterior in point of time to the Greek; and that in writing, the letters were taken from the Hebrew, and employed in the Greek. Hiſtory ſays, that Cadmus was a Phenician, and he has generally among the Greeks the honour of introducing letters. It is alſo obſerved, that as the letters of the alphabet were uſed in expreſſing numbers, the Greeks, after they had in proceſs of time altered or left out the letter *vau* in Hebrew, which ſtands ſixth in order, they put a new mark *s* for ſix, that the reſt might retain their powers; which plainly ſhews, that the Hebrew alphabet was older than the Greek, as it now ſtands.

But, for my own part, I do not underſtand the meaning of ſaying, that the Hebrew language was perfect at firſt; it might be fitted for all the purpoſes of them that uſed it firſt, and is probably at this day as good as any other language, ſo far as it goes; but it is plain, that this and all the other languages of the firſt ages were narrow, ſhort, and ſimple. They muſt have been ſo from the nature

of the thing; moſt probably they conſiſted chiefly of monoſyllables, repreſenting ſimple ideas. What occaſion had they for complex or compound words, when they had few, if any, complex or compound ideas? This appears very plainly from the ſtate of the Hebrew language, ſome of the other orientals, and the language of all uncultivated people. It holds likewiſe in the caſe of the Chineſe language, which, though the people are not uncultivated, properly ſpeaking, is yet in an unimproved ſtate, from their having had little intercourſe with other nations. All ſuch languages have few adjectives; and when they do uſe words as adjectives, they are commonly figurative. There is an ingenious and probable deduction how a ſcanty narrow language might be firſt uſed in Shuckford's Connections. They might expreſs qualities by the name of ſome animal remarkable for them—as a lion-man, for a violent or fierce man. This is wholly agreeable to the genius of the Hebrew language. The Hebrews deſcribe every thing that is very great, by adding the name of God to it, as—the trees of God—the river of God. It follows, that in all uncultivated languages, the figures are frequent, and very ſtrong. The Indians in America have a language full of metaphors. They take up the hatchet, for going to war; and they brighten the chain, when they confirm a peace.

Hence it appears, that in the earlieſt times, if they uſed figures, it was the effect of neceſſity, rather than choice. But what men did at firſt out of neceſſity, orators afterwards returned to from

choice, in order to increaſe the beauty or force of their diction, or both. In fact, figures do make the greateſt impreſſion on men's minds. They are ſenſible, and therefore level to every man's capacity: for the ſame reaſon they make a ſtrong impreſſion on the imagination. They likewiſe leave a great deal of room for the creative power of fancy to make additions. A ſign, or ſymbol, ſeen by a multitude, on a ſubject that is underſtood, carries the contagion of enthuſiaſm, or rage, exceedingly far. In the 19th of Judges, you ſee the Levite took his concubine, and cut her into twelve parts, and ſent them to all the tribes of Iſrael. The Roman alſo, holding up the ſtump of his hand which he loſt in the ſervice of the public, pleaded for his brother with a power vaſtly ſuperior to any language whatever.

LECTURE V.

HAVING given you a ſhort view of language in general, if it were not too long, I would conſider the ſtructure of particular languages; inſtead of which, take the few following ſhort remarks:

1. The nature of things neceſſarily ſuggeſts many of the ways of ſpeaking, which conſtitutes the grammar of a language, and in every language there is nearly the ſame number of parts of ſpeech,

as they are enumerated in the Latin grammar; noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, prepoſition, interjection, conjunction.

2. In the uſe of theſe, there is a very great variety. Nouns, to be ſure, are declined nearly the ſame way in all, by caſes and numbers; though the Greeks in this differ a little, uſing three numbers inſtead of two, having a particular inflection of the word, when there are but two perſons meant; and another for the plural or more: but in the verbs, there is a very great diverſity; in the active and paſſive ſignification, they generally agree, but ſome expreſs the perſons by terminations, and ſome by pronouns and nominatives expreſſed. Some have moods, which others have not. The Greeks have an optative mood; the Latins have gerunds; the Hebrews, with fewer differences of moods, have conjugations that carry ſome variety of ſignification to the ſame word. In one word, *maser*, (he delivered), there is not only this and its paſſive, but another, he delivered diligently, and the paſſive; another, he made to deliver; another, he delivered himſelf. The Greeks, beſides the active and paſſive, have a *media vox*, of which perhaps the uſe is not fully underſtood; ſince ſome of the beſt grammarians ſay it ſignifies doing a think to one's ſelf; *Tupsomai*, I ſhall ſtrike myſelf. Moſt of the modern languages decline their verbs, not by inflection of the termination, as the Greek and Latin, but by auxiliary verbs, as the Engliſh and French. The Chineſe language is perhaps the leaſt improved of any language that has ſubſiſted for any time; this probably is owing

to their want of alphabetical writing; every word among them had a character peculiar to it, ſo that letters and words were the ſame in number in their language; this rendered it of immenſe difficulty to underſtand their writing among themſelves, and quite impoſſible to foreigners; but they were vaſtly ſurpriſed to find, that the Jeſuits from Europe, that came among them, could eaſily write their language by our alphabet; and as they uſe the ſame word in different tones, for different meanings, theſe fathers alſo ſoon found a way of diſtinguiſhing theſe in writing, by certain marks and accents placed over the word, differing as it was to be differently taken.

3. Some have amuſed themſelves with inventing a language, with ſuch a regular grammar as might be eaſily underſtood, and having this language brought into general uſe. We have a remark of this kind, in Father Lami's Rhetorique, in French, and he ſays the grammar of the Tartar language comes neareſt to it. We have alſo had ſome ſchemes and propoſitions of this kind in Engliſh, but it ſeems wholly chimerical. I ſhall only obſerve further, that ſome few have imagined, that the Hebrew language itſelf was originally, and when complete, a perfect language, and that we now have it only maimed, and but a ſmall part of it. Theſe ſuppoſe the language to be generated thus, by taking the letters of the alphabet, and firſt going through them regularly by two, and then by three, *ab*, *ag*, *ad*, &c. *aba*, *abb*, &c. All theſe ſchemes are idle, becauſe no perſon can poſſibly lay down rules beforehand,

for every thing that may be hereafter thought and ſpoken; and therefore, when they are brought out, they will be expreſſed as thoſe to whom they firſt occur ſhall incline; and cuſtom will finally fix them, and give them their authority.

Leaving theſe things, therefore, as matters of more curioſity than uſe, I proceed to ſpeak of eloquent ſpeech, and its hiſtory as an art. It is plain, that in the progreſs of ſociety, and the commerce of human life, it would ſoon appear, that ſome ſpoke with more grace and beauty, and ſo as more to incline the hearers to their ſentiments, than others; neither is it hard to perceive, that it would be early in repute. In the firſt aſſociations of mankind, they muſt have been chiefly governed by thoſe who had the power of perſuaſion. In uncultivated ſocieties, it is ſo ſtill; in an Indian tribe, the ſachem or wiſe man directs their councils. The progreſs of oratory towards perfection muſt have been evidently, in fact, like the propreſs of all other human arts, gradual, and in proportion to the encouragement given to its exerciſe. It prevailed where the ſtate of things, and conſtitution of government, favoured it, but not otherwiſe.

It is to be obſerved here, that by the conſent of all, and by the memorials of antiquity that are left, poetry was more ancient than oratory; or perhaps we may rather ſay, that the firſt exertions of genius in eloquent expreſſion were in poetry, not in proſe. It has frequently been made matter of critical inquiry, why poetry was prior to oratory, and why ſooner brought to perfection? I do not perceive very clearly what great advantage there

is in determining this queſtion, ſuppoſing we ſhould hit upon the true reaſons; one reaſon I take to be, that the circumſtance in poetry that gives generally the higheſt pleaſure, viz. a ſtrong and vigorous fancy, is leaſt indebted to application, inſtruction, or time, for its perfection; therefore poetical productions in general, and that ſpecies of them in particular, which have moſt of that quality, muſt be as eaſily produced in uncultivated times, as any other; and, for ſome reaſons given in a former diſcourſe, muſt appear then with the greateſt effect. Whereas, to ſucceſs in oratory, ſome knowledge of the human heart, and even ſome experience in the ways of men, is neceſſary. Another difference is plain; poetical productions having generally pleaſure or immediate entertainment as their deſign, may produce that effect in any age; whereas, the circumſtances that rendered the orator's diſcourſe intereſting, are all gone.

Perhaps to this we may add, that the incitements to poetry are more general. A poet pleaſes, and obtains fame from every ſingle perſon who reads or hears his productions; but an aſſembly, buſineſs, and an occaſion, are neceſſary to the orator. This laſt is likewiſe limited in point of place and ſituation. Oratory could not thrive in a ſtate where arbitrary power prevails, becauſe then there is nothing left for large aſſemblies, and a diffuſive public, to determine; whereas poetry is pleaſing to perſons, under any form of government whatever.

Thoſe who have given the hiſtory of oratory, have rather given us the hiſtory of the teachers of

that art, than its progreſs and effects. It muſt be obſerved, however, that in this, as well as in poetry, criticiſm is the child, and not the father of genius. It is the fruit of experience and judgement, by reflection upon the ſpontaneous productions of genius. Criticiſm inquires what was the cauſe of things being agreeable, after the effect has been ſeen. Ward brings a citation from Cicero, to ſhow that the orator's art was older than the Trojan war. The purport of this is, that Homer attributes force to Ulyſſes' ſpeeches, and ſweetneſs to Neſtor's; perhaps alſo he has characteriſed Menelaus' manner as ſimple, ſhort, and unadorned. There is not, however, any certainty in this art being much ſtudied or explained in theſe early times from this citation; for though Homer is an excellent poet, of inimitable fire and great ſtrength of natural judgement, it is not certain that he kept ſo perfectly to propriety, as to deſcribe only the manner and ſtyle of things at the time of the Trojan war, which was 250 years before his own. I ſhould be more apt to conclude, that he had deſcribed manners, characters, and ſpeakers as they were in his own time, with a little air of antiquity.

We are, however, told by Pauſanias, that the firſt ſchool of oratory in Greece was opened in the ſchool of Theſeus, the age preceding that war. If there be any certainty in this, its being taught in Greece has been very ancient indeed; but theſe being fabulous times, it is ſcarcely to be depended upon. However, it is certain that oratory flouriſhed early, and was improved greatly in Greece. Many circumſtances concurred to produce this effect. The

ſpirit and capacity of the people—the early introduction of letters—but chiefly their political ſituation—the freedom of their ſtates—the frequency of public aſſemblies—and the importance of their deciſions. There is much ſaid of the ſpirit and capacity of the Greeks for all the arts; and to be ſure their climate, ſo ſerene and temperate, might have all the effect that a climate can have: but I rekon the two other cauſes much more conſiderable. The introduction of letters is neceſſary to the improvement and perfection of a language; and as they were early bleſſed with that advantage, they had the beſt opportunity of improving. However, the laſt cauſe of all is much more powerful than both the former, though perhaps literature is neceſſary to be joined with it to produce any great effect. As to ſome of the other arts, particularly painting and ſtatuary, an eminent modern critic ſays, the Greeks could not but excel, becauſe they, of all others, had the beſt images from nature to copy. He ſays that the games in Greece, in which the beſt formed bodies for agility and ſtrength in the whole country were ſeen naked, and ſtriving and exerting themſelves to the very utmoſt, muſt have preſented to perſons of genius originals to draw from, ſuch as in moſt other nations never are to be ſeen. If this remark is juſt in the other arts, the influence of eloquence in the public aſſemblies of theſe free ſtates muſt have had a ſimilar effect in the art of ſpeaking.

The art of ſpeaking in Greece, however, does not ſeem to have riſen high till the time of Pericles, and he is ſaid to have been ſo powerful an orator, that

he kept up his influence in the city as much by his eloquence as tyrants did by their power. There is a paſſage of Cicero, which ſeems to ſay that he was the firſt who prepared his diſcourſes in writing; and ſome have been ſimple enough to believe that he read them; but nothing can be a more manifeſt miſtake, becauſe action or pronunciation was by all the ancients conſidered as the great point in oratory. There were to be ſeen in Cicero and Quintilian's times, orations ſaid to be of Pericles; but both theſe great orators ſeem to be of opinion that they were not his, becauſe they did not at all ſeem to come up to the great fame of his eloquence. Mr Bayle, a very eminent critic, ſays juſtly, that theſe great men might be miſtaken in that particular; for a very indifferent compoſition may be the work of a very great orator. The grace of elocution and the power of action might not only acquire a man fame in ſpeaking, but keep up his influence in public aſſemblies. Of this we have two very great Britiſh examples, Mr Whitfield in the pulpit, and Mr Pitt in the ſenate.

After Pericles there were many great orators in Greece, and indeed all their ſtateſmen were orators till the time of Demoſthenes, when the Grecian eloquence ſeems to have attained its perfection. The praiſes of this great ſpeaker are to be ſo generally met with, that I ſhall not inſiſt upon them at all, further than reminding you, that though no doubt eminently qualified by nature, he needed and received great improvement from art.

The Roman eloquence was of much ſhorter dura-

tion. It is true that the Roman ſtate being free, and the aſſemblies of the people having much in their power, it ſeems, according to the principles we have gone upon, that public ſpeaking muſt have been in eſteem; but there is ſomething peculiar. The Romans were for many ages a plain, rough, unpoliſhed people. Valour in war was their idol; and therefore, though to be ſure from the earlieſt times the aſſemblies muſt have been managed in their deliberations by their ſpeakers, yet they were conciſe and unadorned, and probably conſiſted more of telling them their ſtory, and ſhowing their wounds, which was of frequent practice among them, than any artful or paſſionate harangues. The firſt ſpeakers of any eminence we read of in the Roman hiſtory, were the Gracchi. Cicero, I believe, makes little mention even of them. Anthony and Craſſus were the firſt celebrated orators among the Romans, and they were but in the age immediately before Cicero himſelf, and from his time it rather fell into decay.

I have ſaid above, that genius and excellence was before criticiſm. This is very plain; for though we read of ſchools and rhetoricians at different times and places, theſe are conſidered by the great maſters as perſons quite contemptible. Of this kind there is a remarkable paſſage in Cicero, in his *Brutus*. "At hunc (ſpeaking of Pericles) non declamator," &c. The firſt juſt and truly eminent critic in Greece was Ariſtotle, who flouriſhed as late as the time of Demoſthenes; and Cicero himſelf was the firſt eminent critic among the Romans. Ariſtotle has laid open the principles of

eloquence and perſuaſion as a logician and philoſopher, and Cicero has done it in a ſtill more maſterly manner, as a philoſopher, ſcholar, orator, and ſtateſman; and I confeſs, unleſs he has had many authors to conſult that we know nothing of, his judgement and penetration are quite admirable, and his books De Oratore, &c. more finiſhed in their kind than any of his orations themſelves.

As to the effects of oratory, they have been and are ſurely very great; but as things ſeen through a miſt, or at a great diſtance, are apt to be miſtaken in their ſize; I am apt to think many ſay things incredible, and make ſuppoſitions quite contrary to nature and reaſon, and therefore to probability. Some ſpeak and write as if all the ancient orators had a genius more than human, and indeed by their whole ſtrain ſeem rather to extinguiſh than excite an ardour to excel. Some alſo ſeem to me to go upon a ſuppoſition as if all the people in the ancient republics had been ſages, as well as their ſtateſmen orators.—There is a remark to be found in many critics upon a ſtory of Theophraſtus the philoſopher, from which they infer the delicacy of the Athenians. That philoſopher, it ſeems, went to buy ſomething of an herb-woman, at a ſtall, and ſhe in her anſwer to him, it ſeems, called him ſtranger. This, they ſay, ſhows that ſhe knew him by his accent not to be a native of Athens, although he had lived there thirty years. But we are not even certain that her calling him ſtranger implied any more than that he was unknown to her. Beſides, though it were true that ſhe diſcovered him not to be an

Athenian born, this is no more than what happens in every populous country, that there is something in the accent which will determine a man to be of one country or province, rather than another; and I am something of opinion, that this would be more discernible in Greece than any where else. The different dialects of the Greek tongue were not reckoned reproachful, as many local differences are in Britain, which therefore people will endeavour to rid themselves of as well as they can. In short, I take it for granted, that an assembly of the vulgar in Athens was just like an assembly of common people among us, and a senate at Athens in understanding and taste was not superior to the senate of Great Britain, and that some of them were but mere mobs; and that they were very disorderly, is plain from what we read of Plato being pulled down from the desk, when he went up to defend Socrates.

The most remarkable story of the effect of oratory is that told of Cicero's power over Cæsar, in his oration for C. Ligarius. This is very pompously told by some critics, that Cæsar came to the judgement-seat determined to condemn him, and even took the pen in his hand to sign his condemnation; but that he was interested by Cicero's eloquence, and at last so moved that he dropped the pen, and granted the orator's request. But supposing the facts to have happened, I am very doubtful of the justness of the remark. Cæsar was a great politician, and as we know he did attempt to establish his authority by mercy, it is not unlikely both that he determined to pardon Ligarius, and to flatter Cicero's vanity by giving him the honour of obtaining it. In

ſhort, oratory has its chief power in promiſcuous aſſemblies, and there it reigned of old, and reigns ſtill, by its viſible effect.

LECTURE VI.

WE now proceed to conſider eloquence as divided into its three great kinds—the ſublime, the ſimple, and the mixed. This is very unhappily expreſſed by Ward, who divides ſtyle into the low, the middle, and the ſublime. Low is a word which, in its firſt and literal ſenſe, ſignifies ſituation, and when applied metaphorically, never is in any inſtance uſed in a good ſenſe, but always ſignifies what is either unhappy, or baſe and contemptible, as we ſay a man's or a ſtate's finances are low. We ſay a man is in a low ſtate of health. We ſay he is guilty of low, mean practices; has a low, mean, paltry ſtyle. It was therefore conveying a very wrong idea to make *low* one of the different kinds of ſtyle. You may obſerve that I have introduced this diſtinction in a manner ſomewhat different from him and other authors. They conſider it as a diviſion of ſtyle. I chooſe rather to ſay, there are three different great kinds, into which eloquence and compoſition may be divided. The reaſon is, I believe, the word *style*, which was uſed both by the Greeks and Romans, but eſpecially the latter, has, like many others, gradually changed its meaning. At firſt it ſignified the manner of wri-

ting in general, and is even ſometimes uſed ſo ſtill, but more commonly now in Engliſh it is confined to the diction. Nothing is more common than to ſay, ſublimity in ſentiments and ſtyle, ſo as to diſtinguiſh the one from the other. I am ſenſible that even in this confined ſenſe there is a ſublimity, ſimplicity, and mediocrity in language itſelf, which will naturally enough fall to be explained; but it is better, upon the whole, to conſider them as different kinds of eloquence, for ſeveral reaſons.

Sublimity in writing conſiſts with all ſtyles, and particularly many of the higheſt and moſt admired examples of ſublimity are in the utmoſt ſimplicity of ſtyle. Sometimes they are ſo far from loſing by it, that they owe a great part of their force to it. That remarkable example of ſublimity in the ſcripture, is wholly in the ſimple. "Let there be light, "and there was light." There are alſo many others in ſcripture: "The gods of the Gentiles are vanity "and lies,"—"I am that I am."

Some of the other kinds alſo, even the ſimpleſt, do ſometimes admit great force of expreſſion, though more rarely; and there is a great danger in the ſimple manner of writing, by admitting lofty expreſſions to ſwell into bombaſt. The mixed kind frequently admits of ſublimity of ſtyle, and indeed is called mixed, as conſiſting, as it were, alternately of the one and the other, or being made up of a proportion of each.

The ſublime kind of writing chiefly belongs to the following ſubjects: Epic poetry, tragedy, orations on great ſubjects, and then particularly the peroration. Nothing can be too great for theſe

ſubjects; and unleſs they are treated with ſublimity, they are not treated ſuitably. The ſimple kind of writing belongs to ſcientific writing, epiſtolary writing, eſſay and dialogue, and to the whole inferior ſpecies of poetry, paſtorals, epigrams, epitaphs, &c. The mixed kind belongs to hiſtory, ſyſtem, and controverſy. The firſt ſort muſt be always ſublime in ſentiment or language, or both. The ſecond may be often ſublime in ſentiment; ſometimes, and very rarely, in language. The mixed admits of both ſorts with full propriety, and may be often ſublime both in ſentiment and language.

Let us now conſider theſe three great kinds of compoſition, ſeparately, in the order in which I have named them.

1. Of the ſublime manner of writing.—This is very difficult to deſcribe or treat of, in a critical manner. It is very remarkable, that all writers on this ſubject, not excepting thoſe of the greateſt judgement, accuracy, and preciſion, when they come to explain it, have uſed nothing but metaphorical expreſſions. It is, however, certain in general, that metaphor ſhould be kept as much as poſſible out of definition or explication. Theſe all agreeing, therefore, in this circumſtance, ſeems to ſhow, that ſublimity is a ſingle or ſimple idea, that cannot be reſolved, divided, or analyſed, and that a taſte for it is, in a good meaſure, a feeling of nature. The critics tell us, that ſublimity is that which ſurpriſes, raviſhes, tranſports: theſe are words frequently applied to its effects upon the hearers, and greatneſs, loftineſs, majeſty, are aſcribed to the ſentiments, to the character, to the perſon. An ora-

tion, or the ſublime parts of a poem, have been compared to the voice of thunder, or penetration of lightning, to the impetuoſity of a torrent; this laſt is one of the beſt metaphorical expreſſions for ſublimity in eloquence, becauſe it carries in it, not only the idea of great force, but of carrying away every thing with it that oppoſes or lies in its way. That may be ſaid to be ſublime, that has an irreſiſtible influence on the hearers, and when examined carries it in the idea of great power and abilities in the ſpeaker: yet even this is not ſufficient, it has the character of greatneſs, as diſtinct from that of beauty, ſweetneſs, or uſe. Burke, on the Sublime, has endeavoured to ſhow, that ſublimity and beauty, though generally united in our apprehenſions, are diſtinct qualities, and to be traced to a different ſource. Of ſublimity in particular, he ſays it is always allied to ſuch things as raiſe the paſſion of terror: but of this I will ſpeak more fully upon a head I have reſerved for that purpoſe; in which I propoſe to inquire into the firſt principles of taſte or approbation, common to this and all other arts.

Longinus mentions no leſs than five different ſources of the ſublime. 1. Greatneſs or elevation of mind. 2. Pathos or paſſion. 3. Figure. 4. Nobleneſs of language. 5. Compoſition, or arrangement of words. But though the laſt two of theſe are of conſiderable moment, and greatly contribute to augment the force as well as beauty of a diſcourſe, I do not think they are of that nature as to be conſidered upon the ſame footing with the other three. Therefore, leaving what is to be ſaid

upon them to the next head, when it will properly occur, I shall consider the others in their order.

1. Greatness or elevation of mind.—This is indeed the first and radical source of sublimity. It is quite impossible for a man to attain to sublimity of composition, unless his soul is great, and his conceptions noble: and, on the other hand, he that possesses these can hardly express himself meanly. Longinus gives it as an advice, that a man should accustom his mind to great thoughts. But if you ask me, what are great thoughts? I confess myself unable to explain it, and unless the feeling is natural, I am afraid it is impossible to impart it; yet it seems to be pretty generally understood. It is common to say, such a man has a great soul, or such another has a mean or little soul. A great soul aspires in its hopes; is not easily terrified by enemies, or discouraged by difficulties. It is worth while to consider a little the effect of a man's outward circumstances. The mind, to be sure, cannot be wholly made by any circumstances. Sentiments and state are different things. Many a great mind has been in narrow circumstances, and many a little rascal has been a king; yet education and manner have a sensible effect upon men in general. I imagine I have observed, that when persons of rank have been at the same time men of real genius, they have generally excelled in majesty and dignity of sentiments and language. This was an advantage generally enjoyed by the ancients whose writings remain to us; having but their own language to study, and being early introduced into public life, and even into the conduct of the greatest affairs,

they were led into nobleneſs of ſentiment. Xenophon, Domoſthenes, Cicero, Cæſar, were all of them great ſtateſmen, and two of them great generals, as well as writers. In modern times, there is a more complete partition of employments, ſo that the ſtateſman, general, and ſcholar, are ſeldom found united in the ſame perſon; yet I think it appears in fact, that when ſtateſmen are alſo ſcholars, they make, upon the whole, greater orators and nobler writers, than thoſe who are ſcholars merely, though of the greateſt capacity. In every ſtation, however, this remark has place, that it is of importance to ſublimity in writing, to endeavour to acquire a large and liberal manner of thinking. Whilſt I am making uſe of this language, I would caution you againſt thinking, that pride and vanity of mind are at all allied to greatneſs, in this reſpect. There is a ſet of men called free-thinkers, who are pleaſed to arrogate to themſelves a large and liberal manner of thinking; and the generality of them are as little creatures as any on the face of the earth. Mr Addiſon compares them to a fly, which lighting upon a great building, and perceiving the ſmall interſtices between the ſtones, cries out of vaſt chaſms and irregularities, which is wholly owing to the extreme littleneſs of his ſight, that is not able to ſee the dignity and grandeur of the whole building.

When I am upon this ſubject of greatneſs and elevation of thought, as one ſource of the ſublime, you will naturally expect that I ſhould give ſome examples to illuſtrate it. I ſhall begin with ſome out of the ſcriptures, where indeed there is the greateſt number, and theſe the nobleſt that can well

be conceived. "I am God alone, and beſides me there is no Saviour.—Who is this that darkeneth counſel by words without knowledge?—Who will ſet the briars and thorns againſt me in battle?" &c. See alſo two paſſages inimitably grand.—Iſa. xl. 12. and ver. 21. and onwards.

To mention ſome of the ſayings in heathen antiquity,—Alexander's ſaying to Parmenio is certainly of the great kind, yet perhaps with a conſiderable mixture of pride as well as greatneſs. Parmenio told him, if he were Alexander he would act in a certain manner. Anſwer: So would I, if I were Parmenio. That of Porus, the Indian king, to Alexander, however, was much greater. When he was Alexander's priſoner, and was aſked by that prince how he expected to be treated? he anſwered, Like a king. Cæſar's famous ſaying of *Veni, vidi, vici*, has often been quoted as a conciſe and noble deſcription of the rapidity of his conqueſts; yet I confeſs I think it very dubious; it had not only an air of improper vanity, but looks like an intended and ſilly play upon the words, and what we call alliteration. They are three words of the ſame length, the ſame tenſe, and the ſame beginning and ending. Cicero, in one of his orations, I believe in that for Marcellus, has a very noble compliment to Cæſar, when he ſays, the gods had given nothing to men ſo great as a diſpoſition to ſhew mercy. But of all great ſayings on record, there is none that ever made ſuch an impreſſion upon me as that of Ayliffe to king James III. He had been detected in ſome of the plots, &c. The king ſaid to him, Mr Ayliffe, don't you know

it is in my power to pardon you? Yes, (ſays he), I know it is in your power, but it is not in your nature!

It is neceſſary to put you in mind, in reading books of criticiſm, that when examples of greatneſs of ſentiment are produced from Homer and the other ancient writers, that all circumſtances muſt be taken in, in order to form a juſt opinion concerning them. We muſt remember his times, and the general belief of his countrymen with regard to theology, and many other ſubjects. There muſt be a probability to make a thing natural, otherwiſe it is not great or noble, but extravagant. Homer, in deſcribing the goddeſs Diſcord, ſays, Her feet were upon the earth, and her head was covered with the clouds. He makes Pluto look up and affirm, that Neptune would open hell itſelf, and make the light to ſhine into that dark abode. There are ſome of theſe that appear to me ſuſpicious even in Homer himſelf; ſuch as, when he makes Jupiter brag, that if all the other gods were to hang at the bottom of a chain, and earth and ſea, and all along with them, he would toſs them all up as eaſily as a ball. However it was with regard to him, who was taught to believe in Jupiter ſitting upon Mount Olympus, or quaffing Nectar in the council of the gods, modern and Chriſtian writers and ſpeakers ſhould be careful to avoid any thing that is extravagant and ridiculous, or even ſuch alluſions to the heathen theology as could only be proper to thoſe who believed in it.

There is the more reaſon to inſiſt upon this, that as grandeur and ſublimity is commonly a great object of ambition, particularly with young perſons,

they are very ready to degenerate into bombaſt. You ought always to remember, that the language ought to be no higher than the ſubject, or the part of the ſubject that is then immediately handled. See an example of the different ways of a ſimple and a turgid writer, upon the very ſame ſentiment, where the Roman empire was extended to the weſtern coaſt of Spain: Sextus Rufus ſimply tells it thus—*Hispanias per Decimum Brutum obtinuimus, et usque ad Gades et oceanum pervenimus.* Florus, taking a more lofty flight, ſays—*Decimus Brutus aliquanto totius*, &c.

I have only further to obſerve, that, in ſublime deſcriptions, great care ſhould be taken that they be all of a piece, and nothing unſuitable brought into view. Longinus juſtly blamed the poet Heſiod, that after he had ſaid every thing he could, to render the goddeſs of darkneſs terrible, he adds, that a ſtinking humour ran from her noſe—a circumſtance highly diſguſting, but no way terrible.

LECTURE VII.

I COME now to the ſecond ſource of the ſublime, which is pathos, more commonly called in Engliſh the pathetic, that is, the power of moving the paſſions. This is a very important part of the ſubject: a power over the paſſions is of the utmoſt conſequence to a poet; and it is all in all to an orator. This every one will perceive, if he only

recollects what influence paſſion or ſentiment has upon reaſon, or, in other words, inclination upon the practical judgement. He that poſſeſſes this power in a high degree has the higheſt capacity of uſefulneſs, and is likewiſe able to do the greateſt miſchief. Sublime ſentiments and language may be formed upon any ſubject, and they touch the heart with a ſenſe of ſympathy or approbation; but to move the paſſions of others, ſo as to incline their choice, or to alter their purpoſe, is particularly the deſign of eloquence.

The chief paſſions eloquence is intended to work upon are, rage, terror, pity, and perhaps deſire in general; though occaſionally he may have occaſion to introduce every affection. In a heroic poem, every affection may be ſaid to take its turn; but the different ſpecies of oratory, or the different objects and ſubjects of it, may be ſaid to divide the paſſions. A ſpeaker in political or deliberative aſſemblies may be ſaid to have it in view to excite the paſſion of rage: he may naturally deſire to incenſe his hearers againſt their enemies, foreign and domeſtic, repreſenting the firſt as terrible and dangerous, to excite averſion and hatred; and the other as weak or worthleſs, to excite contempt. An example of this you have in the great ſubject of Demoſthenes's Orations, Philip, king of Macedon—another in Cicero's diſcourſes againſt Catiline and Anthony. Pity is the chief paſſion attempted to be raiſed at the bar, unleſs in criminal caſes, where indignation againſt villainy of every kind is the part of the accuſer. Terror and its attendants belong very much to a ſpeaker in the pulpit; rage he has no-

thing to do with but in an improper ſenſe, to raiſe a ſtrong and ſteady, but uniform, indignation againſt evil. But even this a ſpeaker from the pulpit ſhould endeavour to convert into compaſſion for the folly and wretchedneſs of the guilty perſon. Pity ſeems to be the ſingle object in tragedy.

One talent of great moment towards raiſing the paſſions, is a ſtrong and clear imagination, and a deſcriptive manner of ſpeaking, to paint ſcenes and objects ſtrongly, and ſet them before the eyes of the hearers;—to ſelect ſuch circumſtances as will have the moſt powerful effect, and to dwell only upon theſe. We have not any where in Engliſh a finer example of the pathetic, and the choice and uſe of circumſtances, than the ſpeech which Shakeſpeare has made for Anthony, in the tragedy of Cæſar. It appears from the hiſtory, that Anthony did ſucceſsfully raiſe the fury of the Romans againſt thoſe who killed Cæſar; and, I think, he could hardly ſelect better images and language, than thoſe we have in the Engliſh poet:

"But yeſterday," &c.

1. To raiſing the paſſions with ſucceſs, much penetration and knowledge of human nature is neceſſary. Without this, every attempt muſt fail. In confirmation of this remark, though there are perſons much better fitted for it by nature than others, the moſt powerful in raiſing the paſſions have generally been thoſe who have had much acquaintance with mankind, and practice in life. Recluſe

ſtudents, and profeſſed ſcholars, will be able to diſcover truth, and to defend it, or to write moral precepts with clearneſs and beauty; but they are ſeldom equal for the tender and pathetic, to thoſe who have been much in what is called the *world* —by a well known uſe of that word, though almoſt peculiar to the Engliſh language. There is perhaps a double reaſon for perſons well verſed in the ways of men, having the greateſt power upon the paſſions. They not only know others better, and therefore how to touch them, but their own hearts, it is likely, have been agitated by more paſſions than thoſe whoſe lives have been more calm and even.

2. To raiſing the paſſions of others, it is neceſſary the orator or writer ſhould feel what he would communicate. This is ſo well known a rule, that I am almoſt aſhamed to mention it, or the trite quotation commonly attending it, *Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi.* You may as well kindle a fire with a piece of ice, as raiſe the paſſions of others while your own are ſtill. I ſuppoſe the reaſon of this, if we would critically examine it, is, that we believe the thing to be a pretence or impoſition altogether, if we ſee that he who wiſhes us to be moved by what he ſays, is notwithſtanding himſelf unmoved. The offence is even ſomething more than barely negative in ſome caſes. If we hear a man ſpeaking with coldneſs and indifference, where we think he ought to be deeply intereſted, we feel a certain diſappointment, and are filled with diſpleaſure; as if an advocate was pleading for a perſon accuſed of a capital crime, if

he ſhould appear with an air of indifference and unconcern, let his language and compoſition be what they will, it is always faulty and diſguſting; or, let a miniſter, when ſpeaking on the weighty ſubject of eternity, ſhow any levity in his carriage, it muſt weaken the force of the moſt moving truths; whereas, when we ſee the ſpeaker wholly engaged and poſſeſſed by his ſubject, feeling every paſſion he wiſhes to communicate, we give ourſelves up to him without reſerve, and are formed after his very temper, by receiving his inſtructions.

3. It is a direction nearly allied to this, that a man ſhould never attempt to raiſe the paſſions of his hearers higher than the ſubject plainly merits it. There are ſome ſubjects that, if we are able, are of ſuch moment, as to deſerve all the zeal and fire we can poſſibly beſtow on them, of which we may ſay, as Dr Young, "Paſſion is reaſon, tranſport temper here."—A lawyer for his client, whom he believes to be innocent; a patriot for his country, which he believes to be in danger: but, above all, a miniſter, for his people's everlaſting welfare, may ſpeak with as much force and vehemence as his temper and frame are ſuſceptible of; but in many other caſes, it is eaſy to tranſcend the bounds of reaſon, and make the language more lofty than the theme. We meet often, for example, with raiſed and laboured encomiums in dedications, a ſpecies of writing the moſt difficult to ſucceed in of any almoſt that can be named. The perſon honoured by this mark of the author's eſteem, is very ſel-

dom placed in the ſame rank by the public that he is by him. Beſides, though he were really meritorious, it ſeldom comes fairly up to the repreſentation: the truth is, to correſpond to the picture, he ſhould be almoſt the only meritorious perſon of the age or place in which he lives. Now, conſidering how cold a compliment this is to all the reſt, and particularly to thoſe who read it, there is little wonder that ſuch rhapſodies are treated with contempt. I have often thought the ſame thing of funeral panegyrics: when a man dies, whoſe name perhaps was hardly ever heard of before, we have a ſplendid character of him in the newſpapers, where the prejudice of relations, or the partiality of friendſhip, do juſt what they pleaſe. I remember, at the death of a perſon whom I ſhall not name, who was, it muſt be confeſſed, not inconſiderable for literature, but otherwiſe had not much that was either great or amiable about him, an elegiac poem was publiſhed, which began with this line, "Whence this aſtoniſhment in every face?" Had the thing been really true, and the public had been deeply affected with the loſs, the introduction had not been inelegant; but on ſuch a pompous expreſſion, when the reader recollected that he had ſeen no marks of public aſtoniſhment, it could not but tempt him to ſmile.

4. Another important remark to be made here, is, that a writer or ſpeaker, in attempting the pathetic, ſhould conſider his own natural turn, as well as the ſubject. Some are naturally of a leſs warm and glowing imagination, and in themſelves ſuſceptible of a leſs degree of paſſion than others;

theſe ſhould take care not to attempt a flight that they cannot finiſh, or enter upon ſuch ſentiments and language, as they will probably ſink, as it were, and fall away from in a little time. Such ſhould ſubſtitute gravity and ſolemnity, inſtead of fire, and only attempt to make their diſcourſe clear to the underſtanding, and convincing to the conſcience: perhaps, this is in general the beſt way in ſerious diſcourſes, and moral writings; becauſe, though it may not produce ſo ſtrong or ardent emotions, it often leaves a deeper and more laſting impreſſion.

Of Figurative Speech.

It is common to meet with this expreſſion, "The tropes and figures of rhetoric." This expreſſion is not juſt: the terms are neither ſynonymous, nor are they two diſtinct ſpecies of one genus. Figure is the general expreſſion; a trope is one of the figures, but there are many more. Every trope is a figure, but every figure is not a trope: perhaps we may ſay, a trope is an expedient to render language more extenſive and copious, and may be uſed in tranquillity; whereas, a figure is the effect of paſſion. This diſtinction, however, cannot be univerſally maintained; for tropes are oftentimes the effect of paſſion, as well as of the narrowneſs of language. Figures may be defined, any departure from the plain direct manner of expreſſion, and particularly ſuch as are ſuggeſted by the paſſions, and differ, on that account, from the way in

which we would have ſpoken, if in a ſtate of perfect tranquillity. Tropes are a ſpecies of figures, in which a word or phraſe is made uſe of in a ſenſe different from its firſt and proper ſignification; as, "The Lord is a ſun and ſhield;" where the words "ſun and ſhield" are uſed tropically. There are ſeveral different tropes.

1. Metonymy.—This is a very general kind of trope, comprehending under it ſeveral others; the meaning of it is a change of name, or one name for another. This may be done ſeveral ways: 1. The cauſe may be put for the effect, or the effect for the cauſe; as when we ſay, cold death, becauſe death makes cold: Old age kept him behind, that is, made him weak, &c. 2. The author for his works. 3. The thing containing, for the thing contained; as, drink the cup, that is, the liquor in the cup. 4. A part is taken for the whole, or the whole for a part; as, my roof, for my houſe; my houſe is on fire, when only a ſmall part of it burns. This is called Synecdoche. 5. A general term for a particular; a hundred reaſons may be given, that is, many reaſons may be given. 6. A proper name for a characteriſtic name; as, he is a Nero, for a cruel man; or, a Sardanapalus, for a voluptuous monarch. All theſe and many more are metonymies.

2. Metaphor.—This might as well have been the general term, as trope; for it alſo ſignifies change of expreſſion: it is a ſpecies of trope, by which any term is applied in a ſenſe different from its natural import; as when we ſay, a tide of pleaſure, to expreſs the impetuoſity of pleaſure; when

the heavens are said to be over our heads as brass, and the earth under our feet as iron.

3. Allegory.—This is continuing the metaphor, and extending it by a variety of expressions of the same kind; as, "The Lord is my shepherd, he maketh me to lie down in green pastures—he maketh me to feed beside the still waters."

4. Irony.—In using words directly contrary to their meaning; as, "No doubt you are the people, and wisdom shall die with you."

5. Hyperbole.—When things are carried beyond their truth, to express our sentiments more strongly; as, "Swifter than the wind, whiter than snow."

6. Catachresis—is the first trope of all, when words are used in an opposite, and sometimes in an impossible sense; as, when chains and shackles are called bracelets of iron.

Figures.

FIGURES cannot be fully enumerated, because they are without number; and each figure may be used several different ways. 1. Exclamation.—This is nothing else than a way of expressing admiration, or lamentation; as, Oh! Alas! Heavens! &c. used by persons much moved. 2. Doubt.—This is frequently the expression of a doubtful mind, in suspence what to do. This is described by Virgil, in the distress of Dido, when Eneas left her: "Shall I go to the neighbouring kings, whom I have so often despised?" Sometimes it

is a beautiful figure, and obliges perſons to take notice of it, and ſometimes of what they would otherwiſe have omitted: "Who is this that cometh from Edom?" 3. Epanorthoſis.—This is a correction or improvement of what has been ſaid: "You are not truly the ſon of a goddeſs, nay, you muſt have ſucked a tygreſs." 4. Pleonaſm.—This is a redundancy; as, "I have heard it with my ears, he ſpake it with his mouth." 5. Similitude.—This is comparing one thing with another; as, "He ſhall be like a tree planted," &c. 6. Diſtribution.—This conſiſts of a particular enumeration of ſeveral correſpondent images: "Their throat is an open ſepulchre, their tongues have uſed deceit." 7. Proſopopeia.—When perſons dead or abſent, or different from the ſpeaker, are brought in ſpeaking; as, Cicero ſuppoſes his country or Italy, and all the public ſaying to him, "Marcus Tullius, what are you doing?" 8. Apoſtrophe.—When perſons dead or abſent, or any inanimate things, are ſpoken to; as Cicero ſays, "*O! vos;*" or, "Hear, O heavens! and give ear, O earth!" 9. Communication.—When a ſpeaker calls upon his hearers to ſay what advice they would give, or what they would have done different from what he, or the perſon whom he defends, has done: What could you have done in this caſe? What ſhould I do now? 10. Interrogation.—Putting a thing home to the readers; as, "What fruit had you then in thoſe things of which you are now aſhamed?"

LECTURE VIII.

I HAVE now gone through the account given in the ſyſtems, of the tropes and figures of rhetoric, by which you will ſufficiently underſtand the meaning of both. The proper applications, however, of them, is a matter of much greater moment, and of much greater difficulty. I will make a few remarks before I cloſe the ſubject, in addition to what hath been already interſperſed through the different parts of it.

1. Perhaps it will not be improper to conſider what is the purpoſe intended by figures. I have introduced them here as a means of giving ſublimity to a diſcourſe; but may there not be ſome little analyſis and reſolution of that purpoſe? may we not inquire, what are the particular effects of figures? Are the effects of figures in general, and of all figures, the ſame? It is certain, that figurative ſpeech is very powerful in raiſing the paſſions. And probably, different figures are proper to expreſs or excite different paſſions; admiration, deſire, pity, hatred, rage, or diſdain. This appears from the explication of figures formerly given. But, beſides this, we may obſerve, that there are ſome effects of figures that ſeem to be wholly unconnected with paſſion; of theſe I ſhall mention three, ornament, explication, conviction. Sometimes figure is made uſe of merely for ornament. Of this Rollin gives us an example, in which an author ſays, "The king, to give an eternal mark of the eſteem

and friendſhip with which he honoured a great general, gave an illuſtrious place to his glorious aſhes, amidſt thoſe maſters of the earth, who preſerve on the magnificence of their tombs an image of the luſtre of their thrones." Under this head may be reckoned all the examples of the uſe of figures, to raiſe things that are mean and low in themſelves, to ſome degree of dignity, by the phraſeology, or to give a greater dignity to any thing than the ſimple idea, or the proper name would convey, as if one ſhould ſay, Looking round the ſcene, and obſerving the bounteous gifts of Providence for the ſupport of innumerable creatures, inſtead of, The graſs and corn every where growing in abundance. Perhaps, alſo, under the ſame head may be reckoned, the cloathing in other terms, any thing that might be ſuppoſed diſagreeable, or diſguſting; as when Cicero confeſſes, that the ſervants of Milo killed Clodius, he does not ſay, *interſecerunt*, but he ſays, "They did that which every good man would wiſh his ſervants to do in like circumſtances." I ſhall only obſerve, that the greateſt delicacy and judgement imaginable is neceſſary in the uſe of figures with this view, becauſe they are very apt to degenerate into bombaſt. Young perſons, in their firſt compoſitions, and eſpecially when they have a good deal of ancient literature freſh in their heads, are very apt to be faulty in this particular. A common word, or ſentiment, which any body might uſe, and every body would underſtand, they think mean and below them, and therefore they have recourſe to unneceſſary figures, and hard or learned phraſes. In-

ſtead of walking about the fields, they perambulate them; they do not diſcover a thing, but recogniſe it. Johnſon, the author of the Rambler, is the moſt faulty this way of any writer of character. A little play of wit, or a few ſtrokes of raillery, he calls *a reciprocation of ſmartness*.

Another uſe of figures is, for explication, to make a thing more clearly conceived. This, in general, may be ſaid to be the uſe of the ſimilitude; only, I think, when figures are uſed for illuſtration, it is as much to aſſiſt the imagination as the judgement, and to make the impreſſion, which was before real and juſt, very ſtrong. For example, when Solomon ſays, "Let a bear robbed of her whelps meet a man, rather than a fool in his folly." "If you bray a fool in a mortar, he will return to his folly." "The fooliſh man walketh by the way, and he ſaith to every one that he is a fool."

A third uſe of figures may be ſaid, although improperly, to be for conviction, or to make us more readily or more fully yield to the truth; as when, to ſupport what we have ſaid, that perſons of ſound judgement are reſerved in ſpeech, we add, deep waters move without noiſe—or that men in eminent ſtations are expoſed to obſervation and cenſure. "A city that is ſet on a hill cannot be hid." In all ſuch caſes, therefore, it is certain, that a ſimilitude is not an argument, yet the analogy of nature ſeems to carry in it a good deal of evidence, and adds to the impreſſion made upon the mind.

2. A ſecond remark is, that figures of every

kind ſhould come naturally, and never be ſought for. The deſign of explaining the ſeveral kinds of figures, is not to teach you to make them, but to correct them. Arguments and illuſtrations we muſt endeavour to invent, but figures never. If they do not flow ſpontaneous, they are always forced. If a man, having proceeded too far in a ſubject, bethinks himſelf, that he will here introduce a ſimilitude, or an allegory, or a proſopopeia, &c. he will either miſs of it altogether, or he will produce ſomething vaſtly more jejune and inſipid, than it is poſſible for any man to make without figures. It puts me in mind of the ridiculous chaſms that ſome perſons bring themſelves to in converſation, when they offer to bring a ſimilitude which has not yet occurred to them. They will ſay, "He raged, and raved, and roared, juſt like—I don't know what." Figures ſhould be the native expreſſion of paſſions or conceptions already felt, as they are the means of raiſing paſſions in thoſe to whomy ou ſpeak. They ſhould, therefore, be poſterior in point of time to the feelings of the ſpeaker, although prior to thoſe of the hearers. The great purpoſe, therefore, of criticiſm on this part of the ſubject, is to prune the luxuriancies of nature, and ſee that the figures be juſt and natural.

3. I have already, in ſpeaking upon the tropes, had occaſion to give ſome rules as to the uſe of them, particularly as to the propriety and conſiſtency of them. But there are ſome things to be obſerved further for explaining them. There are two characters frequently given to tropes, eſpecially to metaphors, which deſerve to be conſidered. The one

is ſtrength, the other is boldneſs. Theſe are by no means the ſame. That is a ſtrong metaphor, or image, that gives us a very lively impreſſion of the thing repreſented. As that of the wiſe man, "A ſtone is heavy, and the ſand is weighty, but a fool's wrath is heavier than both." A bold image, or metaphor, is that which, upon the whole, is juſt and ſtrong, but is conſiderably removed from common obſervation, and would not eaſily or readily have occurred to another. It is alſo called a bold image, when the reſemblance is but in one ſingle point. There is not any where to be ſeen a collection of bolder images, than in the book of Job, particularly in the deſcription of the war-horſe, among which in particular the following ſeems to excel: "Haſt thou cloathed his neck with thunder?" To liken the mane of a horſe to thunder, would not have occurred to every one; neither in idea does the reſemblance hold but in one particular, that the flowing and waving of the mane is like the ſheets and forked flakes of lightning.

LECTURE IX.

I NOW come to conſider the ſimple manner of writing. If I could explain this fully, ſo as to make every one clearly to underſtand it, and at the ſame time incline you to admire and ſtudy it, I ſhould think a very difficult and important point

was gained. It is exceedingly difficult to bring young perſons, eſpecially, to a taſte for the ſimple way of writing. They are apt to think it of little moment, not ſo much the object of ambition, as an exerciſe of ſelf-denial, to ſay a thing plainly, when they might have ſaid it nobly. I would obſerve, therefore, in the very beginning, that it is a miſtake to conſider ſimplicity and ſublimity as univerſally oppoſite; for, on the contrary, there is not only a great excellence in ſome performances, which we may call wholly of the ſimple kind, ſuch as a ſtory told, or an epiſtle written, with all the beauty of ſimplicity, but, in the moſt ſublime and animated compoſitions, ſome of the greateſt ſentiments derive their beauty from being cloathed in ſimple language. Simplicity is even as neceſſary to ſome parts of an oration, as it is to the whole of ſome kinds of compoſition. Let the ſubject be ever ſo great and intereſting, it is prudent, decent, neceſſary, to begin the diſcourſe in a cool and diſpaſſionate manner. That man who ſhould begin an oration with the ſame boldneſs of figure, and the ſame high pitch of voice that would be proper towards the cloſe of it, would commit one of the greateſt faults againſt propriety, and, I think, would wholly prevent its effect upon the hearers.

But how ſhall we explain the ſimple manner of writing? It is, ſay many authors, that which is likeſt to and leaſt removed from the language of common life. It muſt be, therefore, eaſy and obvious, few or no figures in the expreſſion, nothing obſcure in the ſentiments, or involved in the method. Long ſentences are contrary to it, words

either difficult or uncommon are inconſiſtent with it. Cicero and Horace have both ſaid, and all critics have ſaid after them, it is that which, when men hear, they think that they themſelves could have ſaid the ſame, or that it is juſt a kind of expreſſion of their own thoughts. They generally remark further, that it is what ſeems to be eaſy, but yet is not; as Horace ſays, *Ut sibi quivis speret idem*, &c. We may further obſerve, that what is truly ſimple, always carries in it the idea of being eaſy in its production, as well as in imitation; and indeed the one of theſe ſeems neceſſarily to ſuppoſe the other. Whatever ſeems to be the effect of ſtudy and much invention, cannot be ſimple. It is finely exemplified in the introduction of Anthony's ſpeech in Shakeſpeare: "I am no orator, as Brutus is," &c. Rollin has given us an admirable example of a ſtory told with a beautiful ſimplicity, from Cicero's Offices. There is an example alſo in Livy's account of the battle of the Horatii and Curiatii, only with a little more force of expreſſion, as the importance and ſolemnity of the ſubject ſeemed to require it. But it requires a very maſterly knowledge of the Latin language, to perceive the beauties fully, that are pointed at by Rollin in the firſt inſtance, or might eaſily be mentioned in the laſt. There is no author in our language who excels more in ſimplicity than Addiſon. The Spectator, in general, indeed, but eſpecially the papers written by him, excel in this quality. Eaſe and elegance are happily joined in them, and nature itſelf, as it were, ſeems to ſpeak in them.

If ſome of the later periodical writers have equalled, or even excelled them, in force or elegance, not one has ever come up to them in ſimplicity.

The ſubjects, or the ſpecies of writing in which ſimplicity chiefly ſhines, are, narration, dialogue, epiſtolary writing, eſſay writing, and all the lighter ſpecies of poetry, as odes, ſongs, epigrams, elegies, and ſuch like. The ancients were remarkable for a love and admiration of ſimplicity, and ſome of them remain to us as eminent examples of its excellence. Xenophon, in his inſtitution of Cyrus, is particularly remarkable for a ſweet and dignified ſimplicity. He uſes neither language nor ideas that are difficult and far-fetched. In the ſmaller compoſitions of the ancients, as odes, epigrams, &c. they were at prodigious pains to poliſh them, and make them quite eaſy and natural. They placed their great glory in beſtowing much art, and at the ſame time making it to appear quite eaſy and artleſs, according to the ſaying now grown into a proverb, *Artis est celare artem.* The beauty of ſimplicity may not appear at firſt ſight, or be at all perceived by perſons of a vitiated taſte; but all perſons of good judgement immediately, and the bulk of mankind in time, are charmed with what is quite eaſy, and yet truly accurate and elegant.

It ought to be carefully obſerved, that ſimplicity is quite a different thing from lowneſs and meanneſs, and the great art of a writer is to preſerve the one, without degenerating into the other. It is the eaſieſt thing in the world to ſpeak or write vulgariſms, but a perſon of true taſte will carefully avoid every thing

of that kind. For example, one who would write ſimply, and as near the language of plain people in ordinary diſcourſe as poſſible, would yet avoid every abſurdity or barbariſm that obtains a place in common converſation, as to ſay, "This here table, and that there candle." It is alſo quite contrary to ſimplicity, to adopt the quaint expreſſions, or cant phraſes, that are the children of faſhion, and obtain for a little, or in ſome particular places, and not in others. The Spectator attacked, with great ſpirit and propriety, ſeveral of thoſe that were introduced into converſation and writing in his time, ſuch as *mob*, *rep*, *pos*, *bite*, *bamboozle*, and ſeveral others. Moſt of them he fairly defeated, but one or two of them got the better of him, and are now freely introduced into the language, ſuch as *mob*. Johnſon alſo has put *bamboozle* in his Dictionary, which he calls, indeed, a low word. Arbuthnot is his authority, but it was plainly uſed by him in the way of ridicule; and therefore it ſhould either not have been in the Dictionary at all, or ſuch an authority ſhould not have been given for it.

It is exceedingly difficult, and requires an excellent judgement, to be able to deſcend to great ſimplicity, and yet to keep out every low expreſſion or idea. I do not think it is eaſy to be a thorough judge of pure diction in any language but our own, and not even in that, without a good deal of the knowledge of human life, and a thorough acquaintance with the beſt authors. Writers and ſpeakers of little judgement are apt at times to go into extremes, to ſwell too much on the one hand, and

to fall into what is vulgar and offenſive on the other.

When ſpeaking on ſimplicity, I obſerve, that there is a ſimplicity in the taſte and compoſition of a whole diſcourſe, different from ſimplicity of ſentiment and language in the particular parts. This will incline a man to avoid all unneceſſary ornament, particularly the ornaments of faſhion, and the peculiar dreſs or mode of the times. We ſay in architecture, that a building is in a ſimple ſtyle, when it has not a great multiplicity of ornaments, or is not loaded with beauties, ſo to ſpeak. It is very remarkable, that books written in the ſame age will differ very much one from another in this reſpect; and thoſe which have leaſt of the ornaments then in vogue, continue in reputation when the others are grown ridiculous. I will give you an inſtance of this—A ſmall religious treatiſe, Scougal's Life of God in the Soul of Man, which is written with great ſimplicity, and yet dignity, and may now be read with pleaſure and approbation by perſons of the beſt taſte; while moſt of the other writers of his age and country are ridiculous, or hardly intelligible.

Perhaps it may help us to form right notions of ſimplicity, to conſider what are the oppoſites, or the greateſt enemies to it.

1. One is, abſtraction of ſentiment, or too great refinement of any kind; of this the greateſt example in an author of merit, is the writer of the Rambler; almoſt every page of his writings furniſhes us with inſtances of departure from ſimpli-

city, partly in the ſentiment, and partly in the diction.

2. Another is, allegory, and eſpecially far-fetched alluſions, as in the example which the Spectator gives of a poet, who ſpeaks of Bacchus' caſt coat; this is little better than a riddle; and even thoſe who diſcern it, will take a little time to reflect, that according to the heathen mythology, Bacchus was the god of wine; wine is kept in caſks, and therefore an empty caſk, or at leaſt an uſeleſs one, may be called Bacchus' caſt coat.

3. A third enemy to ſimplicity is, an affectation of learning. This ſpoils ſimplicity many ways; it introduces terms of art, which cannot be underſtood but by thoſe who are adepts in a particular branch. Such perſons have been long expoſed to ridicule, under the name of pedants. Sometimes, indeed, the word pedantry has been in a manner confined to thoſe addicted to claſſic literature, and who intermix every thing they ſay with ſcraps taken from the learned languages; but this is quite improper, for lawyers, phyſicians, dunces, or ſchoolmaſters, are equally ridiculous, when they fill their diſcourſe with words drawn from their particular art.

4. The only other enemy to ſimplicity I ſhall mention is, an ambition to excel. This, perhaps, ſhould not have been ſo much divided from the reſt, as made the great principle from which the reſt proceed. Nothing more certainly renders a man ridiculous, than an over forwardneſs to diſplay his excellence; he is not content with plain things, and particularly with ſuch things as every body

might ſay, becauſe theſe would not diſtinguiſh him.

On the whole, as I obſerved on ſublimity, that one of the beſt and ſureſt ways to attain it was to think nobly; ſo the beſt way to write ſimply, is to think ſimply, to avoid all affectation, to attempt to form your manner of thinking to a noble ſelf-denial. A man little ſolicitous about what people think of him, or rather having his attention fixed upon quite another purpoſe, viz. giving information, or producing conviction, will only attain to a ſimple manner of writing; and indeed he will write beſt in all reſpects.

As to the mixed ſtyle or manner of writing, as it conſiſts of the mixture of the other two, I ſhall not need to ſay any thing by way of explaining it, but only make a remark or two, of the uſe and application of it. The mixed kind of writing chiefly conſiſts of hiſtory and controverſy. The great quality neceſſary to execute it properly, is ſoundneſs of judgement, to determine on what ſubjects, and on what parts of ſubjects, it is proper to write with ſimplicity, and on what with force; one would wiſh not to go beyond, but juſt to gratify a reader's inclination in this reſpect.

There are many caſes in hiſtory, where the greateſt ſublimity both of ſentiments and language is both admitted and required; particularly all the beauty and all the force that can be admitted into deſcription, is of importance in hiſtory. Thoſe who will read, in Robertſon's Hiſtory of Scotland, the account he gives of the aſtoniſhment, terror, and indignation, that appeared in the Engliſh

court, when news was brought of the maſſacre at Paris, or, in the ſame author, the account of the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, will ſee the force and ſublimity of deſcription. The difference between ſublimity of ſentiment and language in an hiſtorian, and in a poet or orator, ſeems to me to reſemble the difference between the fire of a managed horſe, when reined in by the rider, and marching with a firm and ſtately pace, and the ſame when ſtraining every nerve in the eager contention in a race. We ſhall enter a little into this matter, if we conſider the different images that are made uſe of in the different arts. In poetry we ſay, a beautiful, ſtriking, ſhining metaphor, fervent, glowing imagery. In oratory we ſay, warm, animated, irreſiſtible. In hiſtory we uſe the words force, nobleneſs, dignity, and majeſty, particularly thoſe laſt attributes of dignity and majeſty. Herodotus has been often called the father of hiſtory, though, I confeſs, I apprehend he has obtained this title chiefly becauſe of his antiquity, and his being the firſt that ever gave any thing of a regular hiſtory; but though he has ſome things auguſt enough, yet he has admitted ſo many incredible ſtories, and even peculiarities into his work, as very much detracts from its dignity; we muſt, indeed, impute a good deal of this to the age in which he lived, and the impoſſibility of their diſtinguiſhing truth from falſehood, ſo well as thoſe of later ages, who have had the advantage of all paſt experience.

Hiſtory, indeed, is not only of the mixed kind of writing, ſo as to admit ſometimes ſublimity, and

ſometimes ſimplicity, but thoſe ſtyles ſhould be really blended together, in every part of it. The moſt noble and animated ſentiments, characters, or deſcriptions in hiſtory, ſhould yet be cloathed with ſuch a gravity and decency of garb, ſo to ſpeak, as to give an air of ſimplicity to the whole. It is an advantage to a poem, that the author ſays but little in his own perſon, but makes the characters ſpeak and ſay all; and in an orator it is an advantage, when he can carry the hearers off from himſelf to his ſubject; but above all, an hiſtorian ſhould not ſo much as wiſh to ſhine, but, with the coolneſs of a philoſopher, and the impartiality of a judge, ſhould ſet the actors and tranſactions before the reader.

Controverſy is another ſubject of the mixed kind, which ought to be in general written with ſimplicity, yet will ſometimes admit of the ornaments of eloquence: of this I ſhall ſpeak a little more afterwards, and therefore ſhall now only add, that controverſy differs from hiſtory, in that it ſometimes admits of paſſion and warmth, when there ſeems to be a ſufficient foundation laid for it; a controverſial writer will endeavour to intereſt his reader, and excite either contempt or indignation againſt his adverſary.

After having given you this view of the three great kinds of writing, or, as they are ſometimes called, different ſtyles, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that there are diſtinctions of ſtyle, which it is proper that an able writer ſhould obſerve, that do not range themſelves, at leaſt not fully and properly, under theſe three heads, but may be ſaid to run through all the kinds of eloquence.

Many eminent authors have ſaid, that the climates have ſome effect upon the ſtyle; that in the warmer countries the ſtyle is more animated, and the figures more bold and glowing: and nothing is more common, than to aſcribe a peculiarity of ſtyle, and that particularly elevated and full of metaphor, to the orientals, as if it belonged to that part of the globe. But if I am not miſtaken, both this and other things, ſuch as courage, that have been attributed to the climate, belong either not to the climate at all, or in a ſmall meaſure, and are rather owing to the ſtate of ſociety and manners of men. We have before had occaſion to ſee that all narrow languages are figured. In a ſtate where there are few or no abſtract ideas, how ſhould there be abſtract terms? If any body will read the poem of Fingal, which appears to have been compoſed on the bleak hills of the north of Scotland, he will find as many figures, and as bold, as in any thing compoſed in Arabia or Perſia. The ſtate of ſociety, then, is what gives a particular colour to the ſtyle; and by this the ſtyles of different ages and countries are diſtinguiſhed. That the climate does but little, may be ſeen juſt by comparing ancient and modern Italy; what difference between the ſtrength and force of the ancient Latin tongue, and the preſent Italian language, in the expreſſion of ſentiments! It muſt therefore vary with ſentiments and manners; and what difference between the ſtern and inflexible bravery of a free ancient Roman, and the effeminate ſoftneſs of a modern Italian! yet they breathed the ſame air, and were nurſed by the ſame ſoil. I will juſt go a little off from the ſub-

ject to say, that a very late author (Lord Kames) seems to think that the courage of mankind is governed by the climates; he says, that the northern climates produce hardened constitutions, and bold and firm minds; that invasions have been made from north to south: but, I apprehend, he may be mistaken here, both in his facts and the reasons of them.—Invasions have not always been made from north to south: for the Roman arms penetrated very far to the north of their territory; the first great conquerors of the east in Egypt and Babylon carried their arms to the north: and where the conquest ran the other way, it was owing to other circumstances; and Dean Swift says, much nearer the truth, it was from poverty to plenty.

The design of this digression is to show, that not only the circumstances that appear in a language, but several others that have also been attributed to climate, owe very little to it, but to the state of mankind and the progress of society. The maxim of that great modern writer, Montesquieu, which he applies to population, is also true of language—that natural causes are not by far so powerful as moral causes. Allowing, therefore, as some have affirmed, that the northern climates may give a roughness and harshness to the accent and pronunciation, I believe it is all that we can expect from climate; the distinction of styles and composition must come from another original.

LECTURE X.

HAVING in a great meaſure rejected the ſuppoſition of the ſtyle in writing being affected by the climate, and ſhown that it rather takes its colour from the ſtate of ſociety, and the ſentiments and manners of men, it follows, that all the great diſtinctions that take place in manners will have a correſpondent effect upon language ſpoken or written. When the manners of a people are little poliſhed, there is a plainneſs or a roughneſs in the ſtyle. Abſolute monarchies, and the obſequious ſubjection introduced at the courts of princes, occaſions a pompous ſwelling and compliment to be in requeſt, different from the boldneſs and ſometimes ferocity of republican ſtates.

Seneca, in remarking upon the Roman language, ſays, *Genus dicendi mutatur per publicos mores*, &c. This he exemplifies in the Roman language, which was ſhort and dry in the earlieſt ages, afterwards became elegant and ornate, and at laſt looſe and diffuſe.

The ſtyle of an age alſo is ſometimes formed by ſome one or more eminent perſons, who, having obtained reputation, every thing peculiar to them is admired and copied, and carried much into exceſs. Seneca has remarked this alſo, that commonly one author obtains the palm, and becomes the model, and all copy him. *Hæc vitia unus aliquis inducit.* And he gives a very good example of it, of which we may now judge in Salluſt. He alſo very pro-

perly obſerves, that all the faults that ariſe from imitation become worſe in the imitator than in the example: thus reproving the fault juſt now mentioned in our anceſtors.

It is remarkable that Seneca himſelf was another example of the ſame thing. His manner of writing, which is peculiar, came to be the ſtandard of the age. His manner has been called by critics, point and antitheſis;—a ſhort ſentence containing a ſtrong ſentiment, or a beautiful one, as it were, like a maxim by itſelf. For an example or two of this: To expreſs the deſtruction of Lyons, he ſays, *Lugdunum quod oſtendebatur*, &c. That Lyons, which was formerly ſhown, is now fought. And on the ſame ſubject,—*Una nox*, &c. There was but one night between a great city and none. *Quid! eſt eques Romanus*, &c. What! is a Roman knight a freed man or ſlave? names generated by ambition or oppreſſion.

The fault of this ſententious manner of writing does not lie in the particulars being blameable, but in the repetition and uniformity becoming tedious; —when every paragraph is ſtuffed with ſentences, and bright ſayings, generally having the ſame tune, it wearies the ear. The moſt remarkable book in the Engliſh language for putting continual ſmartneſs, ſentence, and antitheſis, for elegance, is the Gentleman Inſtructed. I ſhall read you one paragraph—"The misfortune of one breathes vigour into the others: They carry on manfully the attack. Their heads run round with the glaſſes. Their tongues ride poſt. Their wits are jaded. Their reaſon is diſtanced. Brutes could not talk better,

nor men worſe. Like ſkippers in a ſtorm, they rather hallooed than ſpoke. Scarce one heard his neighbour, and not one underſtood him; ſo that noiſe ſtood for ſenſe, and every one paſſed for a virtuoſo, becauſe all played the fool to extravagance."

I ſhall not enlarge much farther upon the difference of ſtyle ariſing from the character of an age, as in the ages before the Reformation, called the times of chivalry, when military proweſs was the great thing in requeſt—their gallantry and heroiſm were to be ſeen in every writer.—At the time of the Reformation and the revival of learning, their citations of the ancient writers and alluſions to the claſſic phraſes diſtinguiſhed every author. In the age of the civil wars in England, of which religion was ſo much the cauſe, alluſions to ſingular expreſſions and theological opinions, are every where to be met with, of which the great Milton is an example.

But there is another diſtinction of ſtyles, which is chiefly perſonal, and will diſtinguiſh one author from another, in the ſame age, and perhaps of the ſame or nearly the ſame abilities. There are ſeveral different epithets given to ſtyle in our language, which I ſhall mention in a certain order, which I ſuppoſe will contribute ſomething to explain the meaning of them. We call a ſtyle, ſimple or plain, ſmooth, ſweet, conciſe, elegant, ornate, juſt, nervous, chaſte, ſevere. Theſe are all different epithets which will each of them convey to a nice critical ear ſomething different; though I confeſs it is not eaſy to define them clearly, or explain them fully. Plainneſs and ſimplicity is, when the author does

not ſeem to have had any thing in view, but to be underſtood, and that by perſons of the weakeſt underſtanding. That ought to be in view in many writings, and indeed perſpicuity will be found to be a character of many ſtyles, when there are other great qualities; but we call that plain and ſimple, when there is no diſcovery of literature, and no attempt at the pathetic. Scougal's Life of God in the Soul of Man, and Dr Evans's Sermons, are admirable patterns of this manner. 2. I would call that a ſmooth ſtyle, when the utmoſt care had been taken to meaſure the periods, and to conſult the ear on the ſtructure of the ſentence; for this I know no author more remarkable than Hervey, in his Meditations. 3. Sweetneſs ſeems to me to differ from the former only in that the ſubjects and the images are generally of a pleaſing or ſoothing nature, ſuch as may particularly be ſeen in Mrs Rowe's Letters; perhaps alſo in a more modern compoſition by a lady, Lady Mary W. Montague's Letters. And indeed when female authors have excelled, they generally do excel in ſweetneſs. 4. The next is conciſeneſs. This is eaſily underſtood; it is juſt as much brevity as is conſiſtent with perſpicuity. It is a beauty in every writing, when other qualities are not hurt by it. But it is peculiarly proper for critical or ſcientific writing, becauſe there we do not ſo much expect or want to know the author's ſentiments, but as ſoon as poſſible to learn the facts, to underſtand them fully, and range them methodically. There are many more authors who excel in this reſpect in the French, than in the Engliſh language. Not the ſcientific writings, but even

political and moral writings, are drawn up by them with great conciſeneſs. There cannot be greater conciſeneſs than in Monteſquieu's Spirit of Laws. Brown's Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, ſeems to be an imitation of that author in his manner. In eſſay-writing, David Hume ſeems to have as happily joined conciſeneſs and perſpicuity as moſt of our Engliſh writers. Some pious writers have been as ſucceſsful this way as moſt of our nation; ſuch as Maſon's Sayings, and Maſon on Self-knowledge. 5. A ſtyle is called elegant, when it is formed by the principles of true taſte, and much pains is taken to uſe the beſt and pureſt expreſſions that the language will afford. It is very common to join together eaſe and elegance. The great patterns we have of theſe are Addiſon and Tillotſon. Seed's Sermons, too, may be mentioned here, as very much excelling in both theſe qualities; ſo alſo does David Hume. The other Hume, author of the Elements of Criticiſm, though a very good judge of writing, ſeems in point of ſtyle to be very defective himſelf. If he has any talent, it is conciſeneſs and plainneſs; but he is at the ſame time often abrupt and harſh. 6. An ornate ſtyle may be ſaid to be ſomething more than elegant, introducing into a compoſition all the beauties of language, where they can find a place with propriety. I mentioned before, that Hervey's ſtyle, in his Meditations, was exceedingly ſmooth and flowing. I may add, it has alſo the qualities of elegant and ornate. That ſtyle is elegant which is correct and free from faults; that is ornate which abounds with beauties. 7. The next character

of ſtyle is, that it is juſt. By this I underſtand, a particular attention to the truth and meaning of every expreſſion. Juſtneſs is frequently joined with, or otherwiſe expreſſed by preciſion; ſo that, (if I may ſpeak ſo), together with a taſte which will reliſh and produce an elegance of language, there is a judgement and accuracy which will abide the ſcrutiny of philoſophy and criticiſm. Many well-turned periods and ſhowy expreſſions will be found defective here. This juſtneſs of ſtyle is ſcarcely ever found without clearneſs of underſtanding, ſo that it appears in accuracy of method, in the whole diſcourſe, as well as in the ſtyle of particular parts. Dr Samuel Clark was a great example of this. He was one of thoſe few mathematicians who were good writers, and, while he did not loſe the life and fervour of the orator, preſerved the preciſion of the natural philoſopher. 8. Nervous or ſtrong, is the next character of ſtyle; and this implies that in which the author does not wholly neglect elegance and preciſion. But he is much more attentive to dignity and force. A ſtyle that is very ſtrong and nervous, might often receive a little additional poliſh by a few more epithets or copulatives, but cannot deſcend to ſuch minuteneſs. It is a fine expreſſion of Richard Baxter, upon ſtyle, "May I ſpeak plainly and pertinently, and ſomewhat nervouſly, I have my purpoſe." Baxter was a great example of a nervous ſtyle, with great neglect of elegance; and Dean Swift is an illuſtrious example of the ſame ſort of diction, with a very conſiderable attention to elegance. Both the one and the other ſeem to write in the fulneſs of their hearts; and to

me without ſcruple thoſe terms are commonly beſt, that firſt preſent themſelves to a fertile invention and warm imagination, without waiting to chooſe in their room thoſe that might be more ſmooth or ſonorous, but leſs emphatic. 9. Chaſtity of ſtyle, I think, ſtands particularly oppoſed to any embelliſhments that are not natural and neceſſary. Nay, we generally mean by a very chaſte writer, one who does not admit even all the ornaments that he might, and what ornaments he does admit are always of the moſt decent kind, and the moſt properly executed. 10. Severity of ſtyle has this title only by way of compariſon. That is a ſevere ſtyle which has propriety, elegance, and force, but ſeems rather to be above and to diſdain the ornaments which every body elſe would approve, and the greateſt part of readers would deſire.

LECTURE XI.

WE come now to the third general head, which was, to ſpeak of oratory as it is divided into the ſeveral parts which conſtitute the art. Theſe have been generally the following, invention, diſpoſition, ſtyle or compoſition, pronunciation, including geſture.

1. Invention. This is nothing elſe but finding out the ſentiments by which a ſpeaker or writer would explain what he has to propoſe, and the arguments by which he would enforce it. This ſubject is treated of very largely, in moſt of the books

of oratory, in which I think they judge very wrong. In by far the greateſt number of caſes, there is no neceſſity of teaching it; and where it is neceſſary, I believe it exceeds the power of man to teach it with effect. The very firſt time, indeed, that a young perſon begins to compoſe, the thing is ſo new to him, that it is apt to appear dark and difficult, and in a manner impoſſible. But as ſoon as he becomes a little accuſtomed to it, he finds much more difficulty in ſelecting what is proper, than in inventing ſomething that ſeems to be tolerable. There are ſome perſons, I confeſs, whom their own ſtupidity, or that of their relations, forces to attempt public ſpeaking, who are entirely barren, and not able to bring out any thing either good or bad; but this is exceedingly rare, and when it does happen, it will be ſo burdenſome to the man himſelf, that he muſt ſpeedily give over the attempt. There are infinitely more who have plenty of matter, ſuch as it is, but neither very valuable in itſelf, nor cloathed in proper language. I think it happens very generally that thoſe who are leaſt conciſe and accurate, are moſt lengthy and voluminous.

I will therefore not ſpend much time upon invention, leaving it to the ſpontaneous production of capacity and experience; only obſerve, that it is called a common place, from whence you draw your argument. That principle of law, nature, taſte, experience, from which you fetch your topic, and apply it to your particular caſe, is a common place; as for example, if I want to prove that a ſtrict diſcipline in a ſociety is beſt, I ſay, that diſcipline which will in the moſt effectual manner

reſtrain offences is certainly the beſt; this is the topic, or common place.

It would be needleſs to point out the ſources of invention, or ſhow from whence arguments may be drawn, for they may be drawn from all the characters and qualities of an action or perſon, and from all the circumſtances that accompany it. If I mean to aggravate a crime or injury, I ſay it was done deliberately, obſtinately, repeatedly, without temptation, againſt many warnings, and much kindneſs; that its effects are very bad to a man's ſelf, to others, to the character, the perſon, the eſtate, &c. If I want to ſpeak in praiſe of a free government, I mention its happy effects in giving ſecurity and happineſs, promoting induſtry, encouraging genius, producing value; and then I apply to experience, and ſhow the happineſs of free ſtates, and the miſery of thoſe that have been kept in ſlavery: but I repeat the remark, that invention need not be taught, unleſs it be to one that never yet compoſed a ſentence. There have been books of common places publiſhed, containing arguments and topics for illuſtration, and even ſimilitudes, ſayings of the ancients, &c. but they are of very little uſe, unleſs to a perſon that has no fund of his own, and then one that makes uſe of them is like a man walking on ſtilts; they make him look very big, but he walks very feebly.

2. The next diviſion of the oratorial art, is diſpoſition or diſtribution. This is a matter of the utmoſt moment, and upon which inſtruction is both neceſſary and uſeful. By diſpoſition as a part of the oratorial art, I mean order in general, in the

whole of a diſcourſe, or any kind of compoſition, be it what it will. As to the parts of which a ſingle ſpeech or oration conſiſts, they will be afterwards conſidered. Before I proceed to explain or point out the way to attain good order, I would juſt mention a few of its excellencies.

(1.) Good order in a diſcourſe gives light, and makes it eaſily underſtood. If things are thrown together without method, each of them will be leſs underſtood, and their joint influence in leading to a concluſion will not be perceived. It is a noble expreſſion of Horace, who calls it *lucidus ordo*, clear order. It is common to ſay, when we hear a confuſed diſcourſe, "It had neither head nor tail, I could not underſtand what he would be at."

(2.) Order is neceſſary to force, as well as light. This indeed is a neceſſary conſequence of the other, for we ſhall never be perſuaded by what we do not underſtand. Very often the force of reaſoning depends upon the united influence of ſeveral diſtinct propoſitions. If they are ranged in a juſt order, they will all have their effect, and ſupport one another; if otherwiſe, it will be like a number of men attempting to raiſe a weight, and one pulling at one time, and another at another, which will do juſt nothing; but if all exert their power at once, it will be eaſily overcome.

(3.) Order is alſo uſeful for aſſiſting memory. Order is neceſſary even in a diſcourſe that is to have a tranſient effect; but if any thing is intended to produce a laſting conviction, and to have a daily influence, it is ſtill more neceſſary. When things are diſpoſed in a proper order, the ſame concatenation

that is in the diſcourſe, takes place in the memory, ſo that when one thing is remembered, it immediately brings to remembrance what has an eaſy and obvious connection with it. The aſſociation of ideas linked together by any tie is very remarkable in our conſtitution, and is ſuppoſed to take place from ſome impreſſion made upon the brain. If we have ſeen two perſons but once, and ſeen them both at the ſame time only, or at the ſame place only, the remembrance of the one can hardly be ſeparated from the other. I may alſo illuſtrate the ſubject by another plain inſtance. Suppoſe I deſire a perſon going to a city, to do three or four things for me that are wholly unconnected, as to deliver a letter to one perſon—to viſit a friend of mine, and to bring me notice how he is—to buy a certain book for me, if he can find it—and to ſee whether any ſhip be to ſail for Britain ſoon,—it is very poſſible he may remember ſome of them, and forget the others; but if I deſire him to buy me a dozen of ſilver ſpoons, to carry them to an engraver to put my name upon them, and get a caſe to put them in, if he remembers one article, it is likely he will remember all of them. It is one of the beſt evidences that a diſcourſe has been compoſed with diſtinctneſs and accuracy, if after you go away you can remember a good deal of it; but there are ſometimes diſcourſes which are pompous and declamatory, and which you hear with pleaſure, and ſome ſort of approbation, but if you attempt to recollect the truths advanced, or the arguments in ſupport of them, there is not a trace of them to be found.

(4.) Order conduces alſo very much to beauty. Order is never omitted when men give the principles of beauty, and confuſion is diſguſted juſt on its own account, whatever the nature of the confuſed things may be. If you were to ſee a vaſt heap of fine furniture of different kinds lying in confuſion, you could neither perceive half ſo diſtinctly what was there, nor could it at all have ſuch an effect, as if every thing was diſpoſed in a juſt order, and placed where it ought to ſtand; nay, a much ſmaller quantity, elegantly diſpoſed, would exceed in grandeur of appearance a heap of the moſt coſtly things in nature.

(5.) Order is alſo neceſſary to brevity. A confuſed diſcourſe is almoſt never ſhort, and is always filled with repetitions. It is with thought in this eſpect, as with things viſible, for, to return to the former ſimilitude, a confuſed heap of goods or furniture fills much more room than when it is ranged and claſſed in its proper order, and every thing carried to its proper place.

Having ſhown the excellence of preciſion and method, let us next try to explain what it is; and that I may have ſome regard to method while I am ſpeaking of the very ſubject, I ſhall take it in three lights: 1. There muſt be an attention to order in the diſpoſition of the whole piece. Whatever the parts be in themſelves, they have alſo a relation to one another, and to the whole body, (if I may ſpeak ſo), that they are to compoſe. Every work, be it what it will, hiſtory, epic poem, dramatic poem, oration, epiſtle, or eſſay, is to be conſidered as a whole; and a clearneſs of judgement in point of

method, will decide the place and proportion of the ſeveral parts of which they are compoſed. The looſeſt eſſay, or where form is leaſt profeſſed or ſtudied, ought yet to have ſome ſhape as a whole; and we may ſay of it, that it begins abruptly or ends abruptly, or ſome of the parts are miſplaced. There are often to be ſeen pieces in which good things are ſaid, and well ſaid, and have only this fault, that they are unſeaſonable and out of place. Horace ſays, in his Art of Poetry, what is equally applicable to every ſort of compoſition, *Denique sit quod vis simplex duntaxat et unum;* and ſhortly after, *Infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum nesciet.*

This judgment in planning the whole, will particularly enable a perſon to determine both as to the place and proportion of the particular parts, whether they be not only good in themſelves, but fit to be introduced in ſuch a work; and it will alſo (if I may ſpeak ſo) give a colour to the whole compoſition. The neceſſity of order in the whole ſtructure of a piece, ſhows that the rule is good which is given by ſome, that an orator, before he begin his diſcourſe, ſhould concentrate the ſubject as it were, and reduce it to one ſingle propoſition, either expreſſed, or at leaſt conceived in his mind. Every thing ſhould grow out of this as its root, if it be in another principle to be explained; or refer to this as its end, if it be a point to be gained by perſuaſion. Having thus ſtated the point clearly to be handled, it will afford a ſort of criterion whether any thing adduced is proper or improper. It will ſuggeſt the topics that are juſt and ſuitable, as well as enable

us to reject whatever is in substance improper, or in size disproportionate to the design. Agreeably to this principle, I think, that not only the subject of a single discourse should be reduceable to one proposition, but the general divisions or principal heads should not be many in number. A great number of general heads both burdens the memory, and breaks the unity of the subject, and carries the idea of several little discourses joined together, or to follow after one another.

2. Order is necessary in the subdivisions of a subject, or the way of stating and marshalling of the several portions of any general head. This is applicable to all kinds of composition, and all kinds of oratory, sermons, law-pleadings, speeches. There is always a division of the parts, as well as of the whole, either expressed formally and numerically, or supposed, though suppressed. And it is as much here as any where, that the confusion of inaccurate writers and speakers appears. It is always necessary to have some notion of the whole of a piece; and the larger divisions being more bulky, (so to speak), disposition in them is more easily perceived; but in the smaller, both their order and size is in danger of being less attended to. Observe, therefore, that to be accurate and just, the subdivisions of any composition, such I mean as are (for example) introduced in a numerical series, 1, 2, 3, &c. should have the following properties.

(1.) They should be clear and plain. Every thing indeed should be clear as far as he can make it, but precision and distinctness should especially appear in the subdivisions, just as the bounding lines

of countries in a map. For this reaſon the firſt part of a ſubdiviſion ſhould be alike, a ſhort definition, and, when it can be done, it is beſt expreſſed in a ſingle term; for example, in giving the character of a man of learning, I may propoſe to ſpeak of his genius, his erudition, his induſtry or application.

(2.) They ſhould be truly diſtinct; that is, every body ſhould perceive that they are really different from one another, not in phraſe or word only, but in ſentiment. If you praiſe a man firſt for his judgement, and then for his underſtanding, they are either altogether or ſo nearly the ſame, or ſo nearly allied, as not to require diſtinction. I have heard a miniſter, on John, xvii. 11. "Holy Father," &c. in ſhowing how God keeps his people, ſay, 1. He keeps their feet: "He ſhall keep thy feet from falling." 2. He keeps their way: "Thou ſhalt keep him in all his ways." Now, it is plain, that theſe are not two different things, but two metaphors for the ſame thing. This indeed was faulty alſo in another reſpect; for a metaphor ought not to make a diviſion at all.

(3.) Subdiviſions ſhould be neceſſary; that is to ſay, taking the word in the looſe and popular ſenſe, the ſubject ſhould ſeem to demand them. To multiply diviſions, even where they may be made really diſtinct, is tedious, and diſguſtful, unleſs where they are of uſe and importance to our clearly comprehending the meaning, or feeling the force of what is ſaid. If a perſon, in the map of a country, ſhould give a different colour to every

three miles, though the equality of the proportion would make the diviſion clear enough, yet it would appear diſguſtingly ſuperfluous. In writing the hiſtory of an eminent perſon's life, to divide it into ſpaces of ten years, perhaps, would make the view of the whole more exact; but to divide it into ſingle years or months, would be finical and diſagreeable. The increaſe of diviſions leads almoſt unavoidably into tedioufneſs.

(4.) Subdiviſions ſhould be co-ordinate; that is to ſay, thoſe that go on in a ſeries, 1, 2, 3, &c. ſhould be as near as poſſible ſimilar, or of the ſame kind. This rule is tranſgreſſed, when either the things mentioned are wholly different in kind, or when they include one another. This will be well perceived, if we conſider how a man would deſcribe a ſenſible ſubject, a county for example; New-Jerſey contains, 1. Middleſex. 2. Somerſet county. 3. The townſhips of Princeton. 4. Morris county. So, if one, in deſcribing the character of a real Chriſtian, ſhould ſay, faith, holineſs, charity, juſtice, temperance, patience, this would not do, becauſe holineſs includes juſtice, &c. When, therefore, it ſeems neceſſary to mention different particulars that cannot be made co-ordinate, they ſhould be made ſubordinate.

(5.) Sub-diviſions ſhould be complete, and exhauſt the ſubject. This, indeed, is common to all diviſions, but is of moſt importance here, where it is moſt neglected. It may be ſaid, perhaps, How can we propoſe to exhauſt any ſubject? By making the diviſions ſuitable, particularly in point of comprehenſion, to the nature of the ſubject; as an

example, and to make use of the image before introduced, of giving an account of a country, I may say, the province of New-Jersey consists of two parts, East and West Jersey. If I say it consists of the counties of Somerset, &c. I must continue till I have enumerated all the counties, otherwise the division is not complete. In the same manner, in public speaking, or any other composition, whatever division is made, it is not legitimate, if it does not include or exhaust the whole subject; which may be done, let it be ever so great. For example: True religion may be divided various ways, so as to include the whole; I may say, that it consists of our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourselves; or, I may make but two, our duty to God and man, and divide the last into two subordinate heads, our neighbour, and ourselves; or, I may say, it consists of faith and practice; or, that it consists of two parts, a right frame and temper of mind, and a good life and conversation.

(6.) Lastly, the subdivisions of any subject should be connected, or should be taken in a series or order, if they will possibly admit of it. In some moral and intellectual subjects, it may not be easy to find any series or natural order, as in an enumeration of virtues, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Patience, perhaps, might as well be enumerated in any other order; yet there is often an order that will appear natural, and the inversion of it unnatural; as we may say, injuries are done many ways to a man's person, character, and possessions. Love to others includes the relation of family, kindred, citizens, countrymen, fellow-creatures.

3. In the laſt place, there is alſo an order to be obſerved in the ſentiments, which makes the illuſtration or amplification of the diviſions of a diſcourſe. This order is never expreſſed by numerical diviſions, yet it is of great importance, and its beauty and force will be particularly felt. It is, if I may ſpeak ſo, of a finer and more delicate nature than any of the others, more various, and harder to explain. I once have ſaid, that all reaſoning is of the nature of a ſyllogiſm, which lays down principles, makes compariſons, and draws the concluſion. But we muſt particularly guard againſt letting the uniformity and formality of a ſyllogiſm appear. In general, whatever eſtabliſhes any connection, ſo that it makes the ſentiments give riſe to one another, is the occaſion of order; ſometimes neceſſity and utility point out the order as a good meaſure: As in telling a ſtory, grave or humorous, you muſt begin by deſcribing the perſons concerned, mentioning juſt as many circumſtances of their character and ſituation as are neceſſary to make us underſtand the facts to be afterwards related. Sometimes the ſenſible ideas of time and place ſuggeſt an order, not only in hiſtorical narrations, and in law-pleadings, which relate to facts, but in drawing of characters, deſcribing the progreſs and effects of virtue and vice, and even in other ſubjects, where the connection between thoſe ideas and the thing ſpoken of is not very ſtrong. Sometimes, and indeed generally, there is an order which proceeds from things plain, to things obſcure. The beginning of a paragraph ſhould be like the ſharp point of a wedge, which gains ad-

mittance to the bulky part behind. It firſt affirms what every body feels, or muſt confeſs, and proceeds to what follows as a neceſſary conſequence. In fine, there is an order in perſuaſion to a particular choice, which may be taken two ways with equal advantage, proceeding from the weaker to the ſtronger, or from the ſtronger to the weaker: As in recommending a pious and virtuous life, we may firſt ſay it is amiable, honourable, pleaſant, profitable, even in the preſent life; and, to crown all, makes death itſelf a friend, and leads to a glorious immortality: or, we may begin the other way, and ſay it is the one thing needful, that eternity is the great and deciſive argument that ſhould determine our choice, though every thing elſe were in favour of vice; and then add, that even in the preſent life, it is a great miſtake to think that bad men are gainers, &c. This is called ſometimes the aſcending and deſcending climax. Each of them has its beauty and uſe. It muſt be left to the orator's judgement to determine which of the two is either fitteſt for the preſent purpoſe, or which he finds himſelf at that time able to execute to the greateſt advantage.

LECTURE XII.

THE next branch of this diviſion, is ſtyle, or compoſition. This, which is ſo great a part of the ſubject, has already been conſidered in one view, under the three great kinds of writing, and

will again be mentioned under the two following heads, as well as the remarks at the close: yet I will drop a few hints upon it in this place.

1. It is necessary that a writer or speaker should be well acquainted with the language in which he speaks; its characters, properties, and defects, its idioms, or peculiar terms and phrases, and likewise with as many other languages as possible, particularly such as are called the learned languages, the Latin and Greek. Our own language is the English. A thorough acquaintance with it must be acquired by extensive reading in the best authors, giving great attention to the remarks made by critics of judgement and erudition, and trying it ourselves in practice. Our language, like most of the northern languages, is rough, with a frequent meeting of consonants, difficult of pronunciation; it abounds in monosyllables. You may write a whole page, and scarce use one word that has more than one syllable; this is a defect, and to be avoided when it can be done consistently with other properties, particularly simplicity and perspicuity. Our language is said to have an over proportion of the letter *s*, and therefore called a hissing language. This a writer of judgement will endeavour to avoid, whenever he can do it with propriety and elegance. A thorough acquaintance with the genius and idioms of our own language, can scarcely be attained without some acquaintance with others, because it is comparison of one with another which illustrates all. There are not only smaller differences between one language and another, but there are some general differences in the arrangement of

words, in the ancient and modern languages: in the Greek and Latin, the governed words are pretty generally before the verb. It is a miſtake for us to ſay, that the Engliſh order is the natural order, as ſome have done. It is certain that they are either both alike natural and equally obvious, when once cuſtom has fixed them, or that the ancient order is the more natural of the two. There are two things, the action and the object, to be conjoined; and it is fully as proper to turn your attention firſt to the object, before you tell what you are to ſay of it, or what you would have done with it, as after. *Istud scalpellum quod in manu habes, commoda mihi paulisper, si placet:* and in longer and more involved ſentences, the ſuſpending the ſentiment for ſome time till it be completed, is both more pleaſing and more forcible. Our own language admits of a little tranſpoſition, and becomes grander and more ſonorous by it, both in poetry and proſe.

2. We may attend to the arrangement of the clauſes of a ſentence, and their proportion and ſound. Every ſentence may be conſidered as having ſo many clauſes or members, which have, each of them, ſome meaning, but which is not complete till it is cloſed. Every ſentence is capable of receiving ſome degree of harmony, by a proper ſtructure; this it receives when the moſt important ideas, and the moſt ſonorous expreſſions, occupy the chief places; but what, you will ſay, are the chief places? We naturally, ſays an eminent French author on this ſubject, love to preſent our moſt intereſting ideas firſt; but this order, which is dictated by ſelf-love, is contrary to what we are directed to by the

art of pleasing. The capital law of this art, is to prefer others to ourselves, and therefore the most striking and interesting ideas come with the greatest beauty, as well as force, in the close. Where the difference does not lie in the ideas, the words or phrases that are most long and sonorous ought to be so distinguished; this rule, however, will admit some exception, when we are to persuade or instruct, for we must never seem to have sweetness and cadence chiefly in view.

The rule of placing in a sentence the most important ideas and expressions last, was taken notice of by ancient writers. *In verbis observandum est*, says one of them, *ut a majoribus ad minus descendat oratio, melius enim dicetur, vir est optimus, quam vir optimus est.* Sometimes several monosyllables terminate a sentence well enough, because in pronunciation they run into one, and seem to the hearers little different from a single word. It is an observation, that the ear itself often directs to the rule upon this subject. Some French critics observe, that some syllables in their language which are usually short, are produced in the end of a sentence; for instance, *Je suis votre serviteur Monsieur, je suis le votre;* where *votre* is short in the first sentence, and long in the second; and I believe the same thing would happen in translating that sentence literally into English.

The harmony of sentences is preserved either by a measured proportion, or regular gradation of the clauses: Cicero says upon this subject, *Si membra*, &c. In every sentence consisting of two members only, every body's ear will make them sensible,

that the laſt clauſe after the pauſe of the voice ought to be longeſt; as in Shakeſpeare, "But yeſterday," &c. In longer ſentences there muſt be a greater variety, and ſeveral cauſes muſt contribute to determine the length of the clauſes; but it is plain, the laſt muſt be longer than the preceding; and ſometimes a regular gradation of more than two clauſes has a very happy effect; ſuch as theſe of Cicero, *Quorum quæstor fueram*, &c. Again he ſays in the ſame oration, *Habet honorem*, &c. There is another order in which there are two equal, and one unequal member, and in that caſe, when the unequal member is ſhorteſt, it ought to be placed firſt; when it is longeſt, it ought to be placed laſt, as in the two following examples: *Testis est Africa*, &c. and *Eripite nos ex miseris*, &c. There is another ſtructure of the members of a ſentence, in which this rule is departed from, and yet it pleaſes, becauſe of a certain exact proportion, as that of Monſieur Fenelon, *Dans sa douleur*, &c. The firſt and laſt members are equal, and that which is in the middle is juſt double to each of them.

Perhaps it will be aſked, Muſt an author then give attention to this preciſe meaſure? Muſt he take a pair of ſcales or compaſſes to meaſure every period he compoſes? By no means. Nothing would be more frigid and unſucceſsful, but it was proper thus to analyſe the ſubject, and ſhow in what manner the ear is pleaſed; at the ſame time there is ſo great a variety and compaſs in the meaſures of proſe, that it is eaſy to vary the ſtructure and cadence, and make every thing appear quite ſimple

and natural. This leads me to the third remark upon ſtyle.

3. That variety is to be particularly ſtudied. If a writer thinks any particular ſtructure neceſſary, and forces every thing he has to ſay juſt into that form, it will be highly diſagreeable; or if he is much enamoured with one particular kind of ornament, and brings it in too frequently, it will immediately diſguſt. There is a mixture in the principles of taſte, a deſire of uniformity and variety, ſimplicity and intricacy; and it is by the happy union of all theſe, that delight is moſt effectually produced. What elſe is neceſſary upon ſtyle, will fall very properly under ſome of the following heads.

The laſt part of the oratorial art is pronunciation, including geſture. This is of the utmoſt, and indeed of univerſally confeſſed importance. The effects of the different manner of delivering the ſame thing are very great. It is a famous ſubject, largely treated of by all critical writers. It ſeems to have been nicely ſtudied by the ancients; and if we may judge from ſome circumſtances, their action has been often very violent. We are told of Cicero, that when he firſt went to the bar, the violence of his action, and what is called *contentio laterum*, was ſuch as endangered his conſtitution, ſo that he took a journey for his health, and on his return took to a more cool and managed way of ſpeaking. There is alſo ſomewhere in his writings, an expreſſion to this purpoſe, *Nec fuit etiam, quod minimum est, supplosio pedis;* as if ſtamping with the foot had been one of the leaſt violent motions then in uſe. We cannot judge of this matter

very well at such a distance. There is a difference in the turn of different nations upon this subject. The French and Italians have much more warmth and fire in their manner than the British. I remember once to have been told that no man could perceive the beauty of Raphael's picture of Paul preaching at Athens, unless he had seen a Frenchman or Italian in the pulpit. Leaving you to read and digest all the criticisms and remarks upon this subject to be met with in different authors, I shall only give a few directions that I esteem most useful for avoiding improprieties, and attaining some degree of excellence in this respect.

1. Study great sincerity; try to forget every purpose but the very end of speaking, information, and persuading. Labour after that sort of presence of mind which arises from self-denial, rather than from courage. Nothing produces more awkwardness than confusion and embarrassment. Bring a clown into a magnificent palace, and let him have to appear in the presence of persons of high rank, and the fear and solicitude he has about his own carriage and discourse, makes both the one and the other much more absurd and awkward than it would have otherwise been.

2. Learn distinct articulation, and attend to all the common rules of reading, which are taugh. in the English grammars. Articulation is giving their full force and powers to the consonants as well as the vowels. The difference between a well articulated discourse and one defective in this respect, is, that the first you will hear distinctly as far as you

can hear the voice; the other you will hear ſound enough, yet not underſtand almoſt any thing that is ſaid. Practice in company is a good way to learn this and ſeveral other excellencies in diſcourſe.

3. Another rule is, to keep to the tone and key of dialogue, or common converſation, as much as poſſible. In common diſcourſe, where there is no affectation, men ſpeak properly. At leaſt, though even here there are differences from nature, ſome ſpeaking with more ſweetneſs and grace than others, yet there is none that falls into any of thoſe unnatural rants or ridiculous geſtures, that are ſometimes to be ſeen in public ſpeakers.

4. It is of conſiderable conſequence to be accuſtomed to decency of manners in the beſt company. This gives an eaſe of carriage and a ſenſe of delicacy, which is of great uſe in forming the deportment of an orator.

5. In the laſt place, every one ſhould conſider not only what is the manner, beſt in itſelf, or even beſt ſuited to the ſubject, but what is alſo beſt ſuited to his own capacity. One of a quick animated ſpirit by nature, may allow himſelf a much greater violence of action, than one of a colder diſpoſition. If this laſt works himſelf up to violence, or ſtudies to expreſs much paſſion, he will not probably be able to carry it through, but will relapſe into his own natural manner, and by the ſenſible difference between one part of his diſcourſe and another, render himſelf ridiculous. Solemnity of manner ſhould be ſubſtituted by all ſuch perſons in the room of fire.

LECTURE XIII.

WE come now to the fourth general diviſion of this ſubject, which is, that its object or end is different. The ends a writer or ſpeaker may be ſaid to aim at, are information, demonſtration, perſuaſion, and entertainment. I need ſcarce tell you, that theſe are not ſo wholly diſtinct, b t that they are frequently intermixed, and that more than one of them may be in view at the ſame time. Perſuaſion is alſo uſed in a ſenſe that includes them all. The intention of all ſpeech, or writing, which is but recorded ſpeech, is to p rſuade, taking the word with latitude. Yet I think you will eaſily perceive that there are very different ſorts of compoſition, in ſome of which one of the above-mentioned purpoſes, and in others a different one, takes the lead, and gives the colour to the whole performance. Great benefit will ariſe from keeping a clear view of what is the end propoſed. It will preſerve the writer from a vitious and miſtaken taſte. The ſame thoughts, the ſame phraſeology, the ſame ſpirit in general, running through a writing, is highly proper in one caſe, and abſurd in another. There is a beauty in every kind of writing when it is well done, and impropriety or bad taſte will ſometimes ſhow themſelves in pieces very inconſiderable. If it were but inditing a meſſage-card, penning an article in a newſpaper, or drawing up an advertiſement, perſons accuſtomed to each of theſe will be able to keep to the common

form, or beaten track; but if any thing different is to be ſaid, good ſenſe and propriety, or their contraries, will ſoon ſhow themſelves.

The writings which have information as their chief purpoſe, are hiſtory, fable, epiſtolary writing, the common intercourſe of buſineſs or friendſhip, and all the lower kinds. The properties which ſhould reign in them, are the following, 1. Plainneſs; 2. Fulneſs; 3. Preciſion; and, 4. Order.

1. Plainneſs it is evident they ought to have; and indeed not barely perſpicuity, ſo as to be intelligible, but an unaffected ſimplicity, ſo as not to ſeem to have any thing higher in view than to be underſtood.

2. When we ſay that fulneſs is a property of writings which have information as their purpoſe, it is not meant to recommend a long or diffuſe narration, but to intimate that nothing ſhould be omitted in giving an account of any thing, which is of importance to its being truly and completely underſtood. Let a writer be as large as he pleaſes in what he ſays, if he omits circumſtances as eſſential as thoſe he mentions, and which the reader would naturally deſire to know, he is not full. Many are very tedious, and yet not full. The excellence of a narrative is to contain as many ideas as poſſible, provided they are intereſting, and to convey them in as few words as poſſible, conſiſtently with perſpicuity.

3. Preciſion, as a quality of narration, belongs chiefly to language. Words ſhould be choſen that are truly expreſſive of the thing in view, and all ambiguous as well as ſuperfluous phraſes carefully

avoided. The reader is impatient to get to the end of a ſtory, and therefore he muſt not be ſtopped by any thing but what you are ſure he would be glad to know before he proceeds further.

4. The laſt particular is order, which is neceſſary in all writings, but eſpecially in narration. There it lies chiefly in time and place, and a breach of order in theſe reſpects is more eaſily diſcerned and more univerſally offenſive than in any other. Common hearers do not always know when you violate order in ranging the arguments on a moral ſubject; but if you bring in a ſtory abruptly, or tell it confuſedly, either in a letter or a diſcourſe, it will be inſtantly perceived, and thoſe will laugh at you who could not tell it a whit better themſelves.

Imagination is not to be much uſed in writings of the narrative kind. Its chief uſe in ſuch writings is in deſcription. A man of a warm fancy will paint ſtrongly, and a man of a ſentimental turn will intereſt the affections even by a mere recital of facts. But both the one and the other ſhould be kept in great moderation; for a warm fancy is often joined to credulity, and the ſentimental perſon is given to invention; ſo that he will turn a real hiſtory into a romance. In hiſtory a certain cool and diſpaſſionate dignity is the leading beauty. The writer ſhould appear to have no intereſt in characters or events, but deliver them as he finds them. The character which an illuſtrious hiſtorian acquires from this ſelf-denial, and being, as it were, ſuperior to all the perſonages, how great ſoever, of whom he treats, has ſomething awful and venerable in it.

It is diſtinguiſhed by this circumſtance from the applauſe given to the poet or orator.

Demonſtration is the end in view in all ſcientific writings, whether eſſays, ſyſtems, or controverſy. The excellencies of this kind of writing may be reduced to the three following: Perſpicuity, order, and ſtrength. The two firſt are neceſſary here as every where elſe, and the compoſition ſhould be ſtrong and nervous to produce a laſting conviction; more force of language is to be admitted, at leaſt more generally in this kind than in the former; but a great deal leſs of imagination and fancy than even there. Whenever a ſcientific writer begins to paint and adorn, he is forgetting himſelf and diſguſting his reader. This will be ſenſibly felt if you apply it to the mathematics. The mathematician is converſant only with ſenſible ideas, and therefore the more naked and unadorned every thing that he ſays is, ſo much the better. How would it look if a mathematician ſhould ſay, Do you ſee this beautiful, ſmall, taper, acute angle? It always approaches to this abſurdity, when, in ſearching after abſtract truth, writers introduce imagination and fancy. I am ſenſible that, having mentioned controverſy as belonging to this claſs, many may be ſurpriſed that I have excluded imagination altogether, ſince commonly all controverſial writers do, to the utmoſt of their ability, enliſt imagination in the ſervice of Reaſon. There is nothing they are ſo fond of as expoſing the weakneſs of their adverſaries by ſtrokes of raillery and humour. This I did on purpoſe that I may ſtate this matter to you clearly. Controverſy ſhould mean, and very ge-

nerally such writers pretend to mean, weighing the arguments on each side of a contested question, in order to discover the truth. What strong professions of impartiality have we sometimes from the very champions of a party-quarrel! while yet it is plain, that searching after truth is what they never think of, but maintaining, by every art, the cause which they have already espoused.

I do not deny that there are sometimes good reasons for making use of satire and ridicule, in controversies of the political kind, and sometimes it is necessary in self-defence. If any writer in behalf of a party, attempts to expose his adversaries to public scorn, he ought not to be surprised if the measure he metes to others, is measured out to him again. What is unlawful in the aggressor, becomes justifiable, if not laudable, in the defender. Sometimes it is necessary to expose tyrants, or persons in power, who do not reason, but punish; and sometimes it is necessary to bring down self-sufficient persons, with whom there is no dealing till their pride is levelled a little with this dismaying weapon. Dr Brown has set this matter in a very clear light, in his Essays on the Characteristics, where he says, that ridicule is not the test of truth, but it may be very useful to expose and disgrace known falsehood.

But when controversy is really an impartial search after truth, it is the farthest distant imaginable, either from passionate declamation on the one hand, or sallies of wit and humour on the other. There is one instance of a controversy carried on between Dr Butler and Dr Clark, upon the subject of space and personal identity, in which there

did not seem to be any design, upon either side, but to discover the truth. It ended in the entire conviction and satisfaction of one of them, which he readily and openly acknowledged: and I think in such an instance there is much greater glory to be had in yielding than in conquering. There is great honour in candidly acknowledging a mistake, but not much in obtaining a victory in support of truth. It is worth while just to mention, that this was far from being the case in another controversy between two, who were also very great men, Mr Locke and Dr Stillingfleet, upon innate ideas. They not only supported each his sentiments, with warmth and keenness, but descended to all the malice of personal reproach, and all the littleness of verbal criticism.

The next great end that may be in view, is persuasion. This being the great and general subject of oratory, has had most said upon it in every age. That you may understand what I mean by distinguishing it from information, demonstration, and entertainment, observe, that persuasion is, when we would bring the reader or hearer to a determinate choice, either immediately upon the spot for a particular decision, as in an assembly or court of justice, or in a more slow and lasting way, as in religious and moral writings. But particularly persuasion is understood to be in view, as the effect of a single discourse. When this is the purpose, there are opportunities for all the ways of speaking within the compass of the oratorial art. There are times when an orator must narrate simply—there are times when he must reason strongly—and there are

times when he may wound ſatirically. It muſt be remembered, however, that too great an infuſion of wit takes away both from the dignity and force of an oration. We ſhall ſee under the next head, that it cannot be admitted in religious inſtruction; but when you are ſpeaking againſt an adverſary that is proud and conceited, or when you want to make your hearers deſpiſe any perſon or thing, as well as hate them, wit and ſatire may be of uſe. A miniſter of ſtate is very often attacked in this way with propriety and ſucceſs. It is ſometimes allowed to relieve the ſpirits of the audience when they begin to flag. In this view Cicero recommends the *urbanitas*, and practiſes it himſelf; and at the ſame times he intimates that it ſhould be done ſparingly, and with caution—*Quo tanquam ſale conſpergatur oratio.* Wit, therefore, is to be abſolutely excluded from ſcientific writings, and very rarely to be uſed in ſerious perſuaſion.

The laſt end of ſpeaking and writing I ſhall mention, is entertainment. This includes all ſuch writings as have the amuſement or entertainment of the hearers or readers as the only, the chief, or at leaſt one great end of the compoſition. This is the caſe with all poetical compoſitions. They may pretend to write for the inſtruction of others, but to pleaſe them and obtain their favour is probably more their purpoſe. At any rate, they muſt content themſelves with taking in both, and ſay with Horace, *Et prodesse volunt et delectare poetæ.* Sweetneſs, tenderneſs, and elegance of ſtyle, ought to characterize theſe ſorts of compoſition. Here is the greateſt room for imagination and fancy. Here is

the dominion of wit and humour. It is an obſervation of ſome, that the word *humour* is peculiar to the Engliſh language; that the *eutrapelia* in Greek, *ſales et urbanitas*, in Latin, have all the ſame meaning with our general term *wit*; but that *humour* denotes a particular kind of wit, conſiſting chiefly of irony. But if the word is peculiar to the Engliſh language, it is certain that the thing itſelf is far from being peculiar to the Engliſh nation. Perhaps Homer's Batrychomachia may be ſaid to be the moſt ancient example of it upon record. Lucian's Dialogues have it in high perfection; though it muſt be owed that it ſeems particularly to have flouriſhed in modern times. Fontenelle's Dialogues of the Dead, and Boileau's Satires, are famous examples of it; but none ever exceeded Cervantes, the celebrated author of Don Quixotte. That piece is highly entertaining to an Engliſh reader, under two great diſadvantages. One is, its being tranſlated into another language. Now, wit is more difficult to tranſlate than any other ſubject of compoſition. It is eaſier to tranſlate undiminiſhed the force of eloquence, than the poignancy of wit. The other diſadvantage is, its being written in ridicule of a character that now no more exiſts; ſo that we have not the opportunity of comparing the copy with the original.

We muſt alſo obſerve, that wit in general, and this ſpecies of it in particular, has often appeared in the higheſt perfection in Britain, both in proſe and poetry; Shakeſpeare's dramatic pieces abound with it, and Dr Donnes' Satires. It is in high perfection in Marvel's Rehearſal Tranſpoſed; Al-

ſop's *Melius Inquirendum*; but, above all, in Swift's writings, proſe and verſe.

It is obſerved ſometimes, that the talent of humour is often poſſeſſed, in a very high degree, by perſons of the meaneſt rank, who are themſelves ignorant of it; in them it appears chiefly in converſation, and in a manner that cannot be eaſily put upon paper. But as to thoſe who think fit to try this manner from the preſs, they ſhould be well aſſured beforehand, that they really poſſeſs the talent. In many other particulars, a real taſte for it, and a high admiration of any thing, is a conſiderable ſign of ſome degree of the talent itſelf; but it is far from being ſo in wit and humour. Mr Pope tells us, that "gentle dullneſs ever loves a joke:" and we ſee every day people aiming at wit, who produce the moſt miſerable and ſhocking performances: ſometimes they do not excite laughter, but loathing or indignation; ſometimes they do excite laughter, but it is that of contempt. There is a diſtinction which every one ſhould endeavour to underſtand and remember, between a wit and a droll; the firſt makes you laugh at what he ſays, and the object of his ſatire, and the ſecond makes you laugh at his own expence, from his abſurdity and meanneſs.

LECTURE XIV.

WE come now to the fifth general diviſion of eloquence, as its ſubject is different; under which we may conſider the three great diviſions of

the pulpit, the bar, and promiſcuous aſſemblies. All the general principles of compoſition are common to theſe three kinds, nor can any man make a truly diſtinguiſhed figure in any one of them, without being well acquainted with literature and taſte. Some peculiarities in different ways of writing have been already touched at, all which I ſuppoſe you gave attention to; but there are ſtill ſome differences, as the ſcene in which a man is to move in life is different, which are highly worthy of obſervation. I will, therefore, conſider each of theſe ſeparately, and try to point out the qualities for which they ought to be diſtinguiſhed; or delineate the character of an accompliſhed miniſter, lawyer, and ſenator.

I begin with the pulpit. Preaching the goſpel of Chriſt is a truly noble employment, and the care of ſouls a very important truſt. The qualities of moſt importance, I think, are as follow.

1. Piety—To have a firm belief of that goſpel he is called to preach, and a lively ſenſe of religion upon his own heart. Duty, intereſt, and utility, all conſpire in requiring this qualification; it is of the utmoſt moment in itſelf, and what men will the leaſt diſpenſe with in one of that profeſſion. All men, good and bad, agree in deſpiſing a looſe or profane miniſter. It diſcovers a terrible degree of depravity of heart, and thoſe that begin ſo ſeldom alter for the better. The very familiar acquaintance which they acquire with ſerious thoughts and ſpiritual ſubjects, ſerves to harden them againſt the arrows of conviction; and it is little wonder that for ſuch daring wickedneſs, God ſhould leave them to them-

ſelves, or ſentence them to perpetual barrenneſs. But whilſt I think it my duty thus to warn you, I muſt beg leave to guard it againſt abuſe, leſt, while we are aggravating the ſin of profane miniſters, others ſhould think themſelves at liberty, who have no view to that ſacred office. We have even ſeen perſons decline the ſacred office, becauſe they did not think they had true religion, and then, with ſeeming eaſe and quietneſs, ſet themſelves to ſome other buſineſs, as if in that there was no need of religion at all. Alas! after all that can be ſaid of the guilt and danger of an irreligious miniſter, there is an infinite danger to every one who ſhall go out of this life an irreligious man. Will it not be poor conſolation, think you, in the hour of ſickneſs or death, that though you muſt periſh everlaſtingly, you go to hell, not as a miniſter, but a lawyer or a phyſician? I do truly think, this has been a pillow of ſecurity to many poor thoughtleſs ſouls, and that they have actually rid themſelves of conviction, by this miſtaken comfort, as if there was much merit in it, that they would not be miniſters, becauſe they wanted religion. Remember this, then, in a ſingle word, that there is neither profeſſion nor ſtation, from the king on the throne to the beggar on the dunghill, to whom a concern for eternity is not the *one thing needful.*

But, let me juſt take notice of the great advantage of true religion to one deſtined for the work of the miniſtry.

(1.) It gives a man the knowledge that is of moſt ſervice to a miniſter. Experimental know-

ledge is ſuperior to all other, and neceſſary to the perfection of every other kind. It is indeed the very poſſeſſion, or daily exerciſe of that which it is the buſineſs of his life, and the duty of his office, to explain and recommend. Experimental knowledge is the beſt ſort in every branch, but it is neceſſary in divinity, becauſe religion is what cannot be truly underſtood, unleſs it is felt.

(2.) True piety will direct a man in the choice of his ſtudies. The object of human knowledge is ſo extenſive, that nobody can go through the whole, but religion will direct the ſtudent to what may be moſt profitable to him, and will alſo ſerve to turn into its proper channel all the knowledge he may otherwiſe acquire.

(3.) It will be a powerful motive to diligence in his ſtudies. Nothing ſo forcible as that in which eternity has a part. The duty to a good man is ſo preſſing, and the object ſo important, that he will ſpare no pains to obtain ſucceſs.

(4.) True religion will give unſpeakable force to what a miniſter ſays. There is a piercing and a penetrating heat in that which flows from the heart, which diſtinguiſhes it both from the coldneſs of indifference, and the falſe fire of enthuſiaſm and vain-glory. We ſee that a man truly pious has often eſteem, influence, and ſucceſs, though his parts may be much inferior to others, who are more capable, but leſs conſcientious. If, then, piety makes even the weakeſt venerable, what muſt it do when added to the fineſt natural talents, and the beſt acquired endowments?

(5.) It adds to a miniſter's inſtruction, the weight

of his example. It is a trite remark, that example teaches better than precept. It is often a more effectual reprimand to vice, and a more inciting argument to the practice of virtue, than the beſt of reaſoning. Example is more intelligible than precept. Precepts are often involved in obſcurity, or warped by controverſy; but a holy life immediately reaches, and takes poſſeſſion of the heart.

If I have lengthened out this particular beyond the proportion of the reſt, I hope you will forgive it for its importance, and obſerve, as the concluſion of the whole, that one devoted to the ſervice of the goſpel ſhould be *really*, *visibly*, and *eminently* holy.

2. Another character which ſhould diſtinguiſh pulpit-eloquence, is ſimplicity. Simplicity is beautiful every where; it is of importance that young perſons ſhould be formed to a taſte for it, and more diſpoſed to exceed here than in the oppoſite extreme; but, if I am not miſtaken, it is more beautiful, and the tranſgreſſions of it more offenſive, in the pulpit, than any where elſe. If I heard a lawyer pleading in ſuch a ſtyle and manner, as was more adapted to diſplay his own talents, than to carry his client's cauſe, it would conſiderably leſſen him in my eſteem; but if I heard a miniſter acting the ſame part, I ſhould not be ſatisfied with contempt, but hold him in deteſtation.

There are ſeveral obvious reaſons why ſimplicity is more eſpecially neceſſary to a miniſter than any other. 1. Many of his audience are poor ignorant creatures. If he mean to do them any ſervice, he muſt keep to what they underſtand, and

that requires more ſimplicity than perſons without experience can eaſily imagine. It is remarkable, that at the firſt publication, it was a character of the goſpel, that it was preached to the poor. In this our bleſſed Maſter was diſtinguiſhed, both from the heathen philoſophers and Jewiſh teachers, who confined their inſtructions in a great meaſure to their ſchools, and imparted what they eſteemed their moſt important diſcourſes, to only a few choſen diſciples. 2. Simplicity is neceſſary to preſerve the ſpeaker's character for ſincerity. You heard before how neceſſary piety is, which is the proper parent of ſincerity in the pulpit. Now, it is not eaſy to preſerve the opinion of piety and ſincerity in the pulpit, when there is much ornament. Beſides the danger of much affected pomp, or foppery of ſtyle, a diſcourſe very highly poliſhed, even in the trueſt taſte, is apt to ſuggeſt to the audience, that a man is preaching himſelf, and not the croſs of Chriſt. So nice a matter is this in all public ſpeaking, that ſome critics ſay, that Demoſthenes put on purpoſe ſome errors in grammar in his diſcourſes, that the hearers might be induced to take them for the immediate effuſions of the heart, without art, and with little premeditation. I doubt much the ſolidity of this remark, or the certainty of the fact; but however it be, there is no occaſion for it in the caſe of a miniſter, becauſe preparation and premeditation are expected from him; and in that caſe he may make his diſcourſes abundantly plain and ſimple, without any affected blunders. 3. Simplicity is alſo neceſſary, as ſuited to the goſpel

itself, the subject of a minister's discourses. Nothing more humbling to the pride of man, than the doctrine of the cross; nothing more unbecoming that doctrine, than too much finery of language. The apostle Paul chose to preach "not with the words which man's wisdom teacheth;" and again, "not with excellency of speech, or wisdom;" which though I admit that it does not condemn study and sound knowledge, yet it certainly shows, that the style of the pulpit should be the most simple and self-denied of any other.

3. Another qualification for a minister is accuracy, from the utmost diligence in his important work. I place this immediately after the other, to guard it against abuse by excess. To avoid vain affected ornaments, is a very different thing from negligence in preparation. The very same apostle who speaks with so much contempt of human wisdom, yet greatly insists, in writing to Timothy and Titus, on their giving themselves to study, to exhortation, to doctrine, "Meditate upon those things," says he, &c.

Study and accuracy, indeed, is necessary, that a minister may procure and keep up the attention of his hearers; that he may inform the judgement, as well as convince the conscience. The ancient fathers have generally insisted upon this, as of much moment. And in our own times, I observe, that it is necessary to avoid offending persons of finer taste, who are too much attached to the outside of things, and are immediately disgusted with every error against propriety, and are apt to reproach religion itself, for the weakness or absurdi-

ty of thoſe who ſpeak in its behalf. Let no man ſeek to avoid that reproach which may be his lot, for preaching the truths of the everlaſting goſpel, but let him always avoid the juſt reproach of handling them in a mean, ſlovenly, and indecent manner.

4. Another quality of a miniſter's eloquence, ſhould be force and vehemence. I have in ſome former parts of the general ſubject, ſhown you how and when this is to be moſt exerted. The deſign of the preſent remark is to let you know, that there is no ſpeaker who has a greater right to exert himſelf to the utmoſt, or who may properly intereſt his hearers more, than a miniſter of the goſpel. No ſpeaker has ſubjects or arguments more proper for producing this effect. To conſider the ſubjects which a ſpeaker from the pulpit has to handle, one would think that it muſt be the eaſieſt thing imaginable to ſpeak from them in a powerful and intereſting manner. The eternal God—the greatneſs of his works—the univerſality of his providence—his awful juſtice—his irreſiſtible power—his infinite mercy—and the wiſdom of God in the myſtery of redeeming grace—the condition of ſaints and ſinners while on earth—and the final deciſion of their eternal ſtate in the day of judgement. The truth is, the ſubjects are ſo very great in themſelves, that it is not poſſible to equal them by the manner of handling them. Probably for this very reaſon many fall ſhort. Diſcouraged by the immenſity of the theme, they fall below what they might have done on ſubjects leſs awful. This, however, ſhews, with what a holy ambition thoſe

who are employed in the ſervice of Chriſt in the goſpel, ſhould endeavour to exert themſelves in the glorious cauſe. Provided they are themſelves in earneſt, and take truth and nature as their guide, they can ſcarcely exceed in zeal and ardour for the glory of God and the good of precious ſouls.

5. Another excellent quality of pulpit-eloquence is, to be under the reſtraint of judgement and propriety. I place this after the former, as its counterpart, and neceſſary to give its proper effect. And it may be obſerved, that as religious and moral ſubjects give the ſureſt and the fulleſt ſcope to zeal and fervour, ſo they need, as much as any, the ſtrict government of prudence and experience. I do not mean only by this, to guard miniſters from the irregular fervours of enthuſiaſm, but to give, if poſſible, a degree of ſolidity and real truth to their inſtructions. They ought to avoid all turgid declamation, to keep to experience, and to take things as they really are. Let ſome people, for example, ſpeak of riches, and what ſhall you hear from them? Gold and ſilver, what are they, but ſhining droſs, ſparkling metals, a thing of no real value? that in the eye of reaſon and philoſophy, they are of no extenſive uſe, and altogether contemptible. And, indeed, to take things in a certain philoſophical abſtraction, they are good for nothing. Mere gold or ſilver you can neither eat nor wear. Their value, you will ſay, depends all upon opinion, the changeable fancy of men. But this manner of ſpeaking, and all that is related to it, ſeeming to be philoſophy and reaſon, is really abſurdity and nonſenſe. For though it be true,

that gold, abſtracted from the opinion of mankind, is not a whit more valuable than ſtones, and that if I was in the midſt of a foreſt, ſurrounded with wild beaſts, a whole bag full of gold would do me no ſervice; yet it is as certain, that in our preſent ſituation, it is of that real value as to procure all the conveniencies of life. The way, then, to treat ſuch ſubjects, is not to uſe theſe rhetorical phraſes in contempt of riches, but to ſhow from experience, that they are good or evil, according to the temper of him that uſes them; and that we ſee diſcontent and ungoverned paſſion find as eaſy acceſs to the anti-chamber of the prince, as the cottage of the poor. The ſame thing I would ſay of fame, that it is eaſy to ſay fame is no more but idle breath, &c.; but the great matter is to view thoſe things in a ſober and rational light, to give to every outward mercy its proper value, and only ſhow how much they are counterbalanced by things of infinitely greater moment.

But what I have often obſerved with moſt regret upon this ſubject is, young perſons carrying the things that are really true and excellent to a certain exceſs or high pitch, that is beyond nature, and does not tend in the leaſt to promote conviction, but rather hinders it. When men ſpeak of virtue or true goodneſs, they are apt to raiſe the deſcription beyond the life in any real inſtance; and when they ſpeak of vice and its conſequences, they are apt to draw the character ſo as it will apply only to a few of the moſt deſperate profligates, and the miſerable ſtate to which they reduce themſelves. This rather ſeems to fortify the generality of per-

ſons, to whom theſe deſcriptions do not apply, in their careleſs and ſecure ſtate.

Once more, I have often obſerved young perſons frequently chooſe as their ſubject afflictions, of which, probably, they have had very little experience, and ſpeak in ſuch a high ſtyle, as if every good man were, as the heroes of old, above the reach of every accident. And it is true, that an eminent ſaint is ſometimes made ſuperior to all his ſufferings; but, generally ſpeaking, we ought to be very tender of ſufferers, till we ourſelves have been in the furnace of affliction; and after that, we ſhall not need be told ſo. On the whole, a ſtrict adherence to truth and nature, and taking the world juſt as it is, will be an excellent mean to direct us in every part of our public ſervice.

6. Laſtly, A miniſter ought to have extenſive knowledge. Every thing whatever, that is the object of human knowledge, may be made ſubſervient to theology. And, conſidering that a miniſter is in public life, and has to do with friends and enemies of all ranks, he ought to be well furniſhed with literature of every kind. At the ſame time, I would have this well underſtood, it is not neceſſary, and I think it is not deſirable, that a miniſter ſhould be quite an adept in particular branches of knowledge, except thoſe that are cloſely related to his proper work. The reaſon of this is, it takes more time to be a perfect maſter of ſome of the particular ſciences, than he has to ſpare from his duty, and therefore with a taſte of the ſeveral ſciences, general knowledge is moſt ſuited to his circumſtances, and moſt neceſſary to his uſefulneſs.

LECTURE XV.

I PROCEED now to the eloquence of the bar. The profeſſion of the law is of great importance in the Britiſh dominions. There is, therefore, great room for this ſort of eloquence. This, indeed, may be ſaid to be the country of law, not only on account of its being a free ſtate, the character of which is, that not man, but the laws, have dominion, which is our glory, but becauſe, by the great multiplicity of our ſtatutes, it becomes an important and difficult ſcience. For both theſe reaſons, there are great hopes propoſed to perſons of ability in this department. They have not only the reaſonable proſpect, if of tolerable abilities, with diligence, to provide an honourable ſubſiſtence to themſelves, but it is the direct road to promotion, and the way of obtaining the higheſt offices in the ſtate.

Here, as in the former particular, we muſt conſider every thing as already ſaid, that belongs to the ſubject in general; and, indeed, by far the greateſt number of valuable books on the ſubject of eloquence having been drawn up by pleaders at the bar, they muſt be at leaſt as much, or perhaps more directly applicable to this ſpecies than any other. I cannot help, however, taking notice of a prepoſterous practice in this country, of ſome who take their children from literature, before they have finiſhed their courſe, becauſe they intend to put them to the law. This muſt be voluntarily confining them to the very loweſt ſort of practice in that pro-

feſſion, for if any whatever ſtand in need of literature, it muſt be the lawyers. Suppoſing, therefore, all that has been ſaid of compoſition, and ſpeaking in general, there are a few particular characters of moſt importance in men of that claſs.

1. Probity, or real untainted integrity. There can be no doubt that integrity is the firſt and moſt important character of a man, be his profeſſion what it will; but I have mentioned it here becauſe there are many not ſo ſenſible of the importance of it in the profeſſion of the law, and think it is neceſſary to make a good man, but not a good lawyer. On the contrary, I am perſuaded, not only that a man loſes nothing in any capacity by his integrity, but that a lawyer ſhould in general ſtudy, by probity and real worth, to obtain reſpect from the public, and to give weight to every thing he ſays. This integrity ſhould ſhow itſelf in undertaking cauſes. There are many that think there is no ground of ſcruple in this reſpect, and ſometimes they are found to boaſt with what addreſs they conducted, and with what ſucceſs they carried through, a very weak cauſe. I apprehend this is truly diſhonourable; and as there are plenty of cauſes in which the equity is doubtful, every one who ſhould make it a point of honour not to undertake a cauſe which they knew not to be juſt, it would give unſpeakable influence to his management and pleadings. The ſame probity ſhould appear in the manner of conducting cauſes;—no ſiniſter arts, no equivocation or concealment of the truth. Perhaps ſome may think that thoſe who ſhould be conſcience-

bound in this manner, would give roguiſh perſons an evident advantage over them; but it is a great miſtake. Let them uſe but prudence and firmneſs, joined with integrity, and they are an over-match for all the villains upon earth. The common proverb is certainly juſt, "Honeſty is the beſt policy." The arts of chicanery can only ſucceed once or twice. As ſoon as a man gets the reputation of cunning, its effect is over, for nobody will truſt him, and every body counter-works him.

2. Another excellent quality for a lawyer, is aſſiduity and method in buſineſs. This is of great advantage to the very beſt genius. I the rather inſiſt upon it, that there prevails often a ſuppoſition that it is not the quality of a great man. Becauſe there are ſome perſons of very middling abilities, who give great application, and are lovers of order, therefore ſome are pleaſed to call thoſe dull plodding fellows, and think it is a mark of fire and vivacity to be irregular both in their buſineſs and in their lives. There are alſo ſome few men of real and great capacity, who are negligent, and even looſe in their practice, who riſe by the mere force of ſingular parts. Theſe are an unhappy example to thoſe ſuperficial creatures, who think, by imitating them in their folly, that they will become as great geniuſes as they. But ſuffer me to obſerve to you, that the greateſt geniuſes here have been remarkable for the moſt vigorous application; and the greateſt men have been, and are, remarkable for order and method in every thing they do. There is a certain dignity which ariſes from a man's word being ſacred, even in keeping an ap-

pointment, or the moſt trifling circumſtance; and for people of buſineſs, order and punctuality gives ſo much eaſe to themſelves, and pleaſure to all who have to do with them, that it is a wonder there ſhould be any body that does not ſtudy it. Is there any genius, think you, in throwing down a thing ſo unthinkingly, that you do not know how to take it up again? The great Archbiſhop of Cambray looks upon it as one of the moſt important things to teach young perſons to put every thing in its proper place. As every thing that belongs to furniture, dreſs, books, and implements, muſt be in ſome place, they are always beſt diſpoſed when each is in its own place. They will give leaſt diſturbance there when they are not uſed, and they will be moſt readily found when they ought to be uſed.

But when we come to looſe and vicious practices, it is truly entertaining to meet with riotous diſorderly fellows, who are pleaſed to ſpeak with contempt of thoſe who love form and good order, as if they themſelves were men of great acuteneſs. Now, I almoſt never knew an example of your miſchief-workers, but they were thick ſculls. I have known ſome, who could neither write a jeſt nor ſpeak a jeſt in all their life, but had tricks enough they could play, to diſturb a ſober neighbourhood. I have thus been led back to the irregularities of youth, from ſpeaking of method in buſineſs, as of importance to lawyers. I ſhall conclude the obſervation with ſaying, that there is no great proſpect of a man's ever being Lord Chancellor, who ſpends his time in ſcouring the ſtreets,

and beating the watch, when he is at the inns of court.

3. Another quality useful to a lawyer is, address, and delicacy in his manners and deportment in general, and the conduct of his business in particular, and above all in pleading and public speaking. The address and delicacy I mean, are such as are acquired by the knowledge of human nature, and some acquaintance with human life. They are useful, I admit, for every public speaker; but, if I am not mistaken, much more needful to the lawyer than the clergyman. The clergyman proceeds upon things of acknowledged moment, a certain dignity of character is allowed him, and expected from him. A pretended delicacy is sometimes offensive in him. A certain firmness, not to call it boldness, and impartiality in administering instruction and reproof, are ornaments in him. But a lawyer must always consider the propriety of time and place; what belongs to him that speaks, or to him or them that are spoken to, or that are spoken of. There are some fine examples of address and delicacy in Cicero, particularly in his orations *pro Roscio, pro Milone, et de lege agraria.*

4. A fourth quality necessary for a lawyer is, extensive knowledge in the arts and sciences, in history, and in the laws. A person that means to rise, or attain to some of the highest degrees of this profession, must strive to accomplish himself by knowledge in the arts and sciences. His business is of a public kind, the causes he may have occasion to treat are exceedingly various. What ad-

verſaries he may meet with, he is altogether uncertain. I do not mean that a lawyer need to be an adept in particular branches of ſcience, but the principles of knowledge in general are very neceſſary, otherwiſe he will frequently expoſe himſelf. Groſs ignorance in the ſciences will lay him open to blunders in language, which he could not otherwiſe avoid. Hiſtory alſo is a branch of literature that a lawyer ſhould make his favourite ſtudy; as his buſineſs lies in canvaſſing the various relations of men in ſocial life, he will be beſt able to reaſon on the meaning and propriety of laws, and their application, if he be well acquainted with hiſtory, which points out the ſtate of ſociety, and human affairs in every age. As to knowledge of the laws, this is what lawyers cannot do without, and what therefore they do neceſſarily ſtudy; but it would be much to their advantage, if they would add to the knowledge of the municipal laws of their own country, a knowledge of the great principles of equity, and of natural and political law, as applied in general.

5. The laſt quality I ſhall mention as of uſe to a lawyer, is, quickneſs and vivacity. It is of uſe to him to have an acuteneſs and penetration to obſerve the turns of a cauſe. To detect the plots and fallacy of adverſaries, as well as to anſwer upon the ſpot, whatever may be thrown up. I am ſenſible that this of quickneſs is entirely a natural quality, and cannot be learned; but I thought it beſt to obſerve it, becauſe it is of more uſe to a lawyer than to moſt other men. A miniſter is on-

ly called to ſpeak what he has deliberately prepared, and fully digeſted; but a lawyer quite incapable of extemporary productions, would not do ſo well. It is alſo certain, that wit, which is intolerable in the pulpit, is often not barely pardonable in a lawyer, but very uſeful. There is, however, ſuch a difference in the capacity of men, that one may be eminent in one branch, and defective in another. A man of coolneſs, penetration, and application, is often eminent in chamber-councils; and one of vivacity, paſſion, and elocution, eminent in pleading cauſes, eſpecially in criminal courts.

The third and laſt diviſion of this claſs, is the eloquence of promiſcuous deliberative aſſemblies. I ſhall not be very long upon this ſubject, but as it is far from being improbable that ſome here preſent may in future life have occaſion to act in that ſphere, and to be members of the provincial aſſemblies, I ſhall make a few remarks upon it to that purpoſe. In large deliberative aſſemblies of the political kind, there is nearly as much opportunity for fervour and paſſion, as there is to the divine, and more ſcope for wit and humour than to the lawyer. For though no matters of a merely temporal kind, are of equal moment in themſelves with the things a miniſter has to treat of, yet men's paſſions are almoſt as much, and in many caſes more, excited and intereſted by them. The fate of nations, the welfare of our country, liberty, or ſervitude, may often ſeem to want as violent an exertion of the paſſionate kind of eloquence, as any ſubject whatever.

It is worth while to obſerve, that ſeveral writers, in ſpeaking of the ancient and modern eloquence, have taken it for granted, that the circumſtances of things are changed; that the violent paſſionate eloquence that prevailed in Greece and Rome, would not do in modern times. They will tell you, that in a modern ſenate, or other deliberative aſſembly, people come all prepared by private intereſt, and will vote juſt as they are engaged, without regard to either eloquence or truth; but ſome very able writers have delivered a contrary opinion, particularly David Hume, who, though an infidel in opinion, is of great reach and accuracy of judgement in matters of criticiſm. He has ſaid, that human nature is always the ſame, and that the eloquence which kindles and governs the paſſions will always have great influence in large aſſemblies, let them be of what ſtation or rank ſoever. I apprehend, that experience, ſince his writing the above, has fully juſtified it by two ſignal examples; one in the ſtate, and the other in the church. Mr Pitt, now Earl of Chatham, from being a colonel of dragoons, roſe to the higheſt ſtation in the Britiſh Empire, merely by the power of a warm and paſſionate eloquence. There was never any thing in his diſcourſes that was remarkable, either for ſtrength of reaſoning, or purity and elegance of ſtyle; but a very great impetuoſity and fire, that carried his point in the Britiſh Houſe of Commons. The other inſtance is the late Mr Whitfield, who acquired and preſerved a degree of popularity, to which the preſent age never ſaw any thing that could be compared. The happy ends that were promoted by this

in providence, I omit, as a ſubject of a different nature; but the immediate and ſecond cauſes that produced it were a power of elocution, and natural talents for public ſpeaking, ſuperior by far to any that ever I ſaw poſſeſſed by any man on earth.

To ſucceed in ſpeaking in public deliberative aſſemblies, the following are the moſt important qualities.

1. Dignity of character and diſintereſtedneſs. In public deliberations, it is not eaſy to procure attention, unleſs there is ſome degree of character preſerved; and indeed, wherever there is a high opinion of the candour and ſincerity of the ſpeaker, it will give an inconceivable weight to his ſentiments in debate.

2. There is a neceſſity of knowledge of the moſt liberal kind, that is, the knowledge of men and manners, of hiſtory, and of human nature. The moſt ſucceſsful ſpeakers in ſenates, are generally thoſe who know mankind beſt; and if a man would uniformly preſerve his character and influence in this light, he muſt addict himſelf to the ſtudy of hiſtory, and the exerciſe of reflection.

3. To this ſort of eloquence is particularly neceſſary, a power over the paſſions. This is one of the moſt important characters of eloquence in general; yet it is more peculiarly neceſſary, and more eminently powerful, in promiſcuous deliberative aſſemblies, than in any other. In religious diſcourſes, the effect is expected to be cool, deep, and permanent. Even preachers in ſingle diſcourſes, rather chooſe to ſpeak as writers, than as pleaders; and lawyers, except in ſome few inſtances, may

expect to have their assertions taken to pieces, canvassed and tried one after another; but in meetings of the political kind, the decision is to be by a vote, before the dissolution of the assembly, and cannot be altered afterwards though the majority should change their sentiments. In these assemblies, therefore, to be sure, a power over the passions must be of the utmost moment.

I shall conclude this particular by two subordinate remarks on the same subject. 1. That to succeed in speaking in senates or large assemblies, there is much need of great discernment, both to proportionate men's attempts to their capacity, and to choose the proper time for exerting it. When information is demanded, any person who can give it will be heard with patience upon it: but on subjects of high political importance, where there are many eminent champions on each side, even persons of moderate abilities would run a risk of being affronted. 2. The other direction is, that all who intend to be speakers in political assemblies, must begin early. If they delay beginning till years shall add maturity to their judgement, and weight to their authority, the consequence will be, that years will add so much to their caution and diffidence, that they will never begin at all.

We come now to consider the structure of a particular discourse—the order, proportion, and mutual relation of the several parts. Orators, or critics on oratory, very early learned to analyse a discourse, and to enumerate the parts of which it is composed. They are a little differently stated by different authors; some reckon four—introduction, proposition,

confirmation, and concluſion; others, five, adding narration; others, ſix, adding refutation; and there are ſome diſcourſes in which you may eaſily have each of theſe different things; but conſidering that we muſt take this matter ſo generally, as to include all kinds of compoſition, it would be, I think, as well to adopt the diviſion in poetical criticiſm, and ſay, that every regular diſcourſe, or compoſition of every kind, muſt have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Every performance, however ſhort, muſt be capable of ſome ſuch diviſion, otherwiſe it is called abrupt and irregular. The reaſon why I would make the diviſion in this manner is, that the beginning is properly the introduction; the middle includes every thing, however various, that is taken into the body of a diſcourſe; now, theſe may be very many, propoſition, narration, explication, confirmation, illuſtration, and refutation; but theſe are not all requiſite in every diſcourſe, and are to be introduced in propoſitions variable and accidental, according to the nature of every particular ſubject.

Let us ſpeak firſt of the introduction.—This is the more neceſſary, that it is of very conſiderable importance, eſpecially to an orator; it is alſo difficult, at leaſt ſpeakers have generally ſaid ſo. We find it ſaid in ſome of the books of oratory, that the introduction, though firſt pronounced, ought to be laſt compoſed—that it comes to be conſidered after the diſcourſe is finiſhed; but this does not appear to me to be either natural or neceſſary, except in a qualified ſenſe; the introduction is commonly ſettled after the ſubject is pitched upon, the diſtribution

planned and digeſted, and ſuch reflection upon the whole as precedes writing.

The ends in an introduction, are ſaid by Cicero to be theſe, *Reddere auditorem attentum, benevolum et docilem ;*—to make the reader attentive to the diſcourſe, favourable to the ſpeaker, and willing to receive inſtruction upon the ſubject. Theſe different views may not only be altered in their order, at the judgement of the orator, but any of them may be left out when it is unneceſſary; if, for example, I have no reaſon to ſuſpect diſaffection in any of my hearers, long apologies, eſpecially if any way perſonal, are rather diſguſting.

The ways of procuring either attention, a favour, or making the hearers teachable, are ſo various, that they can neither be enumerated nor claſſed. In this the orator muſt exerciſe his invention, judgement, and good taſte. The moſt uſual manner of introduction, is a common place upon the importance of the ſubject; the introductions drawn from the circumſtances of time, place, and perſon, are generally the moſt ſtriking; ſometimes an unuſual ſtroke is happy in an introduction, as alſo a weighty reflection or bold ſentiment on the ſubject itſelf. A funeral ſermon was happily begun by Mr Baxter, in this manner: "Death is the occaſion of our preſent meeting, and death ſhall be the ſubject of the following diſcourſe; I am to ſpeak of that which ſhall ſhortly ſilence me, and you are to hear of that which ſhall ſpeedily ſtop your ears." Dr Evans begins a ſermon on Eccleſ. xii. 10. "Rejoice, O young man!" &c by telling a ſtory of a ſoldier whoſe life was ſaved by a Bible in his pocket,

and his converſion produced by the accident; the Bible ſaved him from being ſhot through with a bullet, and, when he examined, it had juſt pierced the leaves through, till it ſtopped at that paſſage, which no doubt he read with particular emotions. A diſcourſe of a lawyer in a law-ſuit, is generally beſt begun by a narrative of the occaſion of the quarrel, and the introducing of any common-place topics would be reckoned affectation. A clergyman may often have an introduction to his ſubject with advantage, and may alſo often begin by a conciſe view of the context, or the occaſion of the words he has choſen to diſcourſe upon.

Perhaps what will be of moſt uſe here, will be to point out ſeveral ways by which an introduction may be faulty: of theſe I ſhall mention the following.

1. An introduction may be faulty, by being too pompous and extravagant. This is one of the moſt common faults in the prefaces or introductions to books. When an author is to write upon any ſubject, he thinks it neceſſary to ſhow, not only that his ſubject is worth the handling, but that it is better than all other ſubjects. Weak and pedantic writers are often guilty of this to a degree that is ridiculous. A treatiſe on arithmetic, ſometimes is introduced by a pompous proof that the knowledge of numbers is either ſuperior to, or the baſis of all other knowledge; the ſame thing is done with grammar; and there is often a general truth or plauſibility from which the ridicule to which they expoſe themſelves takes its riſe; for, to be ſure, number is every where; every thing that ever was or can be, muſt be either

one or more. As to grammar, all good ſenſe muſt certainly be grammar: yet there are ſometimes perſons who would be thought to underſtand both theſe ſubjects very well, who could not ſpeak five ſentences, or write a letter, without being deſervedly laughed at.

2. An introduction may be faulty, by being general. We ſee often reflections in the introduction to a diſcourſe, that would be juſt as proper for one ſubject as for another. Such ſentiments may be ſaid to go before, but they cannot be ſaid to introduce their ſubject. Sometimes you will hear the introduction almoſt out, before you can conjecture what is to be the ſubject; and ſome are ſo unhappy in the choice of introductory ſentiments, that you would think they intend ſomething that is very different from what really appears in the piece itſelf.

3. It is a fault in an introduction, to be filled with remarks quite beaten and hackneyed, if I may ſpeak ſo. Theſe may have been very good remarks or ſentiments when firſt conceived and uttered, but by perpetual repetition have loſt their force, and from the very commonneſs appear mean and deſpicable. They are many of them founded upon ſayings in the claſſic authors, and in the paſt age were commonly produced as quotations, with their paraphraſe, ſuch as, "*Omne tulit punctum qui miſcuit utile dulci.*" "*Ingratum ſi dixeris, omnia dixeris.*"

4. An introduction may be forced and unnatural; that is to ſay, ſuch remarks may be made, as it requires a great deal of pains to ſhow any relation between them and the ſubject to be treated.

5. It may be fanciful or whimsical. There was an age when these sort of introductions were to the taste of the public. This fancy or whim, or, as I may call it, a finical way of entering upon a subject publicly, may be best illustrated by an example. An author of the last age begins a discourse upon ch. viii. of the Epistle to the Romans, v. 28. to this purpose: "The scriptures may be considered as a large and rich garden.—The New Testament is the most valuable division of that garden.—The Epistle to the Romans is the richest compartment of that division; the 8th chapter is the most delightful border of that compartment, and the 28th verse the finest flower of that border."

6. An introduction may be faulty by being tedious. An introduction is designed to whet the attention, and excite impatience for what is to follow. But when it is very long, it not only disgusts by the disappointment, but wastes that attention which should be preserved in full vigour, or raises a high expectation, which is probably for that reason disappointed.

As to the middle or body of a discourse, the chief thing to be attended to in this place is, to make you sensible of what it consists. The former discourses have all been intended to teach you the way of composition, both as to materials and structure; yet as to the method of conducting a particular discourse, I would make the three following remarks:

(1.) Be careful of the order of the several particulars mentioned. You may not see it proper to introduce all in the compass of a single discourse, but so far as they are introduced, they should be in

the following order: Propoſition, narration, illuſtration, confirmation, refutation. You will ſpeedily perceive this to be the order of nature, to lay down the method, narrate the facts, illuſtrate them by whatever may have that effect, adduce the proofs, reſolve objections. A perſon of a clear head will range his ſentiments in this order; yet there are ſome exceptions to be admitted. Sometimes it is uſeful in a cauſe to reſerve a part of the ſtory itſelf, to apply or illuſtrate an argument; and in ſome few inſtances it is beſt to anſwer objections, or remove prejudices, before you adduce your proofs.

(2.) It is a moſt uſeful direction to the greateſt part of writers and ſpeakers, to guard againſt introducing every thing that they might ſay, or being ſo formal that they will ſay ſomething in the way of form in every one of their diviſions. This analyſis of a diſcourſe is good for making the judgement clear; but if it be applied merely to make the invention copious, it will probably produce an unneceſſary load. Some people will needs anſwer objections on any ſubject, and frequently teach their hearers to make objections which they never would have thought of.

(3.) Learn to keep cloſe to a ſubject, and bring in nothing but what is truly of force to the point to be proved. I the rather mention this as a rule for the middle or body of a diſcourſe, becauſe the moſt are there apt to tranſgreſs it. In the introduction and the concluſion, every one but thoſe who are perfectly ſtupid keep their ſubject directly in their eye; whereas in the body, when they are entered

upon argument and amplification, they are apt to be led aſtray, and either to fall into what may be called abſolute digreſſions, or at leaſt to lengthen ſome parts more than true proportion requires.

As to the concluſion or peroration, to this may be applied particularly all that was ſaid upon pathos, or raiſing the paſſions, to which I add the following ſhort obſervations:

1. The concluſion ſhould be by far the warmeſt and moſt animated part of the diſcourſe. It is not, I think, deſirable to attempt to raiſe the paſſions of an audience high, till towards the cloſe of a diſcourſe, becauſe, if it be begun ſooner, there is an evident hazard of not being able to preſerve them in the ſame pitch till the end.

2. The concluſion ſhould collect into one point of view, by ſome well-choſen expreſſions, the force of what has gone before; and the greateſt ſkill in the ſpeaker is ſhown by concentrating the whole in this manner. Before the illuſtration it could not be ſaid ſo briefly; but by the help of what went before, it may be recalled to memory in leſs room.

3. Towards the concluſion the ſentences ſhould be ſtudied, the tone of voice higher, and the pronunciation more rapid than towards the beginning.

4. Laſtly, great care ſhould be taken in moral diſcourſes to have no far-fetched inferences.

LECTURE XVI.

I AM now to conclude the diſcourſes upon this ſubject by an inquiry into the general principles of taſte and criticiſm. In the former diſcourſes, we have kept cloſe to the arts of writing and ſpeaking, and have attempted to deſcribe the various kinds of compoſition, their characters, diſtinctions, beauties, blemiſhes, the means of attaining ſkill in them, and the uſes to which they ſhould be applied. But is it not proper to conſider the alliance, if there be any ſuch, between this and other arts? This will ſerve greatly to improve and perfect our judgement and taſte. It was very early obſerved, that there was a relation between the different arts, and ſome common principles that determine their excellence. Cicero mentions this in the introduction of his oration for Archias the poet. *Etenim omnes artes quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur.*

Theſe arts, which, Cicero ſays, *ad humanitatem pertinent*, are called by the moderns the fine arts. This is to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe commonly called the mechanic arts, making the utenſils and conveniences of common life. And yet even theſe may be included, as taſte and elegance, or the want of it may plainly be diſcerned in every production of human ſkill. However, thoſe called the fine arts are the following: Poetry, oratory, muſic, painting, ſculpture, architecture. It muſt be allowed,

that though these arts have some common principles of excellence, there are some persons who have a strong inclination after, and even a capacity of performing in some of them, and not in others. There are good orators who are no musicians, or perhaps who have very little taste for the beauties of architecture. Yet commonly complete critics, and those who have a well-formed taste, are able to perceive the beauty of the whole, and the relation of one to another. It is remarkable, that the expressions in composition are frequently borrowed from one art, and applied to another. We say, a smooth, polished style, as well as a polished surface; and we say, a building is sweet or elegant, as well as an oration. We say, the notes in music are bold and swelling, or warm and animated.

One of our modern authors on eloquence, has thought fit to take exception at the use of the word *taste*, as being of late invention, and as implying nothing but what is carried in judgement and genius. But I apprehend that the application of it, though it should be admitted to be modern, is perfectly just. It came to us from the French. The *bon gout* among them was applied first to classic elegance, and from thence to all the other arts. And as a sense of the beauty of the arts is certainly a thing often distinct from judgement, as well as from erudition, the term seems not only to be allowable, but well chosen. We find persons who can reason very strongly upon many subjects, who yet are incapable of elegance in composition, and indeed of receiving much delight from the other fine arts. Nay, we find persons of uncommon acuteness in mathematics

and natural philoſophy, who yet are incapable of attaining to a fine taſte.

It has been ſometimes ſaid, that taſte is arbitrary. Some will have it, that there is no ſuch thing as a ſtandard of taſte, or any method of improving it. It is a kind of common proverb with many, that there is no diſputing about taſte: that it is of this intellectual as of natural taſte; according as the palate or organs are differently formed, what gives an agreeable reliſh to one, gives a diſagreeable one to another. They ſay that the modes of taſte are temporary and variable—that different nations, climates, governments, and ages, have different ways of ſpeaking and writing, and a different turn in all the arts—that chance, or particular perſons, will be able to give a turn to the mode in all theſe. Even ſo great a man as Dr Warburton has embraced this ſentiment, and to thoſe who attack the ſcriptures as not being a complete model of eloquence he anſwers, there is no fixed ſtandard of eloquence; that eloquence is one thing in Arabia, another in Greece, and another in England. For this reaſon he condemns thoſe who, after the example of Mr Blackwall, in his Sacred Claſſics, vindicate the ſcriptures from objections of this kind, or produce inſtances of their ſublimity and beauty. But though I have ſhown you in ſome of the former diſcourſes, that the ſtyle and manner in vogue will receive ſome tincture, and be liable to ſome variation, from all the particulars mentioned; yet there is certainly a real beauty or deformity in nature, independent of theſe partial changes, which, when properly explained, and examples of it exhibited, will obtain more uni-

verſal approbation, and retain it longer than the others. The poetry and oratory of the ancients, and their painting and ſtatuary, are inſtances and proofs of this. It may alſo appear from what I mentioned to you formerly, that thoſe compoſitions which have moſt ſimplicity, and ſuch excellencies as are moſt ſolid, with feweſt of the caſual ornaments of faſhion, and the peculiarities of their own age, will pleaſe, when their contemporaries are loſt in oblivion. The ſame thing holds with pieces of furniture that are elegant but plain. Such have the beauties of nature, which belong to every age. But to ſhow this more fully, even the remarks upon natural taſte are not true in ſuch a ſenſe as to weaken what has been ſaid. For though it is certain, that perſons uſed to the coarſeſt kind of food, which they have often eaten with reliſh, may ſhow at firſt an averſion to the delicacies of cookery, yet after a perſon has been a little accuſtomed to that kind of preparation of victuals in which regard is had to the mixtures that are moſt proper to gratify the palate, he will not eaſily return to his ſlovenly proviſion. But though there were leſs in this remark, it ſeems plain, that there is a taſte in the fine arts, and a real foundation for it in nature.

But ſuppoſing that there is a foundation in nature for taſte and criticiſm, there is another queſtion that ariſes, viz. Can we tell what it is? Can we reach the original principles which govern this matter? Can we ſay, not only that ſuch and ſuch things pleaſe us, but why they do ſo? Can we go any further than we have already done, as to compoſition? Some have refuſed that we can with certainty

reach the ſource of this ſubject. When the cauſe is aſked, why one perſon, one thing, or one compoſition, is more excellent than another, they ſay it is an immediate and ſimple perception, a *je ne scais quoi*, as the French ſay; which phraſe ſeems to have taken its riſe from the circumſtance which often occurs, that in a houſe, a garden, a ſtatue or painting, or even in a perſon's countenance and carriage, you perceive ſomething agreeable upon the whole, and yet cannot ſuddenly tell wherein it lies, the parts are not better proportioned perhaps, nor the features better formed, than in another, and yet there is ſomething in the compoſition of the whole that gives the moſt exquiſite delight.

Others, however, and the far greateſt number, have thought it proper to go a great deal further, and to inquire into human nature, its perceptions and powers, and endeavour to trace out the principles of taſte, which apply in general to all the fine arts, or in greater or leſs proportion to each of them, for ſome apply more to one than to others. As for example, if the ſenſe of harmony is an original perception, it applies chiefly to muſic, and remotely to the pronunciation of an orator, and ſtill more remotely to the compoſition of an orator. Theſe powers or perceptions in human nature have been generally called the powers of imagination. Mr Hutchinſon calls them reflex ſenſes, finer internal ſenſations; and upon examination we ſhall find, that, beſides the internal ſenſes, there are certain finer perceptions, which we are capable of, which may be ſaid to take their riſe from outward objects,

and to ſuppoſe the external ſenſation, but yet to be additions to, and truly diſtinct from it. As for example, I ſee a beautiful perſon. My eye immediately perceives colour, and ſhape variouſly diſpoſed; but I have further a ſenſe of beauty in the whole. I hear the ſound of muſical inſtruments; my ear receives the noiſe; every body's ear who is not deaf does the ſame. If I have a ſenſe of harmony, I take a pleaſure in the compoſition of the ſounds. The way to examine the principles of taſte, is to conſider which of theſe perceptions are ſimple, immediate, and original; which of them are dependent upon others; and how they may be combined and compounded, and afford delight by ſuch compoſition.

This is an extenſive ſubject, and it is difficult to treat it conciſely, and yet plainly; and indeed, after all the pains I can take, there will be reaſon to apprehend ſome obſcurity will remain to perſons not uſed to ſuch kind of diſquiſitions. The way I ſhall take is, to ſtate to you critically or hiſtorically the way in which this matter hath been treated by ſome of the moſt celebrated writers. The Spectator, written by Mr Addiſon, on the Pleaſures of the Imagination, reduces the ſources of delight or approbation to three great claſſes, novelty, greatneſs, and beauty. He ſays, that ſuch is our deſire after novelty, that all things that were before unknown, are from this circumſtance recommended to us, and that we receive a delight in the diſcovery and contemplation of what we never ſaw before, except ſuch objects as are painful to the organs of ſight;

that children run from one play-thing to another, not becauſe it is better, but new; that it is the ſame caſe with men; and that authors in particular are at great pains to have ſomething new and ſtriking in their manner, which is the more difficult to be attained that they muſt make uſe of known words, and that their ideas too muſt be ſuch as are eaſily intelligible. There is ſomething here that would require a good deal of explication. I do not think that any object is, properly ſpeaking, painful to the organs of ſight, except too much light; but we do not conſider this as a fault in the object, but feel it as a weakneſs in ourſelves. And further, if there be ſuch a thing as beauty, one would think, that if beauty be agreeable, it muſt have a contrary, which is uglineſs, and that muſt be diſagreeable. As to greatneſs, this has been always conſidered as a ſource of admiration. The moſt ancient critics obſerve, that we do not admire a ſmall rivulet, but we admire the Danube, the Nile, the ocean. This I will afterwards conſider. As to beauty, it has been conſidered as of all other things moſt inconceivable, and therefore made a firſt and immediate perception.

Others have taken beauty and grace as the general terms, including every thing that pleaſes us. Thus we ſay, a beautiful poem, ſtatue, landſcape. Thus alſo we ſay, a ſublime and beautiful ſentiment. Thus they have taken in under it, novelty and greatneſs, and every other agreeable quality. Many eminent critics have acted in this manner, particularly the ancients. Longinus, on the Sublime, in-

troduces ſeveral things which do not belong to it, as diſtinguiſhed from beauty. Taking beauty as the general object of approbation or ſource of delight, and as applicable to all the fine arts, it has been variouſly analyſed.

A French writer, Crouſaz, *Traite de Beau*, analyſes beauty under the following principles: Variety, unity, regularity, order, proportion. Variety is the firſt. This ſeems to be related to, or perhaps in ſome reſpects the ſame with novelty, which was formerly mentioned. It is certain, that a dead uniformity cannot produce beauty in any ſort of performance, poem, oration, ſtatue, picture, building. Unity is, as it were, the bound and reſtraint of variety. Things muſt be connected as well as various; and if they are connected, the variety is nothing but confuſion. Regularity is the ſimilarity of the correſpondent parts; order is the eaſy gradation from one to another; and proportion is the ſuitableneſs of each part to the whole, and to every other part. I think it cannot be denied, that all theſe have their influence in producing beauty.

One of the moſt celebrated pieces upon this ſubject, is the famous painter Hogarth's Analyſis of Beauty. He firſt produced his ſyſtem in a ſort of enigma, drawing one curved line, with the title of the line of beauty, and another with a double wave, which he called the line of grace. He afterwards publiſhed his Analyſis of Beauty, which he reſolves into the following principles: Fitneſs, variety, uniformity, ſimplicity, intricacy, and quantity. The firſt principle is fitneſs; under which he ſhows, that

we always conceive of a thing as intended for ſome uſe, and therefore there muſt be a correſpondence or ſuitableneſs to the uſe, otherwiſe, whatever be its appearance, we reject it as not beautiful. He inſtances ſailors, who, whenever there is a ſhip that ſails well, they call her a beauty. The ſame thing will apply perfectly to all kinds of writing: for whatever fine ſentiments and noble expreſſion be in any compoſition, if they are not ſuited to the ſeaſon and ſubject, we ſay with Horace, *Sed nunc non erat his locus.* Variety and uniformity muſt be compounded together; and as he has made no mention of order and proportion, it is to be ſuppoſed, that by variety he meant that which changes in a gradual and inſenſible manner; for variety without order is undiſtinguiſhable, and a heap of confuſion. Simplicity means that which is eaſy, and which the eye travels over and examines without difficulty; and intricacy is that which requires ſome exerciſe and attention to follow it; theſe two muſt limit one another. In repreſenting beauty as a viſible figure, he obſerves, that a ſtraight line has the leaſt beauty; that which has a wave or eaſy declination one way begins to be beautiful; that which has a double wave has ſtill greater grace. The truth is, if theſe two things do not deſtroy the one the other, ſimplicity and intricacy improve and beautify one another. Mr Hogarth obſerves, that ringlets of hair waving in the wind have been an expreſſion of grace and elegance in every age, nation, and language; which is juſt a contraſted wave, firſt, that

of the curls, and this again rendered a little more intricate by the motion of the breeze. If one would have a view of this principle as exhibited in a ſingle kind, let him look at the flouriſhes with which the maſters of the pen adorn their pieces, and he will ſee, that if they are eaſy and gradual in their flexions, and juſt as intricate as the eye can follow without confuſion, any thing leſs than that is leſs beautiful, and any thing more deſtroys the beauty by diſorder. I might ſhow you how this principle applies to all the art, but ſhall only mention compoſition, where the ſimplicity muſt be combined with refinement, and when the combination is juſt, there reſults the moſt perfect elegance. Mr Hogarth adds quantity; that a thing having the other qualities, pleaſes in proportion as it is great; as we ſay, a magnificent building, where the proportions are truly obſerved, but every part is large.

I have only to obſerve, that Mr Hogarth has very well illuſtrated the principles of beauty; but at the ſame time he ſeems to have introduced two, which belong to other ſources of delight, viz. fitneſs and quantity, as will be ſhown afterwards.

It is to be obſerved, that in the enumeration of the principles of beauty, there are to be found in ſome authors things not only different, but oppoſite. A French author, not many years ago, to the principles mentioned by others, adds ſtrength, which he illuſtrates in this manner: He conſiders it as a principle of grace and beauty in motion, and ſays that every thing that we do with great difficulty, and that ſeems to require our utmoſt effort, is ſeen

with uneaſineſs, and not with pleaſure. For this reaſon, he ſays the motions of young people in general are more graceful than thoſe of old; and agreeably to this we join the word *ease* to gracefulneſs as explicatory—a graceful, eaſy carriage. With this explication it ſeems abundantly proper to admit the remark. On the other hand, there are ſome who have made comparative weakneſs a principle of beauty, and ſay, that the more light and ſlender any thing is, unleſs it be remarkably weak, it is the more beautiful, and that things remarkably ſtrong rather belong to another claſs. Thus we ſay, a fine, tender, delicate ſhape—and, on the contrary, we ſay, a ſtrong, coarſe, robuſt make—a ſtrong, coarſe, maſculine woman. Perhaps we may reconcile theſe two, and ſay, they are both principles, becauſe there ſhould be juſt as much of each as is ſuitable to the thing in queſtion, that a perſon may have either too ſtrong or too weak a frame, for being eſteemed beautiful—that a pillar or dome may be too delicate to be durable, or too ſtrong and bulky to be elegant.

Again: Many writers, as you have ſeen, make greatneſs a principle of beauty; yet there are others who make littleneſs one of the conſtituents of beauty. Thoſe who do ſo tell us, that *little* is a term of endearment, in every nation and language yet known; that it is the language of the vulgar, and therefore the undeſigned expreſſion of nature. They inſtance the diminutive appellations which are always uſed in fondling;—*filiolus*, *filiola*, have

more affection, than *filius* and *filia*—my dear little creature—it is a pretty little thing. To enumerate theſe different appearances, ſome, particularly Burke on the Sublime, affirms, that the ideas of ſublimity and beauty are ideas of a claſs radically different; that the firſt, ſublimity, ultimately ariſes from the paſſion of terror, and the other from that of love and delight; he, with a good deal of ingenuity, reſolves all the ſources of the ſublime into what is either terrible, or allied to this paſſion, exciting it either immediately in ſome degree, or by aſſociation. It is however uncertain, whether we ſhould reduce what we receive ſo much delight from, to a paſſion, which in itſelf, or in its purity, ſo to ſpeak, is painful. This objection he endeavours to remove, by ſhewing that the exerciſe of all our paſſions in a moderate degree, is a ſource of pleaſure; but perhaps we may diſtinguiſh the ideas of ſublime and beautiful, without having recourſe to the paſſion of terror at all, by ſaying, that there is an affection ſuited to the greatneſs of objects, without conſidering them as terrible, and that is, veneration: nay, perhaps we may go a little further, and ſay, that veneration is the affection truly correſpondent to greatneſs, in innocent creatures, which becomes terror in the guilty. I cannot go through the particulars of Burke's theory. He ſeems rightly to devide the ideas of ſublime and beautiful; by the union of which, ſome have made one thing, others directly its contrary, to belong to beauty. One thing remarkable in Burke's Eſſay is, that he denies proportion to be any of the cauſes of beauty, which yet almoſt every

other writer has enumerated among them; and what he says of the infinitely various proportion in plants and animals, seems to be much in support of his opinion: yet in works of art, proportion seems of much moment; and it is difficult to say to what source to refer it. I view a building, and if the parts are not in a regular proportion, it offends my eye, even though I could suppose that the disproportion was voluntary, in order to obtain some great convenience.

I should be inclined to think, that there are a considerable number of simple principles, or internal sensations, that contribute each its part in forming our taste, and are capable of being variously combined, and by this combination are apt to be confounded one with another. One of the most distinct and complete enumerations, we have in Gerard's Essay on Taste, and is as follows: A sense of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, ridicule, and virtue. I cannot go through all these in order, but shall make a few remarks, and show where the division is just or defective. His distinguishing all these from one another, is certainly just; but there are some things that he introduces under wrong heads; fitness, for example, he introduces under the head of beauty; and this seems rather a source of approbation distinct in itself; as also proportion, if that is not included in fitness. Perhaps a more complete enumeration than any of them, may be given thus: Novelty, sublimity, beauty, proportion, imitation, harmony, ridicule, utility, and virtue.

We ſhall now proceed to thoſe we have not ſpoken of before; imitation certainly gives great pleaſure to the mind, and that of itſelf, even independent of the object imitated. An exceedingly well imitated reſemblance of any object, of that which is indifferent or even diſagreeable in itſelf, gives the higheſt pleaſure, either from the act of compariſon, as ſome ſay, or from its ſuggeſting the idea of ſkill and ingenuity in the imitator. The arts of painting and ſtatuary derive their excellence from the perfection of imitation; and it is even thought that poetry and oratory may be conſidered in the ſame light, only that the firſt imitates form, and paſſions by the means of form, and the other imitates actions and affections by language, as the inſtrument.

Harmony is the moſt diſtinct and ſeparate of all the internal ſenſes that have been mentioned; it is concerned only in ſound, and therefore muſt be but remotely applicable to the writer and ſpeaker. What is remarkable, that although harmony may be ſaid to be of much importance in ſpeaking, there are many examples of the moſt excellent ſpeakers, that yet have no muſical ear at all, and I think the inſtances of thoſe who have a remarkably delicate muſical ear, and at the ſame time are agreeable ſpeakers, are not many.

The ſenſe of ridicule is not very eaſily explained, but it is eaſily underſtood when ſpoken of, becauſe it is univerſally felt. It differs in this from moſt other of our conſtitutional powers, that there is ſcarcely any man who is not ſenſible of the ridiculous, or may be made eaſily ſenſible of it; and yet

the number of good performers in the art of ridiculing others, or in wit and humour, is but very small. The multitude who cannot follow ſpeculative reaſoning, and are hard to be moved by eloquence, are all ſtruck with works of humour. Moſt people are apt to think they can do ſomething in the way of humour; and yet we have many who render themſelves ridiculous by the attempt.

As to a ſenſe of virtue, by mentioning it, it is by no means from my joining with thoſe who would place moral approbation entirely on the ſame footing with the internal ſenſes, that are the foundation of taſte. Hutchinſon and Shafteſbury incline very much this way; on the contrary, I think we are evidently ſenſible that the morality of actions is a different ſpecies, and ariſes from the ſenſe of a law, and obligation of a ſuperior nature: yet I have mentioned it here, becauſe there is certainly a relation, or connecting tie, between the ſentiments of the one kind and of the other. The beauties of nature, we are ſenſible, are greatly heightened by adding to their delightful appearance, a reflection on their utility, and the benevolent intention of their author. In perſons capable of morality, as in human nature, we conſider fine features and an elegant carriage, as indications of the moral diſpoſition or the mental powers; and as the whole of the ſources of delight mentioned above may be combined in a greater or leſſer degree, as novelty, ſublimity, beauty, &c. ſo the governing principle which ought to direct the application of the whole, is what gives them their higheſt excellence, and

indeed only is their true perfection. The gratification even of our internal ſenſes is highly improved, when united with taſte and elegance; as the moſt delicious food, when ſerved up with neatneſs and order, accompanied with politeneſs of manners, and ſeaſoned with ſprightly converſation. In the ſame manner, the fine arts themſelves acquire a double beauty and higher reliſh, when they are inſeparably connected with, and made ſubſervient to purity of manners. An admirable poem, or an eloquent diſcourſe, or a fine picture, would be ſtill more excellent, if the ſubject of them were intereſting and valuable; and when any of them are perverted to impious or wicked purpoſes, they are juſt objects of deteſtation.

After having thus attempted the analyſis of the principles of taſte and elegance, I would obſerve, that as nature ſeems to delight in producing many great and different effects from ſimple cauſes, perhaps we may find an ultimate principle that governs all theſe. A French author has written a treatiſe called the Theory of Agreeable Senſations, in which he ſays, that the great principle is, whatever exerciſes our faculties, without fatiguing them, gives pleaſure; and that this principle may be applied to our bodily form, and to the conſtitution of our mind, to objects of external ſenſation, to objects of taſte, and even to our moral conduct. It may no doubt be carried through the whole of criticiſm; and we may ſay, this ſtates the bounds between variety and uniformity, ſimplicity and intricacy, order, proportion, and harmony.

Neither would it be difficult to ſhow, that this principle may be applied to morality, and that an infinitely wiſe and gracious God had ſo ordered matters, that the moderate exerciſe of all our powers ſhould produce at once virtue and happineſs, and that the leaſt tranſgreſſion of the one muſt prove of neceſſity an injury to the other.

You may ſee from the preceding remarks, that the foundation is laid for taſte in our nature; yet there is great room for improvement and cultivation;—by inveſtigating the grounds of approbation; by comparing one thing with another; by ſtudying the beſt examples; and by reflection and judgement, men may correct and refine their taſte upon the whole, or upon particular confined ſubjects.

Carrying taſte to a finical nicety in any one branch, is a thing not only undeſirable, but contemptible; the reaſon of which may be eaſily ſeen: when a perſon applies his attention ſo much to a matter of no great moment, it occaſions a neceſſary neglect of other things of much greater value. After you paſs a certain point, attachment to a particular purſuit is uſeleſs, and then it proceeds to be hurtful, and at laſt contemptible.

END OF VOLUME II.

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 01094 5873

DATE DUE

JUN 13 1994

GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A.